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This dissertation develops and evaluates a Design theory. We follow the design 
science approach (Hevener, et al., 2004) to answer the following research question: 
“How can we formulate a design theory to guide the analysis and design of Secure 
Semantic eBusiness processes (SSeBP)?” Goals of SSeBP design theory include (i) 
unambiguously represent information and knowledge resources involved in eBusiness 
processes to solve semantic conflicts and integrate heterogeneous information systems; 
(ii) analyze and model business processes that include access control mechanisms to 
prevent unauthorized access to resources; and (iii) facilitate the coordination of eBusiness 
process activities-resources by modeling their dependencies.  
Business processes modeling techniques such as Business Process Modeling 
Notation (BPMN) (BPMI, 2004) and UML Activity Diagrams (OMG, 2003) lack 
theoretical foundations and are difficult to verify for correctness and completeness 
(Soffer and Wand, 2007). Current literature on secure information systems design 
methods are theoretically underdeveloped and consider security as a non-functional 
requirement and as an afterthought (Siponen et al. 2006, Mouratidis et al., 2005).  
SSeBP design theory is one of the first attempts at providing theoretically 
grounded guidance to design richer secure eBusiness processes for secure and 
coordinated seamless knowledge exchange among business partners in a value chain. 
SSeBP design theory allows for the inclusion of non-repudiation mechanisms into the 
analysis and design of eBusiness processes which lays the foundations for auditing and 
compliance with regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley.  
SSeBP design theory is evaluated through a rigorous multi-method evaluation 
approach including descriptive, observational, and experimental evaluation. First, SSeBP 
design theory is validated by modeling business processes of an industry standard named 
Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR) approach. Our model 
enhances CPFR by incorporating security requirements in the process model, which is 
critically lacking in the current CPFR technical guidelines. Secondly, we model the 
demand forecasting and capacity planning business processes for two large organizations 
to evaluate the efficacy and utility of SSeBP design theory to capture the realistic 
requirements and complex nuances of real inter-organizational business processes. 
Finally, we empirically evaluate SSeBP, against enhanced Use Cases (Siponen et al., 
2006) and UML activity diagrams, for informational equivalence (Larkin and Simon, 
1987) and its utility in generating situational awareness (Endsley, 1995) of the security 
and coordination requirements of a business process.  
Specific contributions of this dissertation are to develop a design theory (SSeBP) 
that presents a novel and holistic approach that contributes to the IS knowledge base by 
filling an existing research gap in the area of design of information systems to support 
secure and coordinated business processes. The proposed design theory provides 
practitioners with the meta-design and the design process, including the system 
components and principles to guide the analysis and design of secure eBusiness processes 
that are secure and coordinated. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
In this global economy, the unit of competition is no longer a single organization 
but a network of collaborating organizations that have the common business goal of 
creating valuable customer propositions. Inter-organizational business processes allow 
collaborating organizations to provide complementary services through networks of 
collaborating organizations (Sawhney and Parikh, 2001; Dyer, 2000). Organizations 
engaged in collaborative inter-organizational business processes need to share 
information and knowledge to increase their partners’ knowledge base and 
competitiveness (Raghu and Vinze, 2007; Tallman et al., 2004; Loebecke et al., 1999; 
Lorange, 1996). In this context, the resource-based view of the firm with focused 
capabilities is replaced by a network of organizations with a focal enterprise that 
coordinates resources of collaborating organizations to execute eBusiness processes 
(Sawhney and Parikh, 2001). Organizations require that their business processes can 
exchange information and knowledge resources in a secure and coordinated manner 
within and across partner organizations. 
As organizations become increasingly distributed, their reliance on inter-
organizational information flows with partner organizations is integral to any eBusiness 
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processes. Cooperative inter-organizational knowledge sharing can increase partners’ 
knowledge base and competitiveness. This view is consistent with the knowledge-based
view of the firm (Grant, 1996). For this research, the view that information and 
knowledge sharing occurs in a Business Process context is adopted (Raghu and Vinze, 
2007; Singh and Salam, 2006). 
 
1.1. Research Problem and Its Importance 
In establishing an agenda for IT research in heterogeneous and distributed 
environments, March et al. (2000) recognize the complexity involved in sharing 
knowledge in business organizations. Organizations engaged in collaborative inter-
organizational processes continue to deal with several issues related to the seamless flow 
of information and knowledge resources in an eBusiness Process. For instance, 
fragmented and heterogeneous IT infrastructures negatively affect the information flows 
and activity coordination among business partners (Rai et al., 2006; Barua et al. 2004; 
Sambamurthy et al. 2003). Interoperability problems arise from the lack of standards to 
describe products and services, business processes, and security policies that guide access 
to information and knowledge resources. These create difficulty in integrating 
heterogeneous systems within and across organizations. The lack of interoperability 
standards and supporting technologies make collaborating organizations expend 
considerable resources to avoid interoperability problems. A 2004 NIST study estimated 
annual interoperability costs for all business data flows among companies in the 
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transportation, electronic, and construction/building management supply chains to be $5 
billion, $3.9 billion, and $15.8 billion, respectively. These frequently lead to inter-
organizational processes to be performed outside the systems. Semantic interoperability 
is one of the most important research issues in the context of heterogeneous and 
distributed systems and still represents technical challenges that prevent collaborative 
organizations from sharing knowledge.   
Likewise, it has been recognized that information security and systems integration 
are among the key issues for IT executives (Luftman et al., 2006). Semantic 
interoperability problems frequently lead to inter-organizational information and 
knowledge exchange being done manually and outside the systems for both routine 
processes and problem resolution (van der Aalst and Kumar, 2003). Without the 
appropriate security controls for these manual interventions, they lead to unauthorized 
access of resources. The 2006 CSI/FBI Computer Crime and Security Survey identifies 
that authorization violations are the second largest cause of economic losses (Gordon et 
al., 2006). The lack of appropriate access control mechanisms on the information and 
knowledge exchange among business activities leaves organizations vulnerable to various 
information assurance threats and prevents them from engaging in collaborative 
eBusiness processes. Unfortunately, those issues still remain open and prevent 
organizations from realizing the benefits of seamless flow of information and knowledge 
resources in an eBusiness process. 
Coordinating complex inter-organizational processes requires knowledge-driven 
coordination structures to determine knowledge sources and decision authority (Anand 
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and Mendelson, 1997). Similarly, a central issue in inter-organizational knowledge 
sharing is the nature of the knowledge exchange, including what knowledge is to be 
shared and under what conditions (Loebecke et al., 1999). Given the risks associated with 
knowledge sharing, it can only take place in a secure environment. Research on security 
of distributed business processes lacks an integrative business process perspective on 
secure information and knowledge sharing (Oh and Park, 2003). Local security policies 
are not designed for distributed resource sharing. Global policies do not consider 
impediments to local access control of resources (Sandhu et al., 1996). Centralized 
mechanisms fail to capture the distributed nature of systems support required for inter-
organizational business processes. Extant literature does not explicitly consider or 
systematically represent component knowledge of resources such as descriptions of 
product knowledge and skills; process knowledge including process workflow models 
and coordination structures; and security knowledge of authorized access for activities to 
resources within and across organizations. A holistic consideration of component, process 
and security knowledge in the design of information systems to support secure and 
coordinated business processes is critical to inter-organizational eBusiness processes.  
Software engineering methodologies conceptualize security requirements as non-
functional requirements (Mouratidis et al., 2005). They do not fully integrate security in 
all systems development phases (Lee et al., 2002; Apvrille and Pourzandi, 2005). This 
creates a gap between systems development and security of systems (van Wyk and 
McGraw, 2005). Systems development methodologies incorporate security requirements 
as an afterthought at the implementation stage, resulting in a less secure system 
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(Choobinedh et al., 2007). Information systems methodology that includes security 
aspects in all stages is still needed (Baskerville, 1988). Siponen et al. (2006) argue that 
existing secure information systems design methods fail to satisfy secure systems design 
requirements and proposed a design theory for secure information systems (SIS) design 
methods. They identify a meta-notation to incorporate security policies and restrictions to 
enhance use-case descriptions. There is a need for theoretical grounded IS security 
methods and tools (Choobinedh et al., 2007). Soffer and Wand (2007) state that existing 
process modeling techniques are driven by practice and lack of theoretical principles, 
which impede the verification of the ”correctness” of process models. Soffer and Wand 
(2007) propose a goal-driven multi-process analysis approach that is based on the 
Generic Process Model (GPM) to design and analyze processes; however, their approach 
fails to incorporate eBusiness processes security requirements and component knowledge 
into the eBusiness process analysis and modeling.  Existing methods in the design of 
secure information systems lack a conceptualization of secure business process. 
 
1.2. Research Question 
Design science is a problem-solving paradigm that enhances understanding of a 
problem domain by developing purposeful design artifacts that address important and 
relevant organizational problems (Hevner, et al., 2004).  Design theories are normative 
theories that provide guidance to practitioners to effectively develop new systems and 
inform researchers by suggesting testable research hypotheses (Markus et al., 2002). 
Design theories must be based on kernel theories and must be evaluated to demonstrate 
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their quality and utility to solve relevant problems in the problem domain (Walls et al. 
1992; Hevner et al. 2004). Current literature on secure information systems design 
methods is theoretically underdeveloped (Choobinedh et al., 2007) and does not meet the 
goals of a secure information systems design method (Siponen et al. 2006). Moreover, 
business processes modeling techniques such as Business Process Modeling Notation 
(BPMN) (BPMI, 2004), Event-Driven Process Chains Diagrams (EPC) (Scheer, 1999) 
and the UML Activity Diagrams (OMG, 2003) lack of theoretical foundations; as a 
result, the verification of the resultant business processes is difficult to attained (Soffer 
and Wand, 2007).  
This dissertation develops and evaluates a Design theory. Specifically, we follow 
a design science approach to answer the following research question: How can we 
formulate a design theory to guide the analysis and design of Secure Semantic eBusiness 
processes? The proposed Secure Semantic eBusiness Processes (SSeBP) design theory 
provides design principles, including modeling concepts and grammar, for the design and 
development of secure eBusiness processes. The goals of SSeBP design theory are to 
unambiguously represent information and knowledge resources involved in eBusiness 
processes to solve semantic conflicts and to integrate heterogeneous information systems; 
to enable the analysis and modeling of access control mechanisms to prevent 
unauthorized access to resources; and, to facilitate the coordination of eBusiness process 
activities-resources by modeling their dependencies. The design theory proposed in this 
dissertation is the first attempt in providing theoretically grounded guidance to design 
richer secure eBusiness processes for secure seamless knowledge exchange among 
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business partners of a value chain. SSeBP design theory is well grounded in kernel 
theories and is evaluated using a rigorous approach. 
 
1.3. Research Evaluation 
The proposed Secure Semantic eBusiness Processes (SSeBP) design theory is 
evaluated through a multi-method evaluation approach that includes descriptive, 
observational, and experimental evaluation. First, principles and knowledge 
representation mechanisms of SSeBP design theory are applied to critical business 
processes of an industry standard named Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and 
Replenishment (CPFR). SSeBP design method is used to analyze CPFR business 
processes and to show how CPFR models can be mapped and enhanced by the 
application of the SSeBP design theory. Second, SSeBP design theory is applied to a case 
study to illustrate the applicability of SSeBP design theory to map real core business 
processes of an organization to resolve semantic conflicts and enable the exchange of 
component, process and security knowledge. Finally, using situational awareness theory 
(Endsley, 1995) SSeBP artifacts are empirically evaluated against the Enriched-Use Case 
(Siponen et al., 2006) and standard UML activity diagram. A detailed experimental 
design and hypotheses that demonstrates the utility of SSeBP is described.  Hypotheses 
that establish informational equivalence (Larkin and Simon, 1987) and measure the level 
of security awareness generated by the SSeBP design theory are formulated and tested. 
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1.4. Research Contributions 
Specific contributions of this dissertation are to develop a design theory (SSeBP) 
that presents a novel and holistic approach that contributes to the IS knowledge base by 
filling an existing research gap in the area of design of information systems to support 
secure and coordinated business processes. SSeBP provides practitioners with the 
modeling concepts and grammar and with the design process, including the system 
components and principles to guide the crafting of secure eBusiness processes that are 
semantically rich, highly coordinated and seamlessly integrated. SSeBP design theory 
presents an integrative approach that contributes to the IS knowledge base by filling an 
existing research gap in the area of design of information systems to support secure and 
coordinated business processes. We demonstrate how SSeBP utilizes emerging 
technologies to solve semantic conflict issues, to prevent unauthorized access to 
resources, to foster knowledge exchange, and to integrate heterogeneous systems.  
Organizations will benefit from SSeBP in several ways. SSeBP design process 
provides organizations a set of principles and procedures to analyze and design secure 
eBusiness process. These facilitate the management of analysis and development 
activities and will result in more secure eBusiness processes. SSeBP allows management 
to analyze and define the relationships between organizational roles and the activities that 
they perform. This leads to assurance of segregation of duty in the context of eBusiness 
processes. SSeBP enables information and knowledge resources to be represented in a 
standard and unambiguous machine readable format. Common ontologies provide the 
foundation for semantic conflict resolution and seamless flow of information and 
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knowledge among heterogeneous systems involved in an eBusiness process.  In SSeBP, 
roles specify organizational functions responsible for specific activities. This allows for 
the inclusion of non-repudiation mechanisms into the analysis and design of eBusiness 
processes. Non-repudiation mechanisms lay the foundations for auditing, which is needed 
for compliance with regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley and HIPAA.  
 
1.5. Dissertation Organization 
The dissertation is organized following design science research guidelines 
(Hevner et al., 2004; Walls et al., 1992). Chapter two presents the theoretical foundations 
including the description of the research method, and the kernel theories from the 
problem domain and the IS application domain. In Chapter three, the SSeBP design 
theory is developed, including the conceptual SSeBP meta-requirements; the SSeBP 
meta-design; and the SSeBP design method. Chapter four presents the evaluation design 
for assessing the utility of the proposed design theory. Finally, chapter five summarizes 
the main aspect of the SSeBP design theory, and presents the theoretical and practical 
implications, limitations of the study, and directions for future research.  
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CHAPTER II 
 
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS  
 
 
 
This chapter presents the design science paradigm based on the perspectives of 
Walls et al. (1992), Hevner et al. (2004), March and Smith (1995) and Vaishnavi et al. 
(2006). It also establishes the SSeBP design theory’s  kernel theories from the application 
domain and for the IS Knowledge Domain. 
2.1. Design Science Paradigm 
The design science paradigm has its roots in the engineering and the sciences of 
the artificial (Simon, 1996). Design science research addresses classes of problems that 
solve relevant and unsolved problems, or solve problems in a more effective and efficient 
manner.  In other words, design science is a fundamentally problem-solving paradigm 
(Hevner et al., 2004). Design theory is a prescriptive theory that integrates normative and 
descriptive theories into design paths to produce the artifact (Walls et al., 1992). A design 
theory includes the design product or artifact and design process to produce it (Walls et 
al., 1992).  Figure 1 describes the components of a design theory. 
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Figure 1. Components of a Design Theory (Adapted from Walls et al., 1992; Khatri et 
al., 2006; and Vaishnavi et al., 2006) 
 
 
 
Walls et al. (1992, p. 42) state that “design” is both a noun and a verb and 
therefore design is both a product and a process. Design as a product can be defined as “a 
plan of something to be done or produced”. In the context of IS design science research 
that product is the IT artifact. Design as a process can be defined as “to so plan and 
proportion the parts of a machine or structure that all requirements will be satisfied”. In 
other word the process is the method used to produce the IT artifact in a way that the 
meta-requirements are satisfied. 
Hevner et al., (2004) note the similarity between a design artifact and IS Design 
Theory (Walls et al., 1992). The meta-design describes a class of artifacts and a set of 
systems principles to select systems features that meet meta-requirements (Markus et al., 
2002). Kernel theories from the application domain are applied, modified and/or 
extended (Hevner et al. 2004) to develop the theoretical basis for the meta-requirements 
and meta-design. Markus et al. (2002) refer to design process as principles that guide 
artifact development.  
Kernel Theories
Theories for the Application Domain 
Theories for the IS Knowledge Domain
Meta-
Requirements
Meta-
Design
Design
Method
Evaluation
Design
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Gregor (2006) identifies the nature of theory in IS research and develops a 
taxonomy for classifying IS theories. Based on the goals of the theories (i.e.: analysis and 
description, explanation, prediction, and prescription), Gregor classifies IS theories into 
five types of theories namely theory for analyzing, theory for explaining, theory for 
predicting, theory for explaining and predicting, and theory for design and action. In 
particular, we are interested in the characteristics of theory for design and action since in 
this research we attempt to develop a design theory for Secure Semantic eBusiness 
processes. According to Gregor, design and action theories provide explicit prescriptions 
(e.g.: methods, techniques, principles of form and function) for constructing an artifact. 
We refer the interested reader to Gregor (2006) for a detail description of each theory 
type. A design theory can be understood as solutions for specialized classes of IS 
problems (Markus et al., 2002; Walls et al., 1992). These solutions are constructed 
artifacts that address “wicked problems” (Hevner et al., 2004). In order to consider a 
design theory to be complete, it has to exhibit the following set of characteristics (Walls 
et al, 1992): 
1) Design theories must deal with goals as contingencies  
2) A design theory can never involve pure explanation or prediction 
3) Design theories are prescriptive 
4) Design theories are composite theories which encompass kernel theories from 
natural science, social science and mathematics 
5) While explanatory theories tell "what is", predictive theories tell "what will be", 
and normative theories tell "what should be", design theories tell "how 
to/because" 
6) Design theories show how explanatory, predictive, or normative theories can be 
put to practical use. 
7) Design theories are theories of procedural rationality (Simon 1981) 
 
13 
 
Hevner et al. (2004) propose a conceptual framework for understanding, 
executing, and evaluating IS research combining behavioral-science and design-science 
paradigms. The framework involves the following components:  
i) Environment: it defines the scope of the problem domain. It includes 
organizations, technology, and people. 
ii) IS Research: it is conducted by applying behavioral science, through the use 
of theories that explain or justify the business problem, and design science to 
address the building and evaluation of artifacts designed to meet the identified 
business need. 
iii)  Knowledge Base: it encompasses all the theoretical foundations, including 
the research methodologies and the kernel theories. 
 
Basically, Hevner et al. (2004) propose a research cycle that involves the 
identification of a relevant business problem that is solved by designing an IT artifact, 
which is evaluated using the appropriate methods and context; so that new addition to the 
IS knowledge base and environment can be done. Now, we apply Hevner et al. (2004) 
framework for information system research to show (figure 2) how our research is both 
relevant and rigorous and contribute to the IS knowledge base by solving an important 
kind of business problem. 
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Figure 2. Summary of Relevance// Rigor of this Research (Adapted from Hevner et al. 
2004) 
 
 
 
Benbasat and Zmud (2003) suggest that the IT artifact and its immediate 
nomological network should be the core of IS research. Hevner et al. (2004) highlights 
that the main contribution of design science research is the IT artifact per se. Several 
controversial IT artifact definitions exist in the literature. We refer the interested reader to 
Alter (2006) for a compendium of IT artifact definitions. Recently, Baskerville et al. 
(2007) state that the IT artifact is the instantiation of a design theory. In a more broadly 
sense, Hevner et al. (2004, pp. 77) define an IT artifact as “constructs (vocabulary and 
symbols), models (abstraction and representations), methods (algorithms and practices), 
and instantiations (implemented and prototype systems)”. In this research, we adopt the 
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Hevner et al. (2004) IT artifact definition and argue that a design theory must provide 
constructs, models, or methods that guide the design and instantiation of novel IT 
artifacts.  As a sidebar, Baskerville et al. (2007) emphasize the importance that design 
theories represent for the IS field, and as many other IS researchers (e.g.: Hevner et al., 
2004; Gregor, 2006; Benbasat and Zmud, 2003), they argue that design science research 
is receiving a lot of attention because it is conceived as one of the way to address the 
issues related to “the small degree of utilization [of IS research by the practitioner 
community] and relevance of IS research”. 
In this research, the perspectives of Walls et al. (1992), Hevner et al. (2004), 
March and Smith (1995) and Vaishnavi et al. (2006) are integrated in developing a design 
theory for Secure Semantic eBusiness Process (SSeBP) needed to guide the design and 
analysis of secure eBusiness processes. The following sections present the theoretical 
foundations from the kernel theories for the application domain and for the IS Knowledge 
Domain. 
 
2.2. Kernel Theories 
It has been recognized that knowledge resources must be shared to be useful and 
applicable (Raghu and Vinze, 2007). When knowledge is exchanged in a systematically 
way, it might increase collaborating partners’ knowledge base and their competitiveness 
(Loebecke et al. 1999). The knowledge-based view of the firm (Grant, 1996) considers 
knowledge as a strategic resource.  Integrating information and knowledge resources 
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across a value chain requires secure access to preserve local security access control 
(SAC) requirements and autonomy. Activities of organizations are inter-connected and 
require multiple constraints for appropriate access control to information resources (Oh 
and Park, 2003). Current inter-organizational integration models suffer from a lack of 
knowledge sharing in a secure coordinated manner (Singh et al., 2005). In the proposed 
design theory for Secure Semantic eBusiness Processes (SSeBP), the central unit of 
analysis is the eBusiness processes, which span within and across organizations. SSeBP 
considers information and knowledge as the primary resources pertinent to the problem 
domain. SSeBP incorporates coordination of component knowledge, process knowledge 
and security knowledge for integrated inter-organizational eBusiness processes. Security 
is an integral part of the value activities of a business enterprise; in SSeBP, security 
access control (SAC) policies determine an activity’s access to resources. 
 
2.2.1. Kernel Theories for the Application Domain  
Kernel theories from the application domain organize and structure constructs in 
the application domain, while kernel theories of IS Domain provides the representations 
and techniques that form the basis for artifact development. IS problem solving applies 
the IS domain knowledge and concepts to the theories of the application domain and 
advances knowledge in both domains (Khatri et al., 2006). Theories for the application 
domain relates to what Hevner et al. (2004) call the “environment”. These provide the 
“why” and the “what” for the development of SSeBP design theory. In this dissertation, 
the theories for the application domain include the Resource Based View (RBV) of the 
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firm, business process and inter-organizational workflows, coordination theory, access 
control, and situational awareness theory.  
 
2.2.1.1. Resource Based View of the Firm 
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm provides a useful framework to 
identify resources that provide firms with competitive advantages. The resource-based 
view of the firm is based on two fundamental assumptions: 1) strategic resources owned 
by firms are heterogeneous within an industry or group (resource heterogeneity); and 2) 
such resources may not be perfectly mobile across firms, so that heterogeneity can be 
long lasting. These two assumptions are used to explain sources of sustained competitive 
advantage (Barney, 1991). Barney (1991) states that firm’s resources can be sources of 
potential competitive advantages, if they possess the following four attributes: 1) the 
resources must be valuable; 2) they must be rare among a firm’s current and potential 
competition; 3) they must be imperfectly imitable, and 4) they must be non-substitutable. 
The logic behind the RBV of the firm is that if a firm has a resource that is owned by 
several other competing firms that resource cannot be a source of competitive advantage. 
On the other hand, if a firm owns a rare and immobile resource, in the sense that firms 
without such resource incur in a cost disadvantage when they try to obtain, develop, and 
use it, in comparison with the firm that already has the resource, then we can say that the 
firm that possesses that resource can have a sustained competitive advantage (Mata et al. 
1995). While the RBV of the firm considered the individual firm as unit of competition, 
in this research we focus on the value chain, where a focal firm is embedded in a network 
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of collaborating firms that have the common business goal of creating valuable customer 
propositions. This view is consistent with Porter’s framework (1985) of value activities 
and value chain and it is consistent with Sawhney and Parikh’s view (2001) of inter-
organizational processes that allow collaborating organizations to provide complementary 
services through networks of collaborating organizations. Daft (1983) states that “firm 
resources include all assets, capabilities, organizational processes, firm attributes, 
information, knowledge, etc. controlled by a firm that enable the firm to conceive and 
implement strategies that improve its efficiency and effectiveness”. In this research, we 
are interesting in knowledge resources and we recognize knowledge as a vital resource 
that must be shared in a secure and systematically way with partner organizations of a 
value chain. This view is consistent with the knowledge-based view of the firm (Grant, 
1996), which considers knowledge as a strategic resource. 
It has been recognized that knowledge resources must be shared to be useful and 
applicable (Raghu and Vinze, 2007). Knowledge exchange can increase collaborating 
partners’ knowledge base and their competitiveness (Loebecke et al. 1999; Lorange, 
1996). Hult et al. (2004) identify that knowledge development and exchange could 
positively impact supply chain performance. Simonin (1999) studies knowledge transfer 
in strategic alliances and its impacts on collaborative outcomes and explains that 
knowledge ambiguity negatively affects knowledge transfer. Hamel (1991) identifies that 
knowledge format is directly related to ease of transfer. Tallman et al. (2004) show that 
knowledge transferability directly affects firm’s performance.  Likewise, firms can obtain 
significant and sustainable improvements in their performance by developing supply 
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chain process integration capabilities (Rai et al., 2006). It is clear that extant literature 
recognizes that knowledge exchange and supply chain integration affect firms overall 
performance and their competitiveness.  However, there is a lack of research in the areas 
of how knowledge exchange can be done in a systematic way and the kind of knowledge 
that can be shared in the context of an information supply chain. In this context, it is 
important to understand the nature of the knowledge and how inter-organizational 
information systems exchange knowledge. 
Tallman et al. (2004) examine the role of knowledge exchange for competitive 
advantage of a cluster of organizations and note that simpler, codified and less tacit 
component knowledge is amenable to knowledge exchange. Raghu and Vinze (2005) 
highlight that knowledge sharing, when knowledge is not systematically stored, requires 
of special communication and collaborative mechanisms. Although knowledge exchange 
is central for inter-organizational collaboration, we recognize that all knowledge cannot 
be explicated and be effectively represented and reasoned with using decidable and 
complete computational techniques. This research uses an explicit definition of 
knowledge declarative enough for standards-based knowledge representation languages 
and can be processed using agent-based reasoning mechanisms to reach useful inferences. 
These pragmatic restrictions on knowledge are made for practical reasons to build 
effective and practical knowledge-based systems that are both viable and useful. We 
focus on Component knowledge, including descriptions of skills, technologies, tangible 
resources, consumer and product knowledge; and Process knowledge, typically 
embedded in the process models of workflow management systems as coordination 
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knowledge for complex processes. An inter-organizational eBusiness process view of 
knowledge integration incorporates management of component knowledge and process 
knowledge for knowledge integration across inter-organizational systems. 
While cooperative inter-organizational knowledge sharing can increase business 
partners’ competitiveness, organizations are very selective about the nature of knowledge 
resources shared. When knowledge resources are a primary concern, managing 
cooperative relationships is frequently a process of managing knowledge flows 
(Badaracco, 1991). Central to inter-organizational knowledge management (KM) is the 
nature of the knowledge exchange, what knowledge is to be shared and under what 
conditions (Loebecke et al., 1999). In this context, SSeBP design theory must consider 
the nature of the knowledge exchange needed for collaborating organizations to achieve 
inter-organizational eBusiness processes objectives. In particular, the SSeBP design 
theory must focus on methods for knowledge representation and exchange mechanisms 
that allow for its appropriate exchange and use in the inter-organizational eBusiness 
process context. In addition, the SSeBP design theory must support transparent exchange 
of machine-interpretable and unambiguous knowledge required to develop viable 
inter-organizational eBusiness relationships. This allows for knowledge to be interpreted 
by software and shared using automated reasoning mechanisms to reach useful 
inferences.  
The resource-based view (RBV) of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984) and the 
knowledge based theory (Grant, 1996) provide a useful framework to identify resources 
that provide firms competitive advantage. While RBV considers the individual firm as 
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unit of competition, in this research we focus on business processes in a value chain, 
where a focal firm is embedded in a network of collaborating firms that have the common 
business goal of creating valuable customer propositions.  
In summary, in this dissertation, we complement the RBV of the firm (Barney, 
1991), Porter’s framework (1985) of value chain, the knowledge-based view of the firm 
(Grant, 1996), and inter-organizational value chain view (Sawhney and Parikh, 2001) to 
understand the nature of knowledge exchange in an eBusiness process. 
 
2.2.1.2. Business Process and Inter-organizational Workflow  
In this research, we take the view that an eBusiness process is a set of coordinated 
activities enacted by humans or software agents that exchange knowledge resources to 
achieve business objectives. This is consistent with extant literature. Davenport and Short 
(1990, p.12) define business process as “logically related task performed to achieve a 
define business outcome”. Swaminathan and Tayurs (2003, p. 1380) state that eBusiness 
process is “a business process that uses the Internet or other electronic medium as a 
channel to complete business transactions”.  eBusiness is an approach to achieving 
business goals where information and knowledge exchange technology enable business 
activities in and across organizations and support decision making underlying these 
activities (Holsapple and Singh 2000). In addition, according to agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976), an agent represents an entity’s interests and fulfills responsibilities 
on its behalf. Therefore, it is essential for an SSeBP design theory to recognize that 
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eBusiness Processes are the context where relevant information and knowledge exchange 
occurs so that business goal can be attained and that business enterprises, human actors 
(agents) or software agents are responsible carry out the various activities to achieve such 
organizational and system goals.  
As organizations become increasingly distributed, their reliance on 
inter-organizational information and knowledge flows with partner organizations is 
integral to eBusiness processes.  Here workflows establish the logical order of execution 
between individual business activities in business processes within and across 
organizations. Inter-organizational workflow generally involves communications among 
business partners whose information systems are different. In addition, such 
communications are made difficult due to two facts. First, there is not a single way to 
represent the information and knowledge to be exchange. Second,  partner’s process 
information and knowledge are hidden from each other (van der Aalst  and Kumar. 
2003). Basu and Kumar (2002) identify that when mapping or translation of data and 
process information is required, mechanisms that ensure the semantic integrity of the 
information and rules for mapping it correctly are mandatory. Process knowledge 
represents a business process in a form that consists of a network of activities and their 
relationships, criteria to indicate the start and the termination of the process, and 
information about the individual activities, including participants and data, and their 
coordination (WfMC, 1996).  In this context, SSeBP must rely on Process knowledge to 
orchestrate and integrate disparate business activities within and across organizations. 
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Nowadays, businesses are moving from EDI to Web-based approaches.  In fact, 
many firms have adopted eBusiness model to improve their collaborative capabilities 
(Segars and Chatterjee, 2003).  The reason of such movement is that EDI supports dyadic 
relationship while web-based approaches enable many-to-many relationships (Wafa et 
al., 2005). In addition, while organizations can obtain long-term cost saving from EDI, 
EDI does not provide a strategic advantage (Benjamin et al., 1990). Finally, even though 
EDI enables the exchange of transactional data among trading partners, EDI does not 
allow the exchange of detailed process-level information (van der Aalst and Kumar 
2003). Here an SSeBP must provide means to seamlessly represent and exchange Process 
Knowledge among trading partners. Although technology such as eXtensive Markup 
Language (XML) has emerges as the main mechanism to exchange data electronically 
among trading partners, most workflow-management systems use proprietary formats 
which prevents exchange of workflow instances between systems of different vendors.  
In addition, emerging XML standards such the XML Common Business Library (xCBL) 
by CommerceOne, the Partner Interface Process (PIP) blueprints by RosettaNet, the 
Universal Description, Discovery and Integration (UDDI), the Electronic Business XML 
(ebXML) and other initiatives address only the exchange of data among business partners 
but do not take into account the control flow among them (van der Aalst and Kumar, 
2003). Moreover, there is a lack of a unifying model for workflow modeling (Basu and 
Kumar, 2002). van der Aalst and Kumar (2003) develop a language called eXchangeable 
Routing Language (XRL), which is based on XML and allows trading partners to 
describe workflow process schemas to enable flexible documents routing.  Here, it is vital 
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for an SSeBP to enable the exchange of not only data but also information and 
knowledge resources, including Component and Process Knowledge, among trading 
partners, while flexible control flow mechanisms are provided. 
The notion of coordination is embedded in the ideas of workflow and automated 
workflow management systems since they essentially deal with issues of task-task and 
task-resource dependencies and their coordination (Kishore et al., 2004). In other words, 
workflow is a coordinated set of business activities performed by various actors or agents 
necessary to complete a business process. Coordination requirements need to be met, 
while activities are executed to achieve a business process. Here, workflows are 
subsumed in Process Knowledge through the coordination relationships between the 
dependent businesses activities in an eBusiness process. In this dissertation, we posit that 
inter-organizational workflow and eBusiness processes provide an integrative and holistic 
framework to integrate and coordinate knowledge resources. 
 
2.2.1.3. Coordination Theory 
Business processes comprise activities and require coordination mechanisms to 
manage their dependencies (Malone et al. , 1987). Effective coordination of business 
activities by managing their inter-dependencies is critical for effective inter-
organizational eBusiness processes across the value-chain. Coordinating complex inter-
organizational eBusiness processes requires an integrated view of the complete eBusiness 
process and knowledge-driven coordination to determine decision authority over 
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distributed knowledge resources (Anand and Mendelson 1997).  In this context, for an 
SSeBP design theory to enable effective inter-organizational eBusiness processes, it must 
provide coordination mechanisms that effectively manage the dependencies that exist 
among activities and resources of an eBusiness processes. 
Malone et al., (2003), Malone et al.(1999), and  Malone and Crowston (1994) 
develop an interdisciplinary coordination theory drawing from various disciplines 
including computer science, organization theory, operations research, economics, 
linguistics, and psychology. They define coordination theory as a body of principles 
about how the activities of separate actors can be coordinated and they define 
coordination as managing dependencies among activities. Malone and Crowston (1994) 
explain that goals, activities, actors, and interdependencies are the main components of 
the coordination theory, where actors perform interdependent activities to achieve goals. 
Such actors face coordination problems derived from the dependencies that constrain 
how activities can be executed. Activities implement coordination methods to address 
coordination problems. Two key aspects of coordination theory are the processes of goal 
selection and goal decomposition. Here, a process of choosing a goal is followed by 
decomposing that goal into activities such that the selected goal can be attained (i.e.: top-
down goal decomposition) (Malone and Crowston, 1994).  
Malone et al., (2003) provide a taxonomy of dependencies among activities and 
resources. Dependencies among multiple resources and multiple activities are shown in 
Table 1 adapted from Malone et al. (2003). Here, Malone et al. (2003) defines resources 
as anything that can be used or affected by activities.  
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Dependency Type Description 
Flow Dependency 
A resource is the effect of one activity and a precondition of 
another, typical of producer/consumer dependence where a 
resource may either be produced by or consumed by a 
business activity. 
Fit Dependency 
Two activities result in a common resource, e.g., two or more 
parts must ‘fit’ to produce the end product; hence the notion 
of ‘fit’ dependency among activities and output resources. 
Sharing 
Dependency 
Two activities have the same resource as a precondition. 
Table 1. Dependencies among multiple resources and multiple activities  
 
 
 
Crowston and Osborn (2003) identify that dependencies among resources or 
among activities can exists. First, it is possible that a simultaneity dependency exists 
among tasks when “one task might require the concurrent execution of another task, or 
several tasks might have to be performed all at the same time”. Second, a composition 
dependency exists when “both tasks and resources can be thought of as forming 
decomposition hierarchies: higher-level tasks can be decomposed into subtasks and an 
object into components”. Third, an integration dependency exists when the integration of 
multiple tasks’ results is required to accomplish some effect.  
Coordination theory provides an approach to understand and study business 
processes. Crowston and Osborn (2003) show how coordination theory can be utilized to 
develop process descriptions and redesign. They develop a technique that involves six 
steps namely: setting process boundaries, collecting data, identifying actors and 
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resources, identifying activities, identifying dependencies, and verifying a model. 
Basically, actors, activities and resources are identified; and processes are decomposed 
into activities so that dependencies among activities and resources are identified and 
analyzed.  The SSeBP design theory uses the notion of activity-resource dependency 
where activities have a sharing, flow or fit dependency with a resource. This notion of the 
coordination constructs are based on Malone et al. (2003) and are similar to those in van 
der Aalst and Kumar (2003). SSeBP design theory utilizes these coordination constructs 
to develop the activity-resource coordination in the process knowledge representation of 
eBusiness processes using semantic technologies. 
Complexities of coordinating inter-organizational processes require knowledge-
driven coordination structures to determine decision authority and knowledge sources 
(Anand and Mendelson 1997).  Even though access control research is extensive, there is 
paucity in the research on information assurance of distributed eBusiness processes that 
provides a holistic, business process perspective (Oh and Park, 2003).  Centralized 
mechanisms for information assurance fail to capture the distributed nature of systems 
support required for inter-organizational eBusiness processes. An organization will lose 
its competitive advantage if it fails to protect its externalized knowledge (Lee et al., 
2005). In this regard, McGaughey (2002) correctly identifies the types of organizational 
interventions necessary that is “what” interventions are available but fails to point out the 
more important issue of “how” such interventions can be realistically achieved 
specifically for the codified knowledge and information resources in the context of the 
extended enterprise. Carpenter and Janson (2004) point the need for cooperating 
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organizations (that want to exchange information and knowledge resources) to be able to 
specify which of their users should be able to have what rights to access which of their 
resources under what circumstances.  
 
2.2.1.4. Access Control 
Sharing valuable information and knowledge resources entails the risks of 
possible unauthorized access and usage that may lead to foregone returns on information 
and knowledge assets. Research has identified that the most common security techniques 
and/or mechanisms used to  overcome information security issues are the following: 
authentication mechanisms, authorization, access control, data integrity and data 
confidentiality policies, integrity of transactions and communications, non-repudiation, 
end-to-end integrity and confidentiality of message, audit trial, and distributed 
enforcement of security policies. Here, communication security addresses confidentiality 
and integrity of the data transmitted as well as non-repudiation, while and access control 
addresses authentication, separation of duty (SOD), and delegation (Joshi et al 2001; Oh 
and Park 2003). The main objective of access control is, based on business rules, to grant 
or deny the access requested from a particular user. Access control requirements vary 
from one environment to another. In the enterprise environment, access control must 
maintain high degree of information sharing and strong confidentiality (Oh and Park, 
2003). Moreover, Basu and Kumar (2002) highlight that current workflow systems must 
incorporate the organizational structure by allowing the representation of rules and 
policies and ensure that security policies are not breached. In this context, the SSeBP 
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design theory must provide a basis to represent sophisticated access control and security 
requirements for eBusiness processes. Specifically, the SSeBP design theory must 
incorporate business rules embedded in security policies that govern the access to 
knowledge resources within in and across of the value chain in the context of eBusiness 
processes. 
Several access control models have been proposed to secure distributed 
applications.  Here we present the main characteristics of the main access control models 
namely: discretionary access control (DAC) model, the mandatory access control (MAC) 
model, the role-based access control (RBAC) model, and the task-role-based access 
control (T-RBAC). Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and mandatory access control 
(MAC) are the traditional access control models. DAC models use access authorization 
rules for each subject and object in the system. Even though DAC policies are very 
flexible and mostly used on Web-based application, they have some security flaws. 
Under DAC model, data from object can be copied to another object without having the 
right authorization; as a result, the security of the system is compromised. In the MAC 
model, predefined sensitivity levels are used to categorize each subject and object. An 
advantage of the MAC model is that it allows for controlling information flows; so that 
confidentiality and integrity of the information are guaranteed (Joshi et al., 2001). A 
drawback of MAC models is the lack of flexibility; therefore, they cannot be applied 
successfully where trading partners use different security policies and systems. 
Regarding the RBAC models, they classify the elements of the system into users, 
roles, permission, operations, and objects (system resources).  The primary benefit of 
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RBAC over previous security mechanisms such as mandatory access control and 
discretionary access control is the ability of RBAC to accommodate the changing roles of 
users. RBAC adds roles as a layer of abstraction to simplify the association between 
users/actors (agents) and permission. Access control policies that specify users’ 
permissions to specific system resources are defined through the relationships between 
users, roles and permissions. Sandhu et al. (1996) define a family of RBAC models that 
include role hierarchies and constraints that allow system administrators to assign users 
permissions to system resources using roles. Roles are organized and managed using role 
hierarchies that define the inheritance structure of roles. Role hierarchies for an 
organization commonly reflect the organizational structures and the hierarchy of 
responsibility in the organization. Constraints add pragmatic consideration and 
exceptions to the relationships role hierarchies and are a useful tool in implementing 
organizational policy for access to system resources (Park et. al, 2001). Because 
permissions to users are assigned through roles, the administration is made easier (Bhatti 
et al., 2004). Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) facilitates security administration by 
allowing organizations to centrally manage and control access to information and 
processing resources. It is important to mention that the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) adopted RBAC as a National Standard in 2004 
(csrc.nist.goc/rbac). Furthermore, the security literature is rich in the mechanisms and 
extensions of the RBAC (Sandhu, et. al., 1996). However, RBAC does not incorporate 
the content and context of the information workflow and does not separate task from role 
(Oh and Park 2003). Here, the SSeBP design theory must incorporate roles, permissions, 
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access, and security of resources: information and knowledge, from a dynamic eBusiness 
process perspective.   
The task-role-based access control (T-RBAC) model extents RBAC into an 
enterprise environment. Under T-RBAC users are related to permission (access right) 
through a role and task; permissions are assigned to tasks, and task are assigned to roles. 
Task is not a sub-role; in fact, four classes of tasks are defined: i) class private (P): the 
permissions for the tasks in the class P are non-inherited by the ancestor job positions or 
business roles. They are mainly dominated by passive control principles; ii) class 
supervision (S): the permissions for the tasks in the class S are inherited by the ancestor 
job positions or business roles. They are mainly dominated by passive control principles 
and are related to management or supervision. Neither Classes S nor P belong to a 
business process; iii) class workflow (W): the permissions for the tasks in the class W are 
non-inherited by the ancestor job positions or business roles. They are mainly dominated 
by active control principles and belong to a business process; and iv) class approval for 
activity (A): Class A exhibits characteristics of class S and class W. The permissions for 
the tasks in the class A are inherited by the ancestor job positions or business roles and 
are dominated by active control principles. Oh and Park (2003) discuss the characteristics 
of information sharing and access control in organizations: 
1. Information is characterized by information sharing. 
2. Information resources are accessed by many agents as they are produced and 
consumed in the activities of a process 
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3. Environmental changes, and consequent changes in activities necessitate dynamic 
management of access rights to information resources. This makes administration 
of access control challenging. 
4. Additionally, an organization may incur significant cost without appropriate and 
timely authorization for activities to access information artifacts. Authorized 
access to information resources is based on job position and assigned 
organizational roles since separation of duty is an important security principle.  
 
Based on the analysis of access control literature, an SSeBP must allow for the 
separation of duties (DOS) and incorporate agents, activities, permissions,  and resources 
(information and knowledge) in the context of a eBusiness process. In addition, it is 
imperative that an SSeBP enables the representation and enforcement of multiple 
constraints for granting the appropriate access to information and knowledge resources 
involved in an eBusiness process.  In other words, SSeBP must provide an integrative 
framework for component, process, and Security knowledge.  
 
2.2.1.5. Situational Awareness Theory 
Situational Awareness (SA) is the perception of the elements in the environment 
within a volume of time and space, the comprehension of their meaning and the 
projection of their status within the near future. Endsley (1995) defined three level of 
situational awareness (SA). The first level of SA is the ability to perceive the status, 
attributes and dynamics of relevant elements in the environment and forms a basis for 
decision making. The Second level of SA goes beyond awareness, into comprehension 
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and includes an understanding of the significance of elements for pertinent goals. A 
novice may achieve the same Level of SA as an expert, but fall short of also being able to 
integrate various data elements along with pertinent goals to comprehend the situation. At 
the highest level, SA includes the ability to project the future actions of the elements in 
the environment within temporal constraints of the problem domain forms. This is 
achieved through knowledge of the status and dynamics of the elements and 
comprehension of the situation, achieved through the first and second levels of SA.  
Conceptual modeling is the activity of formally describing aspects of the physical 
and social world around us for purposes of understanding and communication 
(Mylopoulos, 1992). In this dissertation, we apply SA theory to define and measure the 
levels of situational awareness of security policies and constraints generated by using the 
SSeBP conceptualization of a secure ebusiness process.  
Table 2 summarizes the kernel theories from the application domain and their 
application to SSeBP design theory. 
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Kernel 
Theory 
Description Application in SSeBP 
Resource-
Based View 
of the Firm; 
Impact of 
knowledge, 
and 
knowledge 
sharing, on 
competitive 
advantage 
(Wernerfelt,1
984; Dyer 
2000; 
Tallman et 
al., 2004; 
Loebecke et 
al., 1999) 
Knowledge is considered a 
source of competitive 
advantage. 
Organizations must 
manage explicit 
knowledge sharing 
mechanisms with partner 
organizations to enact 
business processes in the 
extended enterprise.  
Cooperation through 
knowledge sharing may 
increase each partner’s 
knowledge and therefore 
their competitiveness. 
Knowledge sharing may be governed 
by, and helps form, contractual 
relationships between partner 
organizations. 
Knowledge sharing in supply chains 
is recognized to enhance competitive 
advantage of the supply chain as a 
whole.  
Actors use Information and 
knowledge resources to make 
decisions and reach useful inferences 
in performing their activities and 
accomplish their goals. 
Knowledge 
based view of 
the firm 
(Grant, 1996)  
Knowledge is consider as a 
strategic resource 
 
Knowledge resources are vital 
resources that must be shared in a 
secure and systematically way with 
partner organizations of a value 
chain.  
 
Value Chain 
and networks 
of 
collaborating 
organizations 
(Porter, 1985; 
Sawhney and 
Parikh, 2001) 
 
Porter’s framework (1985) 
of value activities and 
value chain to generate 
valuable customer 
propositions. 
Inter-organizational 
processes that allow 
collaborating organizations 
to provide complementary 
services through networks 
of collaborating 
organizations. 
Value chain as unit of competition. 
A focal firm is embedded in a 
network of collaborating firms that 
have the common business goal of 
creating valuable customer 
propositions. 
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Kernel 
Theory 
Description Application in SSeBP 
Business 
Process and 
Interorganizat
ional 
Workflow  
(van der Aalst 
and Kumar, 
2003; WfMC, 
1996) 
 
A business process is “a 
sequence of activities with 
distinct inputs and outputs 
and serves a meaningful 
purpose in an organization 
or between organizations”. 
(WfMC, 1996) 
Workflows are a 
systematic representation 
of business process (van 
der Aalst and Kumar, 
2003) 
Business processes are deterministic, 
action-event sequences in workflow 
systems 
Activities and resources must be 
coordinated in order for an 
(extended) enterprise to enact 
business processes  
Coordination involves managing 
dependencies among activities. 
Process knowledge including 
coordination mechanisms and 
control structures manage business 
activities.  
Agency 
Theory 
(Jensen and 
Meckling, 
1976) 
An agent represents an 
entity’s interests and 
fulfills responsibilities on 
its behalf  
In a business enterprise, human 
actors (agents) or software agents 
carry out the various activities to 
achieve organizational/system goals.  
Coordination 
Theory 
(Malone et 
al., 2003; 
Kishore et al., 
2006; 
van der Aalst 
and Kumar, 
2003) 
 
Processes are decomposed 
into activities organized by 
generalization-
specialization hierarchies 
and require coordination 
mechanisms for their 
management.   
Coordination is the management of 
dependencies among activities.  
Activities have sharing, flow or fit 
dependency with resources.  
An activity either consumes or 
produces resources. An activity 
cannot produce or consume another 
activity.  
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Kernel 
Theory 
Description Application in SSeBP 
Access 
Control ( 
Role Based 
Access 
Control 
(RBAC))  
The National 
Institute of 
Standards and 
Technology 
(NIST), 2004; 
Oh and Park, 
2003,  
Sandhu et al., 
1996) 
Access control policies 
specify users’ permissions 
to specific system 
resources through 
relationships between 
users, roles and 
permissions.  
Permission to resources is 
based on user role.  
Roles specify 
organizational functions 
responsible for specific 
activities and provide 
repudiation and auditing. 
Roles abstract business activities 
needed to achieve business process 
goals.  
Roles are assigned to actors expected 
to perform the business activities.  
Security Knowledge, SAC policies, 
defines users’ permissions to 
resources. Roles are central to both 
eBusiness processes and RBAC for 
authorized resource access.  
Situational 
Awareness 
(SA) Theory 
(Endsley, 
1995) 
Situational Awareness 
(SA) theory provides a 
framework for measuring 
people level of perception, 
comprehension, and 
prediction of their 
environment. 
SSeBP leads to better security 
awareness about the security policies 
and constraints involved in an 
eBusiness process.  
 
Table 2.  Kernel Theories from the Application Domain extended and applied in SSeBP. 
 
 
 
2.2.2. Kernel Theories for the Information Systems Knowledge 
Domain 
Following Hevner et al. (2004) design science approach, we identify the kernel 
theories from the IS knowledge domain and derive the technical foundations for the 
SSeBP design theory. Theories for the IS domain relates to the “knowledge base” 
identified in Hevner et al. (2004). The SSeBP design theory requires of standardized 
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vocabulary and technologies to support transparent and secure exchange of machine-
interpretable and unambiguous knowledge to develop viable inter-organizational 
eBusiness processes. Information and knowledge transparency for concurrent coordinated 
responses from trading partners require ontological descriptions of knowledge domains 
(i.e.: component, process, and security knowledge) in the context of eBusiness processes.  
It has been recognized that candidates for applications of Semantic eBusiness 
include supply chain management and eMarketplaces (Sing et al., 2005).  Here, we apply 
the semantic web technologies in conjunction with the vision of Semantic eBusiness to 
develop the SSeBP design theory. Developments in semantic technologies make semantic 
web content unambiguously computer-interpretable and amenable to agent 
interoperability and automated reasoning techniques (McIlraith et. al., 2001). Ontology-
based representation of eBusiness processes lends specificity to representation of relevant 
knowledge domains. This allows for knowledge to be interpreted by software and shared 
using automated reasoning mechanisms to reach useful inferences. Built on Resource 
Description Framework (RDF) and Description Logics (DL), the Web Ontology 
Language (OWL) is a W3C standard for semantic knowledge representation. Semantic 
Web technologies provide semantic knowledge representation and exchange mechanisms 
for developing secure semantic eBusiness Processes. Next, we describe the semantic web 
technologies that form the technical foundations for the SSeBP design theory. These 
provide the “how” for the development of the SSeBP design theory. In this dissertation, 
the theories for the IS knowledge domain include semantic web, Semantic eBusiness, 
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Ontologies, Desciption Logic (DL), Intelligent Agents, Functional View of knowledge 
and secure information systems methods. 
 
2.2.2.1. Semantic Web 
The Semantic Web is an extension of the current Web in which information is 
given “well-defined meaning” to allow machines to “process and understand” the 
information presented to them (Berners-Lee et al., 2001). The Semantic Web vision 
comprises Ontologies for common semantics of representation and ways to interpret 
ontology; Knowledge Representation (KR) for structured collections of information and 
inference rules for automated reasoning in a single system; and Intelligent Agent to 
collect content from diverse sources and exchange data enriched with semantics 
(Berners-Lee et al., 2001). This vision provides the foundation for the SSeBP design 
theory proposed in this research. Semantic technologies incorporate knowledge 
representation and intelligent software agents to integrate heterogeneous systems across 
organizations. A recent and relevant application of semantic web in the context of 
eBusiness is the Semantic eBusiness Singh et al. 2005), which is described next.  
 
2.2.2.2. Semantic eBusiness  
Singh et al. (2005) define Semantic eBusiness as “ an approach to managing 
knowledge for coordination of eBusiness processes through the systematic application of 
Semantic Web Technologies”. Semantic eBusiness leverages Semantic Web technologies 
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and concepts to support the transparent flow of semantically enriched information and 
knowledge and enable collaborative eBusiness processes within and across organizational 
boundaries. In addition, Semantic Web aids intelligent agents to organize, store, retrieve, 
search, and match information and knowledge for effective collaboration among 
Semantic eBusiness participants.  
Semantic Web requires of trusted and secure environments. Semantic Web 
consists of three semantic layers namely: 
1. Semantic eBusiness layer, which includes semantic business process descriptions, 
semantic business rules, and business process reasoning; 
2. Semantic Web Technology layer, which includes semantic workflow descriptions, 
product ontologies, and semantic service description; and 
3. Information Technology layer, which includes Web Services architecture, 
network architecture, network communications, computational processes, and 
hardware resources. 
 
The Semantic eBusiness vision provides organizations the means to design 
collaborative and integrative, inter- and intra-organizational eBusiness processes, and 
systems founded upon the seamless exchange of knowledge among trusted business 
partners. Therefore, Semantic eBusiness lays the ground for developing secure semantic 
eBusiness processes. 
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2.2.2.3. Ontology 
SSeBP design theory requires knowledge to be represented in a way that can be 
interpreted by software and shared using automated reasoning mechanisms to reach 
useful inferences. Ontology-based representation of eBusiness processes lends specificity 
to representation of relevant knowledge domains and enables knowledge exchange.  
Even though the word ontology comes from Philosophy, where it means a 
“systematic explanation of being”, research about ontology has become a very pervasive 
phenomenon in the computer science field (Guarino, 1998; Sugumaran and Storey, 2002; 
Wand and Weber, 2002).  According to Guarino (1998), ontology has being studied in 
the field of knowledge engineering (Gruber, 1993; Gaines, 1997; Gómez-Pérez, 1997) 
knowledge representation (Guarino, 1995; Artale et al., 1996; Sowa, 1998), qualitative 
modeling (Gotts et al., 1996; Borgo et al., 1997; Casati and Varzi, 1997), language 
engineering (Lang, 1991; Bateman, 1995), database design (Burg, 1997; Van de Riet et 
al., 1998), information modeling (Ashenhurst, 1996; Weber, 1997), information 
integration (Wiederhold, 1996; Bergamaschi et al., 1998; Mena et al., 1998), information 
retrieval and extraction (Guarino, 1997; Benjamins and Fensel, 1998; McGuinness, 
1998), agent-based systems design, enterprise integration (Uschold et al., 1998; 
Gruninger and Fox, 1995), standardization of product knowledge (Boley and Guarino, 
1996; Barley et al. 1997; Guarino et al., 1997), electronic commerce (Lehmann, 1995),  
and geographic information systems (Casati et al., 1998). In general terms, ontologies 
provide a shared and common understanding of specific domains that can be 
communicated between disparate application systems, and therein provide a means to 
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integrate the knowledge used by online processes employed by organizations (Klein et 
al., 2001). Ontology describes the semantics of the constructs that are common to the 
online processes, including descriptions of the data semantics that are common 
descriptors of the domain context. Ontology documents can be created using standardized 
content languages like BPEL, RDF, OWL, and DAML to generate standardized 
representations of the process knowledge (Sivashanmugam et al., 2004; Thomas et al., 
2006). 
Ontologies are domain specific; therefore, to craft useful ontologies, it is 
important to identify the purposes of them. Noy and McGuinness (2002) identified the 
following as the major purposes of ontologies: 
1. Enable and shared understanding of structure of information among people and 
agents, 
2. Enable information reuse in applications, 
3. Make the assumptions underlying an IS implementation explicit and well-
understood, 
4. Specify the knowledge embodied in an ontology at an appropriate level of 
granularity (universe, bounded universe, domain, operational), and 
5. Apply the ontological structures at different stages of IS development: analysis, 
conceptualization, and design (Kishore et al., 2004). 
 
Jasper and Uschold (1999) identify that ontologies can be classified into: a) 
ontology for knowledge reuse; b) ontology as specification; c) ontology as a provider of 
common access of heterogeneous information; and d) ontology as a search mechanism. In 
this research, we develop ontologies for the SSeBP design theory that are aimed to 
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knowledge reuse, share, and representation and to provide a common vocabulary and 
secure way to integrate knowledge resources across inter-organizational eBusiness 
process. 
Selecting the language for the implementation of the ontology is one of the most 
crucial tasks in the ontology development process. Several ontology languages have been 
developed. In fact, at least 11 different languages can be identified from literature: KIF, 
Ontolingua, LOOM, OCML, FLogic, SHOE, XOL, RDF(S), OIL, DAML+OIL, and 
OWL (Gomez-Perez et al., 2004). The reader is referred to Gomez-Perez et al. (2004) for 
a comprehensive explanation of each ontology language. For this research, we select 
SHIQ Descriptions logics, which is equivalent to DAML+OIL, presented by Li and 
Horrocks (2004) to develop the SSeBP ontologies.  
 
2.2.2.4. Description Logic 
Description logics are logical formalisms for knowledge-representation (Li and 
Horrocks, 2004; Gomez-Perez et al., 2004). A description logic is divided into two parts: 
1) T-BOX, which contains intentional knowledge in the form of a terminology and is 
built through declarations that describe general properties of concepts; and 2) A-Box, 
which contains extensional knowledge, which is specified by the individual of the 
discourse domain (Baader et al., 2003; Gomez-Perez et al., 2004). Description Logics 
provide a formal linear syntax to express the description of top-level concepts in a 
problem domain, their relationships and the constraints on the concepts and the 
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relationships that are imposed by pragmatic considerations in the domain of interest. 
Description logics provide the language for building composite term descriptions from 
primitive concepts. The terms denote several sorts of things including primitive and 
derived concepts, similar to classes or templates for categorizing individual instances; 
and roles which are binary relationships between concepts.  In addition to the 
subsumption hierarchy of primitive and derived concepts, generalizations and 
specialization hierarchies of relationships can be described to express specialized 
relationships between derived concepts that are specializations of more general 
relationships between primitive concepts. The basic description logics language is the AL 
(Attributive Language) which provides a minimal set of concept descriptions including 
atomic concept, atomic concept negation (¬) , concept intersection (C n D), universal 
value restrictions (∀ R.C ), and limited existential value restriction (∃ R. C). We refer the 
interested reader to Baader et. al. (2003) for a full explanation of description logics 
notations, theoretical foundations and applications.  
It is important to highlight that the basic DL language does not fulfill the 
requirements of the present investigation because it is necessary to be able to reason with 
descriptions, which include, for example, cardinality restrictions on roles, and data types 
(integers, strings, etc.). The DL SHIQ is used, because it consists of the basic description 
logics language plus the negation of arbitrary concepts, (qualified) cardinality 
restrictions, role hierarchies, inverse roles, transitive roles, and data types (a restricted 
form of DL concrete domains). A detailed discussion of these and other DL constructors 
can be found in Baader et al. (2003).  In this study, we adopt the SHIQ Descriptions 
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logics presented by Li and Horrocks (2004). Li and Horrocks argue that SHIQ’s 
expressive power made it to be equivalent to DAML+OIL. In addition, the Web 
Ontology Language (OWL) is based on the SH family of description logics which 
supports Boolean connectives, including intersection, union and complements, 
restrictions on properties transitive relationships and relationship hierarchies.  The 
increased expressive power of the language is manifested in a range of additional 
constructors, including: 
∃ R.C (full existential value restriction) 
¬C (atomic negation of arbitrary concept) 
≤ n R (at-most cardinality restriction) 
≥ n R (at-least cardinality restriction) 
= n R (exact cardinality restriction) 
≤ n R.C (qualified at-most cardinality restriction)≡ 
≥ n R.C (qualified at-least cardinality restriction) 
= n R.C (qualified exact cardinality restriction) 
≤n R (concrete domain max restriction) 
≥n R (concrete domain min restriction) 
=n R (concrete domain exact restriction) 
 
Description logic derives its descriptive power from the ability to enhance the 
expressiveness of the atomic descriptions by building complex descriptions of concepts 
using concept constructors. These terminological axioms make statements about how 
concepts or roles are related to each other. This develops a set of terminologies, comprise 
of definitions, which are specific axioms which define the inclusions (⊆) or the 
equivalence (≡). Here, if R is a relationship between two concepts in the problem domain, 
then R - denotes the inverse of the relationship R. Given the above concepts and 
relationships in the problem domain, we can begin to define the relationships between the 
concepts in the domain.  
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Standardized by the World Wide Web Consortium, OWL is the leading approach 
to semantic Web ontologies using description logic as its fundamental knowledge 
representation mechanism. Ontological analysis results in ontology descriptions that are 
presented formally through description logics for theoretical soundness; and in machine 
readable format using the Web Ontology Language (OWL) and OWL-DL (OWL-
Description Logics) to provide practicality for the model. In addition, software reasoners, 
such as Racer, support concept consistency checking, T-Box reasoning and A-Box 
reasoning on models developed using SHIQ description logics translated into OWL-DL.  
These provide the basis for development of a knowledge base of machine interpretable 
knowledge representation, in OWL-DL format, that can be used for developing 
computational ontologies for knowledge integration in inter-organizational eBusiness 
process.  
In this research, for the meta-design, we define the terminology for the secure 
semantic eBusiness process domain using the aforementioned terminological axioms. We 
develop DL-based semantic knowledge representation for activity resource coordination 
in semantic eBusiness processes.  These provide the basis for developing machine-
interpretable knowledge representation and computational ontologies in OWL-DL format 
to support knowledge integration in collaborative inter-organizational eBusiness 
processes. DL-based knowledge representation provides the formalism to express 
structured knowledge in a format amenable for normative reasoning by intelligent 
software agents. 
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2.2.2.5. Functional View of Knowledge 
As it was mentioned earlier, in this research, we are concerned with information 
and knowledge resources of an organization. Organizational and process knowledge is 
central to business activities of human and software agents. It is important for eBusiness 
to explicitly recognize knowledge, and the processes and technologies for knowledge 
management. Newell (1982) provides a functional view of knowledge as “whatever can 
be ascribed to an agent, such that its behavior can be computed according to the principle 
of rationality”. This view forms a basis for functional knowledge management using 
agents, human and software when using explicit, declarative knowledge that is 
represented using standards-based knowledge representation languages that can be 
processed using reasoning mechanisms to reach useful inferences.  
While all knowledge cannot be explicated and be effectively represented and 
reasoned with using decidable and complete computational techniques; it is useful to 
focus on explicit, declarative KR using computationally feasible KR languages to build 
effective and useful knowledge-based systems. We focus on three specific types of 
knowledge in this research: 
i. Component knowledge including descriptions of skills, technologies, 
resources, consumer and product knowledge, is amenable to knowledge 
exchange (Hamel, 1991; Tallman, et al., 2004).  
 
ii. Process knowledge is typically embedded in the process models of workflow 
management systems or exists as coordination knowledge among human 
agents to coordinate complex processes (van der Aalst and Kumar, 2003).  
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iii. Security Knowledge relates to access control mechanisms used to permit or 
deny access to knowledge resources in distributed systems (Sandhu 1996; Oh 
and Park 2003). 
 
 
 
2.2.2.6. Intelligent Agents  
The SSeBP design theory must allow multiple organizations to cooperate in an 
automated, secured, and coordinated manner to accomplish shared goals of the extended-
enterprise. An intelligent agent is “a computer system situated in some environment and 
that is capable of flexible autonomous action in this environment in order to meet its 
design objectives” (Jennings and Wooldridge, 1998). The agent paradigm can support a 
range of decision-making activity, including information retrieval, generation of 
alternatives, preference order ranking of options and alternatives, and supporting analysis 
of the alternative-goal relationships. The specific autonomous behavior expected of 
intelligent agents depends on the concrete application domain and the expected role and 
impact of intelligent agents on the potential solution for a particular problem for which 
the agents are designed to provide cognitive support. Criteria for application of agent 
technology require that the application domain should show natural distributivity with 
autonomous entities that are geographically distributed and work with distributed data; 
require flexible interaction without a priori assignment of tasks to actors; and be 
embedded in a dynamic environment (Muller, 1997). Papazoglou (2001) defines 
intelligent agents as action-oriented abstractions in electronic systems, entrusted to carry 
out various generic and specific goal-oriented actions on behalf of users. Papazoglou 
(2001) discuss the use of intelligent agents in eCommerce. Intelligent agents are able to 
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organize, store, retrieve, search, and match information and knowledge for effective 
collaboration among Semantic eCommerce participants. 
Agents have been conceived to be a key technology to alleviate the problems 
related to communications in distributed environments (Liang and Huang, 2006) and 
recently agent technologies have been applied in the context of supply chains (Nissen and 
Sengupta, 2006). Sikora and Shaw (1998) develop and validate a multi-agent framework 
for the coordination and integration of heterogeneous information systems. Their work 
illustrates how agents can be used to represent organizational functions. Nissen and 
Sengunta (2006) study the application of agent technologies in supply chain. In 
particular, they successfully demonstrate how agents can be used to automate and 
facilitate procurement activities and decisions in the area of maintenance, repairs, and 
operations (MRO). Liang and Huang (2006) develop a multi-agent-based demand 
forecast systems where agents share information and forecasting knowledge to control 
inventory and minimize the total cost of supply chain. Furthermore, intelligent agents 
have been shown to support the processing of complex information and help reduce the 
cognitive load of decision-makers in the context of eMarketplace. Singh et al. (2005) 
propose a multiple-agent enabled infomediary-based eMarketplace that incorporates 
intelligence in the discovery of buyers and suppliers and in the facilitation of 
transactional roles. Kishore et al. (2006) investigate the characteristics of the multi-agent-
based integrative business information systems (MIBIS) universe based on the literatures 
in both the integrative business information systems (IBIS) and multi-agent systems 
domains. They propose eight minimal ontological foundation constructs for the MIBIS 
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universe of discourse, including goal, role, interaction, task, information, knowledge, 
resource, and agent. 
Intelligent agents can be used for knowledge management to support Semantic 
eBusiness Process activities. The agent abstraction is created by extending an object with 
additional features for encapsulation and exchange of knowledge between agents to allow 
agents to deliver knowledge to users and support decision-making activity (Shoham, 
1993). Agents work on a distributed platform and enable the transfer of knowledge by 
exposing their public methods as Web services using Simple Object Access Protocol 
(SOAP) (W3C) and XML. In this respect, the interactions among the agents are modeled 
as collaborative interactions, where the agents in the multi-agent community work 
together to provide decision support and knowledge-based explanations of the decision 
problem domain to the user. A fundamental implication is that knowledge must be 
available in formats that allow for processing by software agents. 
 
2.2.2.7. Secure Information Systems Design Methods 
Baskerville (1988) states that “the best approach to the development of security 
analysis and design methodology, would essentially be to nest it as a component part of 
an existing, established, successful overall information systems analysis and design 
methodology” (p. 88). Holistic information systems methodology that includes security 
aspects in all of its stages is still needed (Baskerville, 1988).  
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Chung and Nixon (1995) developed a process oriented approach that allows 
developers to represent security requirements as non-functional requirements. Lee et al. 
(2005) proposed an integrated software lifecycle process with Security Engineering (SE). 
Apvrille and Pourzandi (2005) proposed a methodology to produce secure applications 
by extending the general project life cycle methodology and inserting security concerns at 
each phase. Mouratidis et al. (2005) extended the TROPOS development methodology 
incorporating security concepts such as security constraints, secure entities, and secure 
dependencies. Unified Modeling Language (UML) is de facto standard for modeling 
information systems (Satzinger and Jackson, 2005) and has successfully been used in 
process modeling (Glassey, 2008). Specifically, use case, sequence, collaboration and 
activities diagrams have been recognized as relevant for process modeling (Glassey, 
2008). However, the UML approach does not specifically address security aspects during 
the analysis and design phases of information systems or business processes. Jürjens 
(2001) extend UML to include modeling of security requirements (UMLsec). While 
UMLsec allows modeling access control mechanisms and aspects of information 
confidentiality, this work primarily focuses on the design phase. Mc Dermott and Fox 
(1999) proposed the use of abuse cases that capture and analyze security requirements. 
An abuse case is an extension of object oriented use case technique and specifies 
interactions between system and actors where the results of the interaction are harmful 
(Mc Dermott and Fox, 1999). An abuse case provides a mechanism to model systems 
security threats in the requirements analysis phase of the SDLC. Sohr et al. (2005) 
explain that several classes of authorization constraints can be represented and specified 
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using UML and the Object Constraint Language (OCL). Sohr et al. (2005), using the 
UML Specification Environment (USE), demonstrate how authorization policies such as 
role based access control (RBAC) policies can be modeled using UML/OCL. Dhillon and 
Backhouse (2001) analyze IS security research using a conceptual framework of four 
paradigms: functionalist, interpretive, radical humanist, and radical structuralist 
paradigm. They find that while most IS security research focuses on formalized rule 
structures in designing security, IS researchers are moving away from the security 
technical viewpoint towards a socio-organizational perspective. This movement may lead 
to more holistic IS security research where organizational security aspects are 
incorporated in the design and development of secure information systems.  
Recently Siponen et al. (2006) propose a meta-notation framework to represent 
and analyze information systems security requirements. They extend the UML-Use Case; 
to incorporate security requirements into the design phase. They use field study and 
action research to validate their proposed framework.  Table 3 shows the meta-notation 
for the Enriched-Use Case.  
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Use case: Booking. 
Version: 1.0 
Functional Summary: A booking clerk books journeys for customers. 
Frequency: Several times a day 
Usability requirements: Any database query and booking must be able to complete in less than 
30 seconds 
Actor/security subject: A clerk. 
Security classification of the subject: confidential 
Security objects and access types to security objects: Object: customer file (the clerk must 
be able to read, update and delete the customer information); Object: booking database (the 
clerk must be able to read, update and delete the customer information on the database) 
Security policy/Specific security restrictions: The clerk is only allowed to access security 
objects classified as confidential with the booking department. 
Preconditions: Booking and customer databases exist. The identity of the booking 
clerk/security subject has been validated. 
Exceptions: If information on a certain journey is not available, an appropriate error message is 
produced. 
Table 3. Enriched- Use Case (Adopted from Siponen et al., 2006) 
Note: Security semantics are illustrated in italics and boldface. 
 
 
 
Enriched-Use Case incorporates security constraints, security subjects, and 
security actors into the design of information systems. However, it fails to capture the 
security requirements and dynamics of a business process. 
Attempts to incorporate security as a functional requirement in the early stages of 
requirement specification and analysis are worthwhile. Current research identifies 
security requirements in the requirement specification stage but fail to show how these 
requirements can be incorporated in the design of secure eBusiness processes. 
Table 4 summarizes the theoretical foundations from IS domain kernel theories 
and their integration in the SSeBP design theory. 
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Kernel Theory Description Application in SSeBP 
Semantic Web 
(Berners-Lee, et 
al., 2001) 
The Semantic Web vision 
comprises: Knowledge 
Representation: structured 
collections of information and 
inference rules linked into a 
single system for automated 
reasoning; Ontologies: to 
discover common meanings for 
entity representations and ways to 
interpret ontology; and Intelligent 
Agents: that collect content from 
diverse sources and exchange 
data enriched with semantics.  
(Berners-Lee, et. al., 2001). 
A Semantic approach to 
eBusiness processes affords 
ontological descriptions of the 
‘context’ for the roles involved. 
This approach can be used to 
describe the roles, permissions, 
resources and security 
requirements by creating a 
standardized vocabulary that 
describes access control and 
security for distributed 
information and knowledge 
sharing. 
Semantic 
eBusiness 
(Singh et al., 
2005) 
Semantic eBusiness is “an 
approach to managing knowledge 
for coordination of eBusiness 
processes through the systematic 
application of Semantic Web 
technologies”. 
Semantic eBusiness supports the 
transparent flow of semantic 
information and knowledge to 
enable collaborative eBusiness 
processes within and across 
organizational boundaries.  
Application of Semantic Web 
technologies provides 
organizations the means to 
design collaborative and 
integrative, inter- and intra-
organizational business 
processes, and systems founded 
upon the seamless exchange of 
knowledge among trusted 
business partners. 
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Kernel Theory Description Application in SSeBP 
Description 
Logics  (DL) 
based 
Knowledge 
Representation 
(Baader, 2003; 
Horrocks et al., 
2003; Singh and 
Salam, 2006) 
Description Logics model a 
problem domain using constructs 
that describe domain specific 
objects and their relationships.  
Description Logics provide 
formalism for theoretical 
soundness and it forms the basis 
for the development of machine 
interpretable knowledge 
representation in the OWL-DL 
format. 
The Web Ontology Language 
(OWL) is a W3C standard 
knowledge representation 
language for the Semantic Web. 
Ontological descriptions are 
formally represented using DL 
for theoretical soundness; and in 
machine-readable and 
implementable format using 
OWL and OWL-DL.  
OWL documents capture 
domain ontologies and rules for 
knowledge sharing among 
agents.  
OWL has robust theoretical 
foundations in DL and provides 
the standards-based foundation 
for semantic knowledge 
representation and management. 
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Kernel Theory Description Application in SSeBP 
Ontology 
(Guarino, 1995; 
Wand and 
Weber, 2002; 
Sugumaran and 
Storey, 2002; 
Kishore et al., 
2006; Ram and 
Park, 2004 ) 
 
Functional view 
knowledge  
(Newell, 1982; 
Lorange, 1996) 
Computational ontologies for IS 
contain the common syntax and 
semantics used to model and 
represent the IS artifacts.  
This helps increase the quality of 
analysis and reduce the cost of 
conceptual analysis, while 
allowing for knowledge reuse.  
Knowledge is “whatever can be 
ascribed to an [software] agent, 
such that its behavior can be 
computed according to the 
principle of rationality”. 
Semantic Inter-operability 
mechanisms allow integration of 
knowledge developed using 
different vocabularies through 
Ontologies.   
 
Ontology describes the 
semantics of constructs common 
to the eBusiness processes, 
including data semantic 
descriptors of the domain.  
Ontologies capture domain 
knowledge for knowledge-based 
systems.  
Ontologies are an effective 
means to facilitate collaboration 
and communication among 
agents.  
Ontology that describe access 
control and security constructs 
allow local and global entities to 
share and describe various 
security requirements in a 
common semantics for 
distributed knowledge and 
information exchange 
OWL documents capture 
domain ontologies and 
knowledge representation for 
knowledge sharing among 
agents. 
Intelligent 
Agents to model 
enterprise 
functions. 
(Singh, et al., 
2005; Sikora 
and Shaw, 
1998) 
Enterprise systems can be 
modeled as multiple agents and 
coordination mechanisms and 
interdependencies in control 
structures and knowledge 
exchange required to model agent 
functions in an enterprise. 
Activities are fundamental to 
multi-agent systems and 
organizations since both 
perform activities to accomplish 
their individual and 
organization/system goals. 
Ontologies can be the object of 
communication between 
software agents for a common 
vocabulary, with standard 
interpretation of problem-
domain constructs 
56 
 
Kernel Theory Description Application in SSeBP 
Secure 
Information 
Systems Design 
Methods 
(Baskerville, 
1988; Siponen 
et al. 2006; 
Mouratidis et al. 
2005 ) 
Secure information systems 
design methods must be 
theoretically grounded and must 
consider security requirements 
from the outset and through all 
their stages.  
SSeBP allows for security 
constraints that incorporate 
access control mechanisms to be 
incorporated in the 
conceptualization of eBusiness 
processes. 
Table 4.  Kernel Theories from the IS Knowledge Domain extended and applied in 
SSeBP. 
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CHAPTER III 
 
DESIGN OF SECURE SEMANTIC E-BUSINESS PROCESSES 
DESIGN THEORY 
 
 
 
Walls et al. (1992) state that a design theory includes the design product or 
artifact and design process to produce it. In developing a design theory, kernel theories 
are applied to develop the theoretical basis for the design theory’s meta-requirements and 
meta-design. Markus et al. (2002) refer to design process as principles that guide artifact 
development. In the next sections, the meta-requirements, meta-design, and design 
process of the SSeBP design theory are described. 
 
3.1. Meta-Requirements for a Secure Semantic eBusiness Processes 
Design Theory 
A set of meta-requirements is the first component of a design theory. The meta-
requirements describe the class of goals to which the theory applies. Since design theory 
solves a class a problem, the requirements must be stated as abstracted as possible (Walls 
et al. 1992). Moreover, design theories are prescriptive theories that dictate how things 
ought to be (Gregor 2006). 
Using the relevant extant literature, we specify the meta-requirements for the 
SSeBP design theory as:  
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1. SSeBP design theory should allow multiple agents to cooperate in a coordinated 
manner to accomplish goals of an eBusiness process. Agents should represent a 
business enterprise and fulfill organizational roles by performing business 
activities.  
2. SSeBP design theory must support coordination of dependencies among business 
activities and information and knowledge resources involved in an eBusiness 
process. 
3. SSeBP design theory should represent access control policies that comply with 
local, intra-organizational and global, inter-organizational, security requirements 
for an eBusiness process.  
4. SSeBP design theory should decouple and simplify association between agents 
and resources permissions and incorporates roles, permissions, access, and 
security of information and knowledge resources from a dynamic eBusiness 
process perspective.   
5. SSeBP design theory must describe eBusiness processes in unambiguous, 
computer-interpretable knowledge representation, amenable to agent-based 
reasoning. 
6. SSeBP design theory should provide an integrative semantic foundation that 
facilitates agents reasoning with process and component knowledge in the context 
of an eBusiness process. 
 
 
3.2. Meta-Design for a Secure Semantic eBusiness Processes Design 
Theory 
The second component of a design theory is the meta-design intended to meet the 
meta-requirements (Walls et al., 1992). Kernel theories guide the development of our 
design artifact to meet these meta-requirements. Analysis of kernel theories reveals that 
collaborative inter-organizational business processes can be represented using the 
following atomic concepts: business enterprise, agent, role, activity, and resource. Those 
atomic concepts are consistent with extant research. Similarly, Singh and Salam (2006) 
propose that essential concepts to model eBusiness Processes include business enterprise, 
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agent, business activity, resource, coordination, information and knowledge. Kishore et 
al. (2006) propose eight minimal ontological foundation constructs for the Multi-Agent-
Based Integrative Business Information (MIBIS) universe of discourse, including goal, 
role, interaction, task, information, knowledge, resource, and agent, based on literature in 
integrative business information systems and multi-agent systems domains. Here, we 
propose that business enterprises engaged in collaborative inter-organizational business 
processes can be represented by agents. Agents fulfill organizational roles and perform 
activities that consume and produce resources. Activities require access to resources to 
perform business activities. Roles de-couple the relationships and provide authorization 
constraints for agents and the individual activities that comprise the business process. 
Consistent with RBAC, resources, in our model, allow activities to be performed on 
them. Here, we consider only information and knowledge resources involved in business 
processes. They are used by agents in a business enterprise to perform their assigned 
activities in order to accomplish their goals. Dependencies among multiple resources and 
multiple activities are coordinated using flow, fit, or sharing coordination methods 
(Adapted from Malone et al. 2003). The design theoretic conceptualization of the SSeBP 
design theory including constructs and relationships derived from the analysis of the 
kernel theories and posited to meet the meta-requirements is shown in Figure 3 and 
conceptualized as:  
In an eBusiness process, a Business Enterprise authorizes representation to an 
actor or Agent to fulfill a Role, which performs Activities that have access 
permissions to resources.  
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Resources permit activities performed by Roles fulfilled by Agents that represent 
Business Enterprises, engaged in an eBusiness Process. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. The Secure Semantic eBusiness Process Design Theory (adopted and extended 
from Singh and Salam, 2006 and Kishore et al., 2006) 
 
 
 
It is important to emphasize that the proposed Secure Semantic eBusiness Process 
Design Theory concepts are consistent with RBAC (Sandhu 1996); coordination 
mechanism in Malone et al. (2003) and van der Aalst  and Kumar (2003); view of 
business process in  Singh and Salam (2006) ,Oh and Park (2003), and Raghu and Vinze 
(2007); and constructs of a multi-agent systems in Kishore et al. (2006).   
DL representation of the SSeBP design theory describes the semantic schema 
through complex concepts specifications and relation expressions built upon atomic 
concepts and relations. Constructs are represented as unary predicate concept constructs 
and relationships are the n-ary relations construct. These concepts and relationships 
define KR as terminological axioms for the SSeBP design theory, represented using 
OWL-D as shown below in Table 5.  
Fulfill
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Atomic Concepts and Relationships 
Essential atomic concepts in the secure 
semantic eBusiness process domain include: 
 
i. Business Enterprise (BE) 
ii. Agent (Ag) 
iii. Role (Rl) 
iv. Business Activity (Ac) 
v. Resource (Rs) 
Essential atomic relationships in the secure 
semantic eBusiness process domain include: 
 
i. Represents ( ≡ IsRepresentedBy-)  
ii. Fulfills ( ≡ IsFulFilledBy-)  
iii. Performs ( ≡ IsPerformedBy -)  
iv. Permits ( ≡ HasPermission-)  
v. Coordinates( ≡ HasCoordination-)  
vi. Owns( ≡ IsOwnedBy-)  
Business 
Enterprise 
A Business Enterprise is 
represented by at least one 
Agent and owns at least one 
resource need in the business 
process. 
BusinessEnterprise ⊆  
 ( ≥ 1 IsRepresentedBy ⋅ Agent) ∧  
 ( ≥ 1 Owns⋅ Resource) ∧  
 (≥ 1 HasClassificationID ⋅ StringData) ∧ 
 (≥ 1 HasDescription ⋅ StringData) ∧ 
 (≥ 1 HasAddress ⋅ Address) ∧ 
 (≥ 1 HasProfile ⋅ Profile)  
Agent 
An Agent represents a 
Business Enterprise and 
fulfills a Role for the Business 
Enterprise. 
Agent ⊆  
 ( = 1 Represents ⋅ BusinessEnterprise) ∧ 
  (≥ 1 Fulfills ⋅ Role)  
Role 
A Role concept is fulfilled by 
an Agent and performs at least 
one Business Activity 
Role ⊆  
 ( ≥ 1 IsFullfilledBy ⋅ Agent) ∧ 
 (≥ 1 Performs ⋅ Activity) 
Business 
Activity 
A Business Activity is 
performed by a Role, has at 
least one permission to a 
Resource, coordinates 
Resources and has a Begin 
Time and End Time. 
Business Activity ⊆ 
  ( ≥ 1 hasLabel ⋅ StringData) ∧ 
  ( ≥ 1 isPerformedBy ⋅ Role) ∧ 
  ( ≥ 1 hasPermission ⋅ Resource) ∧ 
  ( ≥ 1 isCoordinatedBy ⋅ Resource) ∧ 
  ( = 1 hasBeginTime ⋅ DateTimeData) ∧ 
  ( = 1 hasEndTime ⋅ DateTimeData) 
Resource  
 
A Resource is a thing owned 
by exactly one Business 
Enterprise and permits 
Business Activities to perform 
operations on it and 
coordinates Business 
Activities 
Resource ⊆ 
 ( = 1 hasID⋅ StringData) ∧ 
 (= 1 IsOwnedBy⋅ Business Enterprise) ∧ 
 ( ≥ 1 Permits⋅ BusinessActivity) ∧ 
 (≥ 1 Coordinates ⋅ BusinessActivity) 
Table 5. DL Representation of concepts and relationships in the SSeBP model 
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If a business activity has permissions it is allowed to perform an operation on a 
resource. Permits and HasPermission are inverse relationships.  
Resource∃(Permits.BusinessActivity) 
BusinessActivity∃(HasPermission.Resource) 
 
Activities depend on resources and require coordination mechanisms to resolve 
dependencies. A resource is related to an activity by the Coordinates relationship.  
Resource∃(Coordinates.BusinessActivity) 
BusinessActivity∃(HasCoordination.Resource) 
 
The Coordinates relationship is specialized in inheritance hierarchies as 
CoordinatesFlow, CoordinatesFit, or CoordinatesSharing relationships as shown in 
Figure 4. 
Coordinates ⊆ 
 CoordinatesFlow 
 CoordinatesFit 
 CoordinatesSharing 
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Coordinates
CoordinatesFlow CoordinatesFit CoordinatesSharing
A R
A
A
R
FlowConsumes
Sharing
CoordinatesFlow
ConsumedBy
CoordinatesFlow
ProducedBy
R: Resource
A: Activity
FlowProduces
A
A
R
Fit 
A R
 
Figure 4. Coordinates Relationships between Activities and Resources 
 
 
 
This is used to develop a complex description of the relationship between 
Resources and Business Activities.  
Resource ∃  
 (≥0 CoordinatesFlow.BusinessActivity)∧ 
 (≥0 CoordinatesFit.BusinessActivity)∧ 
 (≥0 CoordinatesSharing.BusinessActivity) 
 
Coordination requirements lead to specific permissions on resources. A Permits 
relationship is specialized as PermitRead, PermitWrite, PermitCreate or PermitDelete 
relationships.  
Permits  ⊆ 
 PermitRead 
PermitWrite 
PermitCreate 
PermitDelete 
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Permits relationships are shown in Figure 5. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Permits Relationships 
 
 
 
The inheritance hierarchy of the Permits relationship allows more specific 
relationships between Resources and Business Activities.  
Resource ∃  
 (≥0 PermitsRead.BusinessActivity) 
 (≥0 PermitsWrite.BusinessActivity) 
 (≥0 PermitsCreate.BusinessActivity) 
 (≥0 PermitsDelete.BusinessActivity) 
 
 
Here we only consider Information and Knowledge as the primary resources 
pertinent to the problem domain.  
Information⊆ Resource  
Knowledge⊆Resource 
 
These definitions comprise terminology, “TBox” for the SSeBP design theory 
including primitive concepts and their relationships. An “ABox” contains descriptions of 
individual instances. Specific instance level descriptions, using the TBox, provide 
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illustrative examples for verification, refinement and for implementation of the semantic 
data models. These form the DL-based KR system used to reason about the problem 
domain. Terminological axioms comprising definitions and descriptions of problem 
domain concepts further describe the relationships between concepts and roles. 
Satisfiability and logical implication in SHIQ are ExpTime-complete (Baader, et al., 
2003).  Tools like Protégé (protege.stanford.edu) and Racer (www.racer-systems.com) 
verify conformance to DL formalism and modeling requirements and model consistency. 
Protégé generates OWL-DL for schema and instance level documents for verification and 
implementation of semantic KR. Reasoning procedures allow inferencing from the 
model.  
 
3.3. Design Method for a Secure Semantic eBusiness Processes Design 
Theory 
As it was explained earlier, Walls et al. (1992) describe the design method as the 
procedure(s) for the artifact construction. It has been recognized that an information 
systems design method includes a process system and a notation system (Siponen et al., 
2006; Hirschheim and Klein, 1992).  Next, the SSeBP design method and design 
processes are described. 
The design method can focus on any of the information systems analysis and 
design stage (e.g., requirements analysis, implementation, testing) (Walls et al. 1992; 
Siponen et al. 2006). In this context,the SSeBP design theory is intended to guide the 
analysis and design of secure and semantically rich eBusiness processes. Specifically, 
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SSeBP focuses on security requirements analysis and modeling. Then, we describe the 
procedure (steps) that must be followed in order to develop an IT artifact that meets the 
meta-requirements of SSeBP. SSeBP design method is an interactive process that 
requires the cooperation among information security, information systems, and business 
analysts and experts from the domain of the eBusiness process. 
 
1. Identify the different business enterprises and business units that are involved in 
the eBusiness process. 
2. Identify the business activities involved in the business process of interest. 
Careful analysis of existing Dataflows and Workflows are a good starting point to 
locate the main activities of a business process. Follow-up interviews and 
discussions with experts from the domain of the business process are aimed at 
validating the identified activities and to make sure that relevant activities are not 
missing. At this stage, it is important to identify both manual and automated 
activities.  
3. Identify the information and knowledge resources involved in the business 
process of interest. The analysts should not limit to identify data sources from 
existing IS. Documents and spreadsheets are important information and 
knowledge resources. 
4. Identify the attributes of each information and knowledge resource identified in 
the previous step. Follow-up interviews and discussions with experts from the 
domain of the business process are aimed at validating the identified resources. 
5. Decide which activities can be automated. Here, activities can be automated by 
representing resources in a machine-readable format or by assigning activities to 
be performed by intelligent agents on behalf of the human actors. 
6. Identify and analyze the organizational roles and security access control (SAC) 
policies that pertain to the access of the information and knowledge resources 
identified in step 3. In conjunction with the security analyst, authorization and 
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authentication, non-repudiation, and segregation of duties security mechanisms 
must be identified. 
7. Based on the identified activities, roles, and the SAC policies, a role-activity-
resource-permissions mapping for the business process of interest must be 
created. The permission hierarchy which is specialized in permitsread, 
permitscreate, permitsdelete, and permitswrite must be followed.  
8. Identify the dependencies that exist among activities and resources and represent 
them using the coordinates hierarchy which is specialized in coordinatessharing, 
coordinatesfit, and coordinatesflow. 
9. Create the SSeBP model of the business process of interest by using the modeling 
grammar and modeling concepts of the SSeBP design theory. 
10. Review and verify the resulting role-activity-resource-permissions mapping and 
the SSeBP model and repeat the previous steps as it is needed. 
 
SSeBP design method is similar to the one presented in Crowston and Osborn 
(2003).  Crowston and Osborn (2003) based on the coordination theory develop process 
model descriptions and process redesign through six steps: setting process boundaries, 
collecting data, identifying actors and resources, identifying activities, identifying 
dependencies, and verifying a model. However, SSeBP incorporates the security 
requirements and constraints which are missing in the Crowston and Osborn approach. 
 
3.3.1. Design Process for a Secure Semantic eBusiness Processes 
Design Theory 
Markus et al. (2002) refer to the design process as a set of principles that 
effectively guide the artifact development process. Based on the analysis of the 
theoretical foundations and the meta-design, we identify the following modeling concepts 
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and grammar (Hadar and Soffer, 2006) as guiding principles for developing secure 
eBusiness processes.  
1. Actors fulfill organizational roles. 
2. Organizational Roles are authorized to perform Business Activities. 
3. Business Activities are permitted operations, including read, delete, write, 
create, on Information and Knowledge Resources. 
4. Business activities cannot directly produce or consume another business 
activity. 
5. Dependencies do not exist directly between Business Activities. 
6. In activity-resource dependency, activities have a sharing, fit, flow 
dependency with an information resource. 
 
It is important that information modeling methods provide notations to represent 
security requirements and constraints in the context of eBusiness processes. As depicted 
in Figure 3, the modeling concepts of the SSeBP design theory include business 
enterprise, agents, roles, activities, and resources. As a way to standardize the 
representation of those modeling concepts we adopt the following graphical notations. 
Table 6 presents the graphical representation adopted to model an SSeBP. 
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Modeling Concept Graphical Representation 
Business Enterprise 
 
Agent 
 
Role  
 
Activity 
 
Resource 
 
Relationship 
IsRepresentedBy 
Fulfills 
Performs 
HasCoordination 
HasPermission 
 
 
 
 
Relationship Name 
Table 6. Graphical Representations for an SSeBP 
 
Role Name 
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 EVALUATION OF THE SECURE SEMANTIC EBUSINESS 
PROCESS DESIGN THEORY 
 
 
 
The main purpose of this chapter is to explain how the proposed design theory is 
evaluated. Here, we describe the different methods used to assess the efficacy and utility 
of SSeBP design artifacts.  
An IS design theory is a prescriptive theory that dictates, by integrating normative 
and descriptive theories, how to produce a specific type of IT artifact (Walls et al., 1992).  
While the natural sciences are concerned with how things are, design sciences are 
concerned with how things “ought” to be, with devising artifacts to attain goals (Simon, 
1996). Hence, the utility and efficacy of an IS design theory are established by evaluating 
its outputs, design artifacts.  A design artifact must be evaluated to demonstrate its utility, 
quality, and efficacy.  The goals of the design artifact evaluation are to show that the 
proposed artifact provides value to the problem domain.  By showing that the design 
artifact fulfills the requirements and constraints of the problem domain, the researcher 
demonstrates that the design theory is complete and effective.   
Hevner et al. (2004) suggest that the nature of the problem, characteristics of the 
artifact, and available resources dictate the selection of the evaluation method. Hevner et 
al. (2004) state that any of the evaluation methods available in the knowledge base may 
be used to rigorously evaluate an IT artifact.  
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Five different kinds of evaluation methods, namely observational, analytical, 
experimental, testing, and descriptive have been suggested to evaluate a design artifact.  
The observational evaluation method involves the use of case study and field 
study to evaluate the design artifact. The observational methods allow studying and 
monitoring the artifact in depth in the real business environment. The analytical 
evaluation method encompasses static analysis, which evaluates the structure of the 
artifact for static qualities; architecture analysis, which studies the technical fit of the 
artifact into the IS architecture; optimization, which is used to demonstrate optimal 
properties of the artifact; and, dynamic analysis, which evaluates the artifact in terms of 
dynamic qualities. The experimental evaluation method involves the use of controlled 
experiments and simulation to study the artifact qualities and functionality. The testing 
evaluation method consists of functional and structural testing. Functional testing 
considers the artifact as a “black box” and therefore evaluates its interfaces to identify 
any failures and/or defects in the operation of the artifact. Structural testing considers the 
artifact as a “white box” and evaluates the artifact using some metrics in the artifact 
implementations. The last evaluation method, the descriptive method encompasses the 
use of informed argument and scenarios. The informed argument relies on the application 
of knowledge base to illustrate and demonstrate the utility of the artifact. The scenarios 
method consists of using scenarios to demonstrate the artifact’s utility.  
Baskerville et al. (2007) suggest that in order to have a comprehensive evaluation 
approach and to avoid errors during the evaluation processes, a combined evaluation 
approach that includes “hard methods”, such as experiments, and “soft methods”, such as 
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case studies, should be used. Consistently with Baskerville et al. (2007) and Hevner et al. 
(2004), we demonstrate the utility and efficacy of SSeBP design theory by evaluating its 
outputs, SSeBP design artifacts. We use a multi-method and rigorous evaluation approach 
that includes descriptive, observational, and experimental evaluations.  
For the descriptive evaluation, we use the Collaborative Planning Forecasting 
and Replenishment (CPFR) approach, which is an emergent standard developed by the 
industry to deal with demand uncertainty. It seeks to develop collaborative relationships 
between buyers and sellers through co-managed processes and shared information 
(www.VICS.org). Its standards provide the templates for collaborative inter-
organizational business processes in the value chain. Since CPFR’s standards are 
developed and adopted by a wide array of firms, evaluating the applicability of SSeBP 
design artifacts to CPFR process templates provides a level of generalizability to the 
SSeBP design theory. In addition, CPFR guidelines do not include sharing process 
knowledge across partner organizations and its technical specifications do not include 
security knowledge. We demonstrate the utility of SSeBP design theory by showing how 
to model and enhance CPFR process templates as secure business processes using SSeBP 
design artifacts.  
Even though industry standards such as CPFR provide guidelines for business 
processes, they are not intended to capture nuances of the real world. Therefore, for the 
SSeBP’s observational evaluation, we conduct a detailed case study at a leading apparel 
business, a Fortune 100 organization and its key customer, a Fortune 50 retailer.  We 
apply SSeBP design theory to illustrate its application in mapping core business processes 
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of the selected organization. We show how SSeBP design artifacts resolve semantic 
conflicts and enable the exchange of component, process and security knowledge in the 
context of a real organization. We use multiple decision makers in the IT and other 
functional areas to evaluate the SSeBP design artifact’s utility.  
For the experimental evaluation, we use Situational Awareness (SA) theory 
(Endsley, 1995) to empirically evaluate the SSeBP artifacts against an existing approach. 
Situational Awareness (SA) theory explains how individuals perceive, comprehend, and 
predict elements’ meaning and status. The objective of the experimental evaluation is to 
illustrate how SSeBP design artifacts generate security awareness at least as well as 
existing methods. Specifically, we assess the efficacy of SSeBP design artifacts in 
representing access control mechanisms that prevent unauthorized access to information 
resources, provide non-repudiation mechanisms, and allow for segregation of duties.  
Thus, an experimental design that demonstrates the utility of SSeBP is developed and 
executed.   
The following sections of this chapter present a detailed description and 
discussion of the results of the descriptive, observational, and experimental evaluation of 
SSeBP design theory.  
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4.1. Descriptive Evaluation of the Secure Semantic eBusiness Processes 
Design Theory 
To show SSeBP design theory’s utility, we describe how business processes from 
the Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR) approach can be 
modeled and enhanced by the application of the SSeBP design theory. Since CPFR is an 
industry standard, adopted by several organizations, evaluating the applicability of our 
approach with CPFR’s process templates provides a level of generalizability to SSeBP 
design theory.  
The descriptive evaluation’s goal is to illustrate how business processes can be 
analyzed, mapped and enhanced by using SSeBP design artifacts. In addition, we develop 
and validate description logics (DL)-based semantic knowledge representation for 
activity resource coordination of CPFR eBusiness processes. By developing such DL, we 
illustrate the technical feasibility of the SSeBP design artifacts.   DL-based knowledge 
representation provides machine-interpretable knowledge representation and 
computational ontologies in OWL-DL format to support knowledge integration in 
collaborative inter-organizational eBusiness processes. 
 
4.1.1. Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, and Replenishment 
(CPFR) Approach 
Successful supply chain management involves the coordination of activities 
performed by multiple independent companies to deliver a product or service to the end 
customer (Lee and Whang, 1998). Several factors affect the success of supply chains. 
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Demand uncertainty has always been a topic of interest for the academic and practitioner 
communities. Swaminathan and Tayur (2003) explain that the Collaborative Planning, 
Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR) is an approach aimed at alleviating the issues 
related to demand uncertainty. CPFR attempts to create collaborative relationship 
between buyers and sellers through co-managed processes and shared information 
(www.VICS.org). CPFR standards provide the templates for collaborative inter-
organizational business processes. CPFR aims to make pertinent information available to 
all members of the supply chain to improve its efficiency. In particular, seamless flow of 
information across the supply chain helps to coordinate and improve the accuracy of the 
critical demand forecasting and capacity planning information. According to the 
Voluntary Inter-industry Commerce Standards Association (VICS), several leading 
retailers and manufacturers have successfully adopted CPFR and have obtained benefits 
such as reducing working capital and fixed capital, reducing operation expensive, 
improved technology ROI, and growing sales (www.VICS.org). Appendix A shows 
corporations at various positions in the supply chain that have adopted CPFR.  
While several organizations have implemented CPFR models to varying degrees 
of success, several practical impediments remain. CPFR guidelines do not include 
sharing process knowledge across partner organizations and do not consider how private 
and proprietary information and knowledge can be systematically and securely shared 
while maintaining information assurance concerns. CPFR technical specifications do not 
include security knowledge. In other words, the permissions about the kinds of activities 
agents can perform over resources are missing. Atallah et al. (2005) highlight the need to 
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secure CPFR data flows through a Secure Multi-Party Computation framework. They 
explain that the fear that a supply-chain partner may take advantage of private 
information or that information may leak to a competitor is preventing organization from 
adopting the CPFR approach. The lack of appropriate access control mechanisms on the 
information and knowledge exchange among business activities leaves organizations 
vulnerable to various information assurance threats and prevents them from engaging in 
collaborative eBusiness process.  
CPFR specifies nine primary business processes and data flows needed to enable 
collaboration among business partners. Table 7 summarizes the main CPFR’s business 
processes and data flows. 
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Business Process Data Consumed Data Produced 
Develop Front End 
Agreement 
(None; Manual process) (None; Manual process) 
Create Joint Business 
Plan 
Buyer’s Corporate Strategy Joint Business Plan 
Create Sales Forecast Joint Business Plan 
POS Data 
Event 
Sales Forecast Revisions 
Sales Forecast 
Identify Sales 
Forecast Exceptions 
Sales Forecast 
Exception Criteria 
Metrics 
Events 
Identified Exception 
Items 
Collaborate on Sales 
Forecast Exceptions  
Buyer Secondary Data for 
Exception Items 
Identified Exception Items 
Seller’s Secondary Data for 
Exceptions Items 
Sales Forecast Item 
Revisions 
Create Order Forecast Order Forecast Revisions 
POS DATA 
Current Inventory on Hand 
Sales Forecast 
Events 
Product Historical Demand & 
Shipments 
Product Availability Data 
Item Management Profile Data 
Order Forecast 
Identify Order 
Forecast Exceptions 
Order Forecast 
Exception Criteria and Values 
Events 
Identified Order 
Exception Items 
Collaborate on Order 
Forecast Exceptions 
Buyer’s Secondary Data for 
Exception Items 
Identified Exception Items 
Seller’s Secondary Data for 
Exception Items 
Order Forecast 
Revisions 
Generate Order Order Forecast 
Item Management Profile 
Order 
Table 7. CPFR Business Processes and Data Flows (Source: CPFR Technical 
Specifications, VICS 1999) 
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From those CPFR business processes, we consider the Create Order Forecast and 
Generate Order business processes. These processes are of strategic and tactical 
importance (Caridi et al., 2005) and require high degree of collaboration and integration. 
Figure 6 presents the dataflow in the Create Order Forecast and Generate Order 
processes. The Create Order Forecast dataflow describes the information exchanged in 
an initial order forecast for products within a planning period. The Generate Order 
dataflow shows the transmission of a “firm” order for products, based on an order 
forecast and an item management profile (CPFR Technical Specifications, VICS 1999).  
More specifically, Create Order Forecast and Generate Order business processes 
take place between a buyer and a seller. Sellers and buyers must work together to 
estimate future orders needs. In other words, they must determine the right products and 
their quantities that must be ordered for the next planning period.  Accurate order 
forecasts drive sales increases, improve customer service, and support better inventory 
decisions. The process is triggered at the beginning of each planning period.  The buyer 
organization consolidates its point of sales (POS) data and generates an initial prediction 
of its sales for the next planning period (sales forecast).  Such information, along with the 
available stock, the promotions and event calendars, including weather, school season, 
and holidays information,  and the historical order shipment data are then retrieved by the 
seller organization to generate an initial sales forecast. At this point, the buyer and the 
seller organizations with the assistance of a collaborative information system must 
compare their initial estimates to reach an agreement. Basically, the collaborative system 
retrieves information about the buyer inventory strategies, seller order shipment data, and 
79 
 
collaborative policies to determine any differences and/or errors that might exist in the 
initial sales forecast.  Finally, the collaborative system produces the exceptions resolution 
data that are used to make the corrections or adjustments to the seller and buyer sales 
forecast.   
 
 
 
Figure 6. Create Order Forecast and Generate Order Processes Data Flow (Adapted from 
CPFR Technical Specifications, VICS 1999) 
 
 
 
We analyze these business processes using the SSeBP meta-design (from Figure 
1) and identify the following atomic concepts:  
i) Business Enterprise:  Buyer and Seller. 
ii) Business Activities:  Communicate POS Data; Communicate Forecast Events; 
Communicate Inventory Strategy; Communicate Current 
Inventory; Communicate Order; Communicate Capacity 
Limitation; Communicate Historical Demand & Shipment; 
Communicate Order Shipment Data; Create Order Forecast; 
Generate Actual Order; and Receive Order. 
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iii) Resources:  POS Data; Forecast Impact Events; Inventory Strategy; Current 
Inventory; Sales Forecast; Exception Resolution Data; Order 
Forecast; Capacity Limitation; Historical Demand & Shipment 
Data; Item Management Data; Order. 
 
By applying the meta-design to the CPFR approach, we create DL formalisms for 
knowledge representation for such business processes, which form the basis for the 
development of machine interpretable knowledge representation in the OWL-DL format.  
All DL knowledge representations have been developed, validated and checked for 
consistency using Protégé and Racer. Appendixes B1-B4 show the DL for the following 
business activities and resources: 1) creates order forecast activity, 2) order forecast 
resource, 3) generates order activity, 4) order resource. Figure 7 shows the results of the 
DL validation. We did not find any consistency or integrity violations in the DL. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.  Consistency and Integrity Checks Results 
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These DL formalisms provide computationally feasible knowledge representation 
mechanisms for business processes for VICS-CPFR. This forms the basis for the 
development of machine interpretable knowledge representation in the OWL-DL format. 
DL is used as the knowledge representation formalism to express structured knowledge in 
a format amenable for intelligent software agents to reason with it in a normative manner. 
This illustrates the technical feasibility of instantiations of SSeBP design artifacts. 
Our design artifact enhances CPFR by incorporating the roles-activities and 
resource-permissions needed in the business processes. Using RBAC (Sandhu et al., 
1996), we show, in Table 8, the role-activity-resource permissions for CPFR’s generate 
order business process.   
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Agent Role 
Business 
Activity 
Permission 
Type (Write, 
Read, Create, 
Delete) 
Resource 
Buyer 
Agent 
Buyer 
Role 
Communicate 
POS Data 
Read POS Data 
Communicate 
Forecast Events 
Read Forecast Impact Events 
Communicate 
Inventory 
Strategy 
Read Inventory Strategy 
Communicate 
Current Inventory 
Read Current Inventory Data 
Communicate 
Order 
Read Order 
Seller 
Agent 
Seller 
Role 
Communicate 
Capacity 
Limitation 
Read Capacity Limitations 
Communicate 
Historical 
Demand & 
Shipment  
Read Historical Demand & Shipment Data 
Communicate 
Order Shipment 
Data 
Read Order Shipment Data 
Create Order 
Forecast 
Read Order Forecast, Sales Forecast, 
Exception Resolution Data, Item 
Management Data, POS Data, 
Forecast Impact Events, Inventory 
Strategy, Current Inventory, 
Capacity Limitations, Historical 
demand & Shipment Data, Order 
Shipment Data 
Create/Write/Re
ad 
Order Forecast 
Generate Actual 
Order 
Read Item Management Data, Order 
Forecast 
Order 
Create/Write/Re
ad 
Actual Order 
Receive Order Read Actual Order 
Table 8. Security analysis for role-activity-resource permissions for the CPFR’s generate 
order business process 
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The atomic concepts and their relationships in the design artifact are used to map 
core business processes of CPFR and to incorporate security knowledge in the CPFR 
models and technical specifications. Figure 8 shows how SSeBP design theory’s atomic 
concepts, grammar, and relationships are used to develop the secure semantic activity-
resource coordination mapping for the Create Order Forecast and Generate Order 
business processes discussed above.  
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By applying SSeBP design theory to the CPFR -Create Order Forecast and 
Generate Order business processes, we demonstrate how the SSeBP meta-requirements, 
meta-design, and design method, including modeling concepts and grammar, can be used 
not only to model business processes but to enhance them by incorporating security 
access control requirements and standard knowledge representation that provide the 
foundation for the seamless and secure exchange of information and knowledge resources 
within and across partner organizations in the context of eBusiness processes.  
A primary motivation of our design artifact is including security as a functional 
requirement in the early analysis of the business process. We show how our artifact can 
be used to analyze and represent granular security requirements for specific CPFR 
business processes. For instance, based on results of analysis presented in Table 8 and 
Figure 8, business and system analysts can recognize that the POS Data can only be read 
by the Communicate POS Data Activity, which can only be performed by the Buyer 
Role. This implies that if any other business activity tries to modify the POS Data, it 
would result in a security violation. The Role-Activity Resource permission analysis 
allows mapping organizational responsibilities into roles, fulfilled by specific agents. In 
addition, for instance, the seller agent, fulfilling the seller role, is responsible for 
executing the business activities identified in Table 8. If the Seller Agent, in the Seller 
role, executes a business activity not identified above, it is a security violation. These 
analyses, for all agents, roles, activities and resources, can be used to develop security 
policies for the inter-organization business process.  
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Although we have not applied our approach to the business processes of 
organizations that have developed and adopted the CPFR industry standard, 
demonstrating the applicability of the approach to model processes of an industry 
standard does provide a level of confidence that the approach presented here can be used 
by other companies’ business processes. 
 
4.2. Observational Evaluation of the Secure Semantic eBusiness 
Processes Design Theory  
The objective of the observational evaluation is to assess the utility and efficacy 
of SSeBP design artifact in the context of a real organization. Yin (2002, pp. 2) states that 
“case study method allows the investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful 
characteristics of real-life events”. Case study is used when the researcher wants to 
address the “how” and “why” type of questions about contemporary events, where the 
researcher has little or no control over the events. Here, it is important to highlight that 
case studies play an important role in evaluation research. They can be used to explain, 
describe, illustrate, explore, and meta-evaluate the phenomenon of interest (Yin, 2002).  
We demonstrate the utility of the proposed design theory by applying SSeBP 
design theory to analyze and map core business processes of an organization and their 
security requirements. The researcher, with the assistance of Supply Chain and IT senior 
managers from the selected organization, identify core business processes that exhibit the 
characteristics of the problem domain. We show how the resulting SSeBP artifacts lay the 
foundation to resolve semantic conflicts and enable the exchange of component, process 
87 
 
and security knowledge in the context of a real organization. Finally, we use multiple 
decision makers in the IT and other functional areas from the chosen organization to 
assess the SSeBP design artifact’s utility. 
 
4.2.1. Applying the Secure Semantic eBusiness Processes Design 
Theory: A Case Study 
We analyzed business processes related to the demand forecast and capacity 
planning business processes for Organization A and its primary customer. These 
processes were selected because of their strategic value. In addition, they require an 
exchange of information and knowledge resources within and across organizations while 
a secure and seamless flow of information and knowledge is guaranteed. We conducted 
open-ended interviews on key stakeholders to have a better understanding about the 
current business processes and the challenges that Organization A faces in securing and 
integrating them. Specifically, we interviewed senior managers in IT, planning, customer 
management and operations, and demand analysts. Questions related to the business 
processes’ background, stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities were asked.  In addition, 
we reviewed and analyzed different information systems and documentation that pertain 
to the Create Order Forecast and Generate Order (COFGO) business processes of 
Organization A. 
Organization A is a leader in the apparel industry, with annual revenues of over 
$1.2 billion for the fiscal year of 2005. It designs and manufactures clothing that is 
distributed to warehouses and retailers throughout the world.  Organization A’s demand 
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is fragmented into a few large customers that account for approximately 65% of its 
revenues. Organization A’s demand is highly sensitive to seasonal and fashion volatility, 
which is common in the apparel industry. Organization A’s COFGO business processes 
require information and knowledge resources from multiple business units, including 
replenishment, forecasting, planning, and procurement, from within Organization A and 
across partner organizations. Further investigation of Organization A’s COFGO 
processes reveals the following issues in automating the secure and seamless exchange of 
information and knowledge resources needed for the business processes.   
• Organization A and its primary customers are advocates of the CPFR approach. 
While they implement CPFR models to varying degrees of success, several practical 
impediments remain. CPFR guidelines do not include sharing process knowledge 
across partner organizations in a systematic manner, and do not consider how private 
and proprietary information and knowledge can be systematically and securely shared 
while maintaining information assurance concerns. Paraphrasing the director of 
planning and replenishment “Our organization is trying to have a collaborative 
process, but in reality we are struggling to make it happen”. 
• According to Organization A’s Director of Planning and Replenishment, COFGO 
business processes are very complex and require integration of information from 
multiple business units of Organization A and its customers. It requires coordinated 
information exchange across the customer’s decision support system for Point of 
Sales (POS) data, a logistic system and two CPFR systems. Currently, Organization 
A’s planning analysts use several spreadsheets to develop an annual demand and 
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capacity plans for each Stock Keeping Unit (SKU) per week. There are seven product 
categories with hundreds of SKUs. Ten planning analysts maintain and analyze these 
spreadsheets and manually feed the forecasting systems.  This literally requires using 
every column available in an Excel spreadsheet.  
• Frequent manual data entry interventions are needed to identify and record demand 
adjustments for every product, due to seasonality and promotions. Bi-weekly 
meetings between the customer, planning analysts, and replenishment analysts are 
needed to analyze the differences between the real demand, the expected demand, and 
the historical demand forecast from the system. This “collaborative” demand 
forecasting process results in a final, agreed-upon, weekly demand per SKU. The 
customer development manager notes: “This process is very inefficient. We have to 
manually feed the seasonality and special offers indicators for each product into our 
systems and into the customer systems, and on top of that if any error occurs, we have 
to manually do the adjustment and absorb the cost, if any”. 
• Given the extent of manual processes and heterogeneous information systems, it is 
very difficult to develop and enforce security policies in a systematic manner. Manual 
and ad-hoc processes are difficult to secure and monitor, and almost impossible to 
audit. Separation of duty and non-reputation mechanisms has not been implemented 
at all. A single organizational log-in is used to access the primary customer’s systems 
with read and write privileges. This is exacerbated by sharing of the authorization 
credentials with various organizational roles due to the need for information and 
knowledge. While changes submitted to the customer’s system are subject to approval 
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by the customer, a systematic method of non-repudiation and segregation of duty in 
identifying and adjusting exceptions to demand forecast is clearly lacking. As a result, 
critical information for demand forecasting, is shared verbally in meeting or is not 
shared at all with customers.  
• Organization A does not have a single production forecasting system in place. Due to 
several mergers and acquisitions, production units have their own forecasting systems 
that range from customized packages to spreadsheets. Demand forecasts are manually 
input to each system on a weekly basis. 
• Organization A uses EDI with its primary customers. However, semantic conflicts 
stemming from new product descriptions, the customer’s promotion codes and 
packaging and bundling for Organization A’s promotions, occur frequently. The 
customer development manager explained that Organization A distributes customer 
orders to various warehouses served by the customer’s logistics. These three business 
organizations each use different units of measurements for ordering. A package for a 
warehouse system could be a pallet of thousands of items, while the package for 
customers could be a dozen items. Organization A has to determine the correct 
measurement unit for each order by analyzing its final destination. Organization A 
managers use lookup tables for units of measurement for various shipment types and 
manually translate from one type to another for recording as product moves from one 
business activity to another. Once conflicts are resolved, revisions are manually 
entered by customer development officers and approved by directors of planning and 
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execution. “Can you imagine the kind of confusions and rework this simple error 
might produce if we didn’t spend time looking at each order?”  
It is important to highlight that Organization A was a leader in the development of 
the CPFR approach. It has adopted CPFR approach with their main customers, albeit with 
several modifications. In addition to the standard CPFR’s dataflows depicted on Figure 6, 
Organization A provides information about orders’ adjustments, event calendar, and 
cancellation to the buyer organizations. An analysis of the COFGO business processes 
using SSeBP meta-design reveals the following atomic concepts:  
i) Business Enterprise: Buyer and Seller. 
ii) Business Activities: Communicate POS Data; Communicate Event Calendar; 
Communicate Inventory Strategy; Communicate Available 
Stock; Communicate Sales Forecast; Communicate Exception 
Resolution Data; Receive Adjustments; Communicate 
Adjustments; Communicate Historical Demand and Shipment 
Data; Communicate Order Shipment Data; Communicate CPFR 
policies; Communicate Item Management Data; Communicate 
Cancellations; Communicate Order (Promotions// New 
Products); Communicate Order Forecast; Create Order Forecast; 
Generate Order; Received Order. 
iii) Resources:  POS Data; Event Calendar; Inventory Strategy; Available Stock; 
Sales Forecast; Exception Resolution Data; Adjustments; 
Historical Demand and Shipment Data; Order Shipment Data; 
CPFR policies; Item Management Data; Cancellations; Order 
(Promotions// New Products); Order Forecast.  
 
Applying the design artifact leads to a design where agents can perform activities 
that heretofore were manual. Standardized ontologies represent component, process, and 
security knowledge for streamlining collaborative eBusiness processes, while semantic 
inter-operability problems are solved in a systematic manner that lends itself to 
automation. To identify the key organizational roles and functions associated with the 
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Create and Generate Order Forecast, we interviewed the Organization A’s director of 
planning and replenishment. We gathered information about the roles and permissions 
that the different actors have in the Create Order Forecast and Generate Order processes 
and analyzed them using RBAC (Sandhu et. al, 1996), to develop the role-activity-
resource permissions shown in Table 9. Three primary roles, namely planning, 
replenishment, and demand forecast are shown. It is noteworthy that the buyer 
organization presents similar roles to those of Organization A. 
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Agent Role Business Activity 
Permission 
Type (Write, 
Read, Create, 
Delete) 
Resource 
Buyer 
Planning 
Agent 
Planning 
Role 
Receive 
Adjustments 
Read Adjustments 
  Communicate POS 
Data 
Read POS Data 
  Communicate 
Events Calendar 
Read Events Calendar 
  Communicate 
Available Stock 
Read Available Stock 
  Communicate Order 
(Promotions//New 
products) 
Read Order 
(Promotions//New 
products) 
Buyer 
Replenishme
nt 
Agent 
Replenishme
nt 
Role 
Communicate 
Inventory Strategy 
Read Inventory Strategy 
  Communicate Sales 
Forecast 
Read Sales Forecast 
  Communicate 
Exception 
Resolution 
Read Exception 
Resolution Data 
Seller 
Planning 
Agent 
Planning 
Role 
Communicate 
Adjustment 
Read Adjustment 
  Communicate 
CPFR Policies 
Read CPFR Policies 
  Communicate Item 
Management Data 
Read Item Management 
Data 
  Create Order 
Forecast 
Read POS Data, Events 
Calendar, Inventory 
Strategy, Available 
Stock, Sales 
Forecast, Exception 
Resolution Data, 
CPFR Policies, 
Item Management 
Data, Historical 
Demand  & 
Shipment Data 
   Create/Write/Re
ad 
Order Forecast 
Seller 
Forecast 
Agent 
Demand 
Forecast 
Role 
Communicate 
Historical Demand 
& Shipment  
Read Historical Demand 
& Shipment Data 
  Communicate Order 
Shipment Data 
Read Order Shipment 
Data 
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Agent Role Business Activity 
Permission 
Type (Write, 
Read, Create, 
Delete) 
Resource 
Seller 
Replenishme
nt 
Agent 
Replenishme
nt 
Role 
Receive Order Read Order 
  Communicate Item 
Management Data 
Read Item Management 
Data 
  Communicate 
Cancellations 
Read Cancellations 
  Generate Actual 
Order 
Read Order (Promotions 
and New Products), 
Order Forecast,  
Item Management 
Data 
Cancellations 
  Create/Write/Re
ad 
Order 
Table 9. Security Analysis for role-activity-resource permissions for the Organization 
A’s Create Order Forecast and Generate Order processes 
 
Using the atomics concepts, grammar, and relationships from our artifact, we 
show how the Create Order Forecast and Generate Order processes can be mapped to 
the semantic activity-resource coordination of the design artifact.  Figure 9 shows the 
secure semantic activity-resource coordination for the Create Order Forecast business 
process.  
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We show the ontological engineering using DL-based definitions for the activity 
resource coordination for Organization A. It is important to highlight that these demand 
requirement characteristics are intended to serve as examples and they are not exhaustive. 
In the create order forecast business process, the buyer business enterprise is represented 
by a buyer planning agent and by a buyer replenishment agent. The security of the 
Organization A’s Generate Order Forecast and Create Order business process is 
incorporated through the role-activity-resource permissions mapping.  
PlanningRole  ⊆   
 (=1 isRepresentedBy . BuyerPlanningrAgent ) ∧ 
(=1 Performs. ReceiveAdjustments) ∧ 
  (=1 Performs. CommunicatePOSData) ∧ 
  (=1 Performs. CommunicateEventsCalendar) ∧ 
  (=1 Performs. CommunicateInventoryStrategy) ∧ 
(=1 Performs. CommunicateAvailableStock) ∧ 
  (=1 Performs. CommunicateOrder_Promotions_New Products) ∧ 
  (=1 Performs. CommunicateOrderForecast) 
 
ReplenishmentRole ⊆   
 (=1 isRepresentedBy . BuyerReplenishmentAgent ) ∧ 
   (=1 Performs. CommunicateSalesForecast) ∧ 
                 (=1 Performs. CommunicateExceptionResolution)  
   
The business activities: Receive Adjustments, Communicate Adjustments, and 
Create Order, and the resources: Adjustments and Order Forecast, from Figure 9, are 
critical to this business process and their DLs are shown in Appendixes B5-B9.  
These DL formalisms provide computationally feasible knowledge representation 
mechanisms for business processes for both VICS-CPFR and Organization A’s case 
study. This forms the basis for the development of machine interpretable knowledge 
representation in the OWL-DL format. We utilize DL as the knowledge representation 
formalism to express structured knowledge in a format amenable for intelligent software 
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agents to reason with it in a normative manner. Understanding the inherent relationships 
among business processes within and between organizations is a key topic of the 
information systems field.  
All DL knowledge representations presented in this research have been 
developed, validated and checked for consistency using Protégé and Racer. These tools 
generate OWL-DL knowledge representations essential to development of semantic 
collaborative inter-organizational business processes incorporating reasoning and 
inferencing mechanisms based on DL-formalism. The use of standard semantic models 
such as W3C’s OWL (Web Ontology Language) and OWL-DL transforms this approach 
into a truly implementable framework without loss of theoretical robustness. These 
provide the basis for practitioners to initiate further development and evaluation of secure 
semantic eBusiness processes that are semantically rich, highly coordinated and 
seamlessly integrated.  
By applying the SSeBP design theory to COFGO business processes, we provide 
the foundation to develop semantic wrappers aimed at reducing manual inputs and 
adjustments. The standard ontology that is used to represent the information related to 
such adjustments and activities are represented in a machine-readable format. This allows 
the activity to be automatically performed by seller and buyer agents while managing 
semantic inter-operability in a secure and coordinated manner.  
As the final step of SSeBP design theory observational evaluation, the semantic 
process mappings presented in the previous section were the subject of multiple 
discussions with managers and analysts at Organization A. Such stakeholders are directly 
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responsible for systems support for demand forecasting, capacity planning and customer 
development with specific responsibility for the business with the customer organization. 
In addition, we held follow-up interviews with the CIO of the organization and the 
director of planning and replenishment. Specifically, the proposed artifact was evaluated 
with respect to the motivating problems identified before. The results show that the 
proposed artifact allows for mapping and representing security requirements of business 
processes leading to segregation of duties and non-repudiation of business activities. 
 Organization A’s CIO recognizes that SSeBP design artifacts would help them to 
develop formal controls to guarantee the integrity and confidentiality of critical data 
sources in the context of a business process.  The SSeBP artifacts describe access control 
and security constructs that allow local and global entities to share and describe various 
security requirements in common semantics for distributed knowledge and information 
exchange. Paraphrasing the remarks of Organization A’s CIO, this helps us understand 
the delicate balance between accessibility, transparency and security and allows us to put 
documented security needs on the table in discussions with the customer organizations. 
In addition, the SSeBP design artifact lays the foundations for semantic conflict 
resolution and integration of multiple dispersed data and information sources by 
providing common semantics for distributed knowledge and information exchange. 
Delineation of a common ontological structure for the information exchanged between 
the organizations provides a basis to move manual processes back into the systems.  
Implementing a common ontology of resources for these business activities will allow 
Organization A to move these activities from a time-consuming and error prone manual 
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process that is currently conducted out of the system to one that requires managerial 
oversight and approval. In this way, errors can be avoided and significant amounts of 
time can be saved by managing the semantic conflict resolution by exception rather than 
as the norm, as is the current practice. Organization A currently hosts weekly meetings 
with the customer where managers sit with individual laptops and resolve issues with 
semantic conflicts for a variety of ad-hoc issues including new products, promotion codes 
for the customer organization and packaging issues for Organization A and product 
bundling for promotions. When conflicts are resolved and agreements are reached, the 
revised information is manually entered by customer development officers and directors 
of planning and execution. The proposed SSeBP design artifacts can be used to develop 
semantic wrappers to dynamically solve semantic conflicts and feed the subsequent 
systems. An overall view of the business process and its constituent business activities, 
along with semantically consistent ontological definitions of the various resources 
utilized in the business process, assists in common vocabulary for establishing and 
institutionalizing a standard vocabulary of terms used in the process. This saves valuable 
time and money, and also reduces the chance of errors in data input, in the affected 
business process. Organization A’s director of planning and replenishment said “this kind 
of approach will help us to integrate multiple dispersed data and information sources, to 
reduce inaccurate information and errors, and definitively it will assist us in advancing 
toward having real collaborative processes”.  
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A primary motivation of SSeBP design artifacts is to analyze, express and 
incorporate access control policies that comply with security requirements for activities 
and resources involved in business processes within and across organizations. 
Organization A’s management expressed that the proposed IT artifact requires them 
analyze and define the relationships between organizational roles, and the activities that 
they perform. It assists in analysis of roles and in the identification of issues with 
segregation of duties within and across the organization in the context of the eBusiness 
process. The analysis, with the resultant secure activity resource coordination mapping 
provides everyone, including the customer organization, with a detailed representation of 
the inter-organizational business process. This includes the activities to be performed, the 
resources produced and consumed by the activities and their inter-relationships. In 
addition, it provides an analysis of the organizational roles needed by both organizations. 
The SSeBP design artifact provides an understanding of the resources that are needed by 
the activities and the human or software agents that will have access to these resources. 
The mapping provides granular information about the organizational responsibilities 
associated with a particular role and allows process designers to incorporate a detailed 
analysis of the security requirements of the business process for partner organizations. 
This creates the foundations for incorporating security requirements as functional 
requirements in the early analysis of the business processes, which is critically needed in 
the development of methods for the design of secure information systems (Siponen et al., 
2006).   
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Based on the findings from the discussion and follow-up interviews, business and 
IT executives felt that the proposed IT artifact has significant impact on the issues that 
are considered in the planning of business processes, as well as the systems that support 
them. They were most interested in the security aspects of the planning processes. In 
particular, they were interested in incorporating a review of the security requirements and 
policy needs of business activities. Since Organization A has recently undertaken a 
significant Sarbanes-Oxley compliance effort, the issues of segregation of duty and non-
repudiation of business activities were of significant interest. In particular, the systematic 
management of exceptions and demand forecast adjustments through the mapping 
presented in this research was perceived as useful for the organization. An additional 
benefit of the concepts presented in this research as perceived by the Organization A was 
the possibility of dynamic and flexible supply chain configuration for handling ad-hoc 
requests from the customer organization. Common and shared ontology serve as a means 
to resolve conflicts and move towards more seamless integration between systems within 
and across both Organization A and the customer organization in a secure manner.  
We have shown how SSeBP design theory atomic concepts and grammar can be 
applied to analyze and represent real-world core business processes. Specifically, SSeBP 
design artifacts allow the analysis and design of business processes that require the 
exchange of information and knowledge resources within and across organizations while 
a secure and seamless flow of information and knowledge are guaranteed.   By using real 
core business processes, we capture both the information and knowledge, including 
component, process, and security knowledge related to the business processes and the 
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richness of the organizational environment. SSeBP design artifacts’ utility was evaluated 
and demonstrated by using the inputs from different stakeholders. We illustrate how 
SSeBP design theory provides a holistic framework to integrate component, process, and 
security knowledge that enables the sharing of information and knowledge resources in a 
coordinated and secure manner within and across organizations of a value chain. Thus, 
we have shown using an observational evaluation method that the SSeBP design theory 
prescribes the models (meta-requirements); methods (development practices), and 
mechanism for artifact instantiation (system solution) as suggested by Hevner et al. 
(2004) and Walls et al. (1992).    
 
4.3. Experimental Evaluation of the Secure Semantic eBusiness Process 
Design Theory 
In design science research, experimental evaluations assess the utility of design 
artifacts, which are the instantiations of the design theories. Evaluating the proposed 
design theory using an experiment empirically demonstrates the qualities of the artifact 
(Hevner et al., 2004) and allows for the generalizability of the findings.  Walls et al. 
(1992) suggest an experimental design where the performance of the experimental group 
using the IT artifact is compared against the performance of the control group not using 
the IT artifact.  
A primary purpose of the SSeBP design theory is to incorporate security 
requirements into the conceptualization of business processes. The experimental 
evaluation of SSeBP design theory assesses how design artifacts developed using SSeBP 
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generates awareness of security constraints in modeling the secure exchange of 
information resources in coordinated business processes.  Situational Awareness (SA) 
(Endsley, 1995) theory explains how individuals perceive, comprehend, and predict 
elements’ meaning and status.  We use Situational Awareness theory as foundation to 
assess how an individual perceives, comprehends, and predicts security elements in the 
context of a business process.  
UML-Use case, sequence, collaboration and activities diagrams are relevant for 
process modeling (Glassey, 2008). However, the UML approach does not specifically 
address security aspects during the analysis and design phases of information systems or 
business processes. Siponen et al. (2006) propose a meta-notation framework to represent 
and analyze information systems security requirements. They extend the UML-Use Case 
to incorporate security requirements into the design phase. Enriched-Use Case 
incorporates security constraints, security subjects, and security actors into the design of 
information systems. We empirically evaluate the difference between the security 
awareness generated by the SSeBP design artifact and the security awareness generated 
by the Enriched-Use Case (Siponen et al., 2006) and UML-Activity diagram. 
Specifically, we study how SSeBP design artifacts and the Enriched-Use Case (Siponen 
et al., 2006) and UML-Activity diagrams allow analysts to identify, explain and predict 
security constraints and violations in a business process.  
The following sections describe this empirical evaluation including the research 
model, research hypotheses, experimental design, data analysis, and results. 
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4.3.1. Research Model 
Business process models are used to increase the awareness and knowledge about 
business processes and to decouple organizational complexity (Davenport, 1993; 
Hammer and Champy, 1993).  Existing methods for the design of secure information 
systems still lack a conceptualization of secure business process. We evaluate the utility 
of SSeBP design theory in representing security constraints in the conceptualization of a 
secure business process. We use situational awareness theory (Endsley, 1995) to 
empirically evaluate the SSeBP design artifacts against the Enriched-Use case (Siponen et 
al., 2006) and UML-activity diagram. We assess how SSeBP design artifacts help in 
developing a greater level of security awareness.  
We argue that when security specifications are incorporated as functional 
requirements early in the modeling and analysis of business processes, analysts become 
more aware of security constraints and possible violations resulting into more secure 
business processes. This, in turn, leads to the incorporation of security policies and 
constraints in subsequent stages of information systems development, including 
modeling, analysis, and design. 
We expect that SSeBP design artifacts lead to greater security awareness, 
including the perception, comprehension, and prediction of security requirements and 
constraints in business processes. Figure 10 shows the research model.  
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Figure 10. Research Model to Test Security Awareness 
 
 
4.3.1.1. Research Hypotheses 
According to Larkin and Simon (1987, p. 67) “two representations are 
informationally equivalent if all the information in the one is also inferable from the 
other, and vice versa”. Even though SSeBP and the Enriched-Use Case and UML-
Activity diagrams provide two different representations for the same business process, we 
must ensure that SSeBP design artifacts are at least informationally equivalent to 
Enriched-Use Case and UML-Activity diagrams in capturing the dynamics of business 
processes. Only then we guarantee that our approach is at least as good as existing 
approaches and does not create any loss of information about the business process.  
Therefore, we must first test that the two approaches are informationally equivalent. This 
is tested in hypothesis H1 by comparing the inferences that users make about the business 
processes represented using SSeBP design artifacts and the Enriched-Use Case (Siponen 
et al. 2006) combined with the UML- activity diagrams.  
H1: Business Process Models (BPM) represented by SSeBP and Enriched-
UseCase combined with UML activity diagrams are informationally 
equivalent. 
Security Awareness
•Perception of Security Elements in 
Current Situation
•Comprehension of Security Current 
Situation
•Prediction of Future Security State
Security Design Methods
•SSeBP IT artifact
•Enriched Use Case and Activity 
Diagram
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A primary goal of conceptual process modeling of business processes is to 
provide a better understating about activities, resources, and dependencies present. In 
particular, a business process model (BPM) developed using SSeBP design theory must 
convey a better security awareness than those  developed using Enriched-Use Case and 
UML-Activity diagram. We hypothesize that: 
 
H2: BPM developed using SSeBP Artifact creates a higher level of security 
awareness than a Business process model developed using an Enriched Use 
Case and Activity Diagram. 
 
More specifically: 
 
H2a: BPM developed using SSeBP Artifact creates a more accurate perception 
of security elements (i.e.: segregation of duties, non-repudiation, and 
authorization), in a business process than those using the Enriched Use Case 
and Activity Diagram. 
 
H2b: BPM developed using SSeBP Artifact creates a more accurate 
comprehension perception of security elements (i.e.: segregation of duties, 
non-repudiation, and authorization) in a business process than those using the 
Enriched Use Case and Activity Diagram. 
 
H2c: BPM developed using the SSeBP Artifact creates a more accurate 
prediction of the future security state of the business process, that those using 
the Enriched Use Case and Activity Diagram. 
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4.3.2. Experimental Design 
An experimental design consists of four elements: (i) a set of treatments; (ii) a set 
of experimental units; (iii) rules for assigning treatments to experimental units; and (iv) 
measurements on the experimental units (Neter et al., 1990).  
We empirically compare the utility of two treatments in generating security 
awareness. A simplified version of a “create order forecast” business process was 
selected as the scenario for both treatments. We based our selection on the fact that 
“create order forecast” business process requires that business partners exchange high 
volume of information in a secure and coordinated manner. With the help of demand and 
forecast analysts from Organization A, we developed the description for the scenario. 
Appendix D presents the narrative for the “create order forecast” business process. 
Treatment A consists of Enriched-Use Case and UML-Activity Diagram. We followed 
Siponen et al. (2006) guidelines to develop the Enriched-Use Case representation, and to 
develop the UML-Activity diagram, we followed the Object Management Group’s 
guidelines (OMG, 2003). Figure 11 and 12 show Enriched-Use Case and UML-Activity 
Diagram respectively. We validated these figures with the help of the CIO and systems 
analysts from the Organization A. 
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Use Case: Create Order Forecast 
Scenario: Create a new Order Forecast 
Brief Description: Determining the right products and quantities that must be 
ordered for the next planning period 
Actors/Security 
Subjects: 
Buyer and Seller 
Security 
Classification of the 
subject: 
All Data Sources are confidential 
 
Security Objects 
and Access Types to 
Security Objects: 
Object:  Buyer Forecast and Inventory Database (the buyer must be 
able to read and write  sales forecast, point of sales (POS) Data, and 
to read  Inventory Strategy) 
 
Object:  Seller Forecast and Inventory Database (the seller must be 
able to read  sales forecast, POS Data, Available Stock, Events 
Calendar, Historical Order Shipment Data) 
 
Object:  Collaborative Planning and Replenishment Database(the 
collaborative systems must be able to read order shipment, CPFR 
policies, Inventory Strategy and Item Management Data.  The 
collaborative system must be able to read and write the seller and 
buyer adjustment forecast and the order forecast) 
 
Security 
Policy/Specific 
Security 
Restrictions 
Buyer and Seller are only allowed to access security objects 
classified as confidential with the planning and replenishment 
department 
Preconditions: All the Data Sources exists  
Flow of Events: Actor: 
 1. The buyer generates and consolidates its point of sales 
(POS Data)  
2. The buyer generates the initial Sales forecast 
3. The seller retrieves the buyer’s POS data, available stock, 
events calendars, and historical order shipment data. 
4. The seller generates an initial Sales forecast 
5. The buyer sends its inventory strategy 
6. The seller sends the order shipment data and retrieve 
CFPR policies and Item Management Data 
7. The collaborative system generates the exceptions 
resolution data 
8. The collaborative system generates the adjustments to the 
seller and buyer Sales forecast  
Exception 
Conditions: 
If information about any object is not available, an appropriate error 
message is produced. 
Figure 11. Enriched- Use Case for the “create order forecast” business process 
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Figure 12.  UML- Activity Diagram for the “create order forecast” business process 
 
Treatment B consists of the representation of the “create order forecast” business 
process using the SSeBP design artifacts. We followed SSeBP design theory design 
principles to develop the SSeBP Role-Activity-Resource Permissions and the SSeBP 
Secure Activity Resource Coordination diagram for the selected business process, which 
are depicted in figure 13 and 14 respectively. 
Buyer Collaborative System Seller 
Generate POS Data
Generate Sales 
Forecast
Generate Initial Sales 
Forecast-Buyer
Retrieve POS Data
Retrieve Sales 
Forecast
Retrieve Available 
Stock
Retrieve Events 
Calendar
Retrieve Historical 
Order Shipment Data
Generate Initial Sales 
Forecast-Seller
Generate Exceptions 
Resolution Data
Send Order Shipment 
Data
Retrieve Item 
Management Data
Retrieve CPFR 
Policies
Send Inventory 
Strategy
Generate Adjustments to 
Seller & Buyer Sales 
Forecast
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Agent Role Business 
Activity 
Permission Type Resource 
Buyer 
Planning 
Agent 
Buyer 
Planning Role 
Generate POS 
Data 
Create/Write/Read POS Data 
  Generate Buyer 
Initial Sales 
Forecast 
Create/Write/Read Buyer Initial 
Forecast Sales 
   Read POS Data, 
Sales Forecast 
Buyer 
Replenishment 
Agent 
Buyer 
Replenishment 
Role 
Communicate 
Sales Forecast 
Read Sales Forecast 
  Communicate 
Inventory 
Strategy 
Read Inventory 
Strategy 
  Communicate 
Exceptions 
Resolution 
Data 
Read Exceptions 
Resolution 
Data 
Seller 
Forecasting 
Agent 
Seller 
Forecasting 
Role 
Retrieve POS 
Data 
Read POS Data 
  Retrieve Sales 
Forecast 
Read Sales Forecast 
  Generate Seller 
Initial Sales 
Forecast 
Create/Write/Read Seller Initial 
Sales Forecast 
   Read POS Data, 
Sales Forecast, 
Available 
Stock, Events 
Calendar, 
Historical 
Demand 
Shipment Data 
Seller Planning 
Agent 
Seller Planning 
Role 
Retrieve 
Available Stock 
Read Available 
Stock 
  Retrieve Events 
Calendar 
Read Events 
Calendar 
  Communicate 
Historical 
Demand & 
Shipment Data 
Read Historical 
Demand  & 
Shipment Data 
  Communicate 
Order Shipment 
Read Order 
Shipment 
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Agent Role Business 
Activity 
Permission Type Resource 
  Communicate 
CPFR Policies 
Read CPFR Policies 
  Communicate 
Item 
Management 
Data 
Read Item 
Management 
Data 
  Generate 
Exceptions 
Order Forecast 
Read Inventory 
Strategy, Buyer 
Initial Sales 
Forecast, Seller 
Initial Sales 
Forecast, Order 
Shipment, 
CPFR Policies, 
Item 
Management 
Data 
   Create/Write/Read Exceptions 
Resolution 
Data  
  Communicate 
Exceptions 
Resolution 
Data 
Read Exceptions 
Resolution 
Data  
Figure 13. SSeBP Role-Activity-Resource Permissions for the “create order forecast” 
business process 
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Experimental designs with repeated measures have several benefits (Keren, 1993; 
Brooks, 1980). First, they have high statistical power due to the fact that there will be a 
positive correlation between treatments. Second, under repeated measures designs, 
subjects act as their own control and the confounding effects due to different subjects’ 
background are minimized. Finally, repeated-measures designs require fewer subjects as 
compared to a between-subject design to achieve the same statistical power level.  
Despite the benefits of repeated-measures designs, a shortcoming of this type of 
experimental design is the existence of a carryover or learning effect (Greenwald, 1976), 
where the former treatment effects are confounded with the results of the first treatment. 
To address the potential negative consequence of the carryover effect, we follow a 
counter-balanced repeated-measures experimental design. The effect of the 
counterbalancing is to spread the unwanted variance arising from the treatment by 
practice or sequence interaction among the different treatments (Laitenberger et al. 2001).  
An experimental design with repeated measures is used to assess the utility of 
both treatments in generating security awareness. Specifically, we follow a crossover 
experimental design with two treatments. Under this experimental design, one group 
receives the treatment sequence AàB and another group receives the sequence Bà A. 
This type of experimental design is equivalent to the 2x2 Latin Square arrangement with 
two treatments and two periods (Williams, 1949). As a result, the treatments effects are 
not confounded by the effect of sequences (Kuehl, 2000). 
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Specifically, in this dissertation, subjects in each group are presented with a 
detailed scenario describing the “create order forecast” business process. The first group 
of subjects is given a representation using an Enriched Use-Case description following 
Siponen et al. (2006) and a UML-activity diagram, (Treatment A). Next, subjects are 
asked to identify elements of security in the models presented to them including the 
authorization constraints and security policies. Then, the subjects in the same group are 
presented with SSeBP design artifacts conceptualization (Treatment B) in a table and 
diagram format of the same business process, followed with a set of questions aimed at 
identifying elements of security in the models presented to them. For the second group 
the sequence of the treatment (Treatment B à Treatment A) is swapped to minimize the 
carryover or learning effect (Laitenberger et al. 2001). Table 10 presents the experimental 
design. 
 
 
Group 1 Enriched Use Case and 
Activity Diagram 
(Treatment A) 
Observation  SSeBP Design Artifacts 
(Treatment B) 
Observation  
Group 2 SSeBP Design Artifacts 
(Treatment B) 
Observation Enriched Use Case and 
Activity Diagram 
(Treatment A) 
Observation 
Table 10. Experimental Design 
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4.3.2.1. Sampling Strategy 
Previous studies aimed at studying conceptual models approaches (Bolloju and 
Leung, 2006), software inspections (Porter et al., 1994) and systems modeling tools 
(Jeyaraj and Sauter, 2007; Danesh and Kock, 2005; Agarwal and Sinha, 2003) have 
successfully used IS students as subjects. This selection is supported by the fact that IS 
students would become information systems and/or business analysts responsible for the 
analysis and design of information systems. Therefore, such students resemble the 
characteristics of information systems and business analysts’ population.   
For this study, the experimental units are human subjects and the sample consists 
of undergraduate and graduate students enrolled in business process information 
technology, information systems analysis and design, and advanced information systems 
courses.  
 Participation in the study was totally voluntary; however, the instructors awarded 
credits for students who participated in the study. Even though there was not a time limit 
for completing the questions of the experiment, the subjects were expected to complete 
the questions in not less than 30 minutes. We used a 30 minute cut-off to determine 
whether or not the subjects answered the questions conscientiously. We set this cut-off 
time based on the numbers of questions of the instrument and on the average time it took 
subjects to complete the experiment during the pilot study.  A total of 154 students 
participated in the study and 84 (54.54%) usable answers were obtained. The average 
time to complete the experiment was 46 minutes, and the minimum and maximum times 
were 30 min. and 110 min. respectively. 
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4.3.2.2. Sample Size 
An analysis of the relevant literature was conducted to identify the appropriate 
sample size to test the differences between SSeBP design artifact and the Enriched Use 
Case (Siponen et. al, 2006) combined with the UML-Activity Diagram. Table 11 lists 
relevant studies with their sample size. 
 
 
 
Reference Sample 
Size 
Subject Types Experimental Design 
Jeyaraj and Sauter 
(2007) 
117 Students Repeated Measurement- Two 
treatments 
Porter et al. (1994) 
48  Students  Repeated Measurement- Two 
treatments 
Laitenberger et al. 
(2001) 
60 Professional 
Software developers 
Replicated Quasi-Experiment 
Two Treatments 
Laitenberger et al. 
(2000) 
18 Practitioners-
Programmers 
Repeated Measurement- Two 
treatments 
Miller et al. (1998) 50 Students Repeated Measurement- Two 
treatments 
Agarwal  and 
Sinha (2003) 
39 Students Single Measurement- Four 
Treatments 
 
Table 11. Sample Sizes Used in Literature 
 
 
 
 
117 
 
Based on the above analysis, a sample size of at least 18 subjects seems to be 
appropriate to obtain a significant power of the statistical test. In addition, Kuehl (2000) 
suggests that the required number of subjects to obtain a power level (1-β) of .95 at an α 
level of 0.01 to be at least 36 subjects and to obtain a power level of .80 at an α level of 
0.01 to be at least 24. Based on the extant literature, for this study, we consider that a 
sample size of at least 50 subjects, students enrolled in information systems related 
courses, to be appropriate. 
 
4.3.2.3. Research Procedure 
Before conducting the study, we obtained approval from the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB), Office of Research Compliance (ORC) at the University of North Carolina 
at Greensboro. Copies of the IRB acceptance document and the project description are 
included in Appendix C. 
Subjects completed a questionnaire about their demographics and experience 
using systems analysis and design methods; UML modeling techniques; business process 
modeling; and analyzing information security requirements. 
The stimulus material in the experiment consists of a “create order forecast” 
business process represented as Enriched-Use case combined with UML-Activity 
diagram and SSeBP design artifacts.  We developed multiple-choice and yes/no type 
questions to assess the level of security awareness generated by each artifact. The use of 
these types of questions reduces subjects’ cognitive burden and facilitate the gathering, 
 
118 
 
verification, and coding of the responses. Appendix D shows the instrument used for this 
study. 
Specifically, to test the level security perception, the first level of situational 
awareness, subjects answered five questions aimed at identifying elements of security in 
the models presented to them including the authorization constraints and security 
policies. The following is an example question to assess security perception: 
 Who has permission to perform the Communicate Inventory Strategy activity? 
a) Buyer Planning Analyst 
b) Buyer Replenishment Analyst 
c) Seller Planning Analyst 
d) Seller Forecasting Analyst 
e) All 
f) None 
g) It cannot be determined from the information given 
h) I do not know 
To test the level of security comprehension, second stage of situational awareness, 
subjects answered five questions aimed at identifying the reasons of security violations. 
Since comprehension involves some type of explanation power, we use a “why/because” 
type questions. The following is an example of the questions to assess security 
perception: 
Why? Because 
a) The Buyer Replenishment Analyst has permission to Read the Inventory 
Strategy information 
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b) The Seller Planning Analyst has permission to Read the Inventory 
Strategy information 
c) All analysts have permission to Read the Inventory Strategy information 
d) Nobody has permission over the Inventory Strategy Information 
e) It cannot be determined from the information given 
f) I do not know 
To test security prediction, subjects were presented with five questions about 
access control violation scenarios and were asked to predict how the business process 
conceptualization would prevent the threat from propagating through the business 
process. To assess security prediction, we asked “what would happen if” type of 
questions. The following is an example of the questions to assess security perception: 
What would happen if the Replenishment analyst from the buyer organization 
does not have permission to read the Inventory Strategy information? 
a) The Communicate Order Shipment activity would not be performed 
b) The Generate Exceptions Order Forecast activity would not be 
performed 
c) The execution of the remaining activities would not be affected 
d) The Generate Buyer Initial Sales forecast activity would not be 
performed 
e) It cannot be determined from the information given 
f) I do not know 
Finally, to test the level of business process coordination and the information 
equivalence of the two approaches, using five questions subjects were asked to identify 
elements of workflows such as predecessors and successors activities needed to complete 
 
120 
 
the business process. The following is an example of the questions to assess security 
perception: 
Can the activity Generate Exceptions Order Forecast be executed before 
retrieving CPFR Policies? Yes___  No___ 
 
In addition, using six questions, the subjects were asked about their perceptions 
on the utility and efficacy of the SSeBP design artifacts and the Enriched-Use Case 
combined with the UML-Activity diagram.  These six questions are assessed using a 
Likert-scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is equal to “strongly disagree” and 5 is equal to 
“strongly agree”.  
Since we are using an experiment with counter-balanced repeated-measures 
approach, we ensured that all subjects were exposed to both treatments.  To achieve this, 
subjects were randomly assigned to two groups.  Using a different treatment sequence, 
each group received both treatments. Then after each treatment, subjects were asked the 
same questions related to security perception, security comprehension, security 
prediction, and business process coordination. Color coded questionnaires were used to 
avoid confusion. 
It is important to highlight that although feedback helps subjects understand their 
performance, subjects did not receive any kind of feedback to alleviate the problems 
related to the learning effect (Basili et al. 1998, Laitenberger et al, 2000). In addition, 
given the effect that time constrains could have over the subject’s performance (Benbasat 
and Dexter, 1986; McDaniel, 1990; Payne et al., 1980), we did not impose any time limit 
to finishing the experiment. 
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The experiment was conducted between November 2007 and February 2008 and 
it was run at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro and at North Carolina State 
University. A total of 154 responses were obtained. 
 
4.3.3. Data Analysis 
In this section, we provide a detailed analysis of the data collected from the 
experiment. Sample demographics and descriptive statistics are summarized. Results 
from the carryover effect test using the procedure suggested by Grizzle (1965) are 
presented. Finally, based on the research model, the research hypotheses are tested using 
paired t-tests. All of the statistical procedures in this study were conducted using SAS 
version 9.1 running in a Windows environment. 
 
4.3.3.1. Data Preparation 
An important step for hypothesis testing is to make sure that the data are in the 
appropriate form. In this particular case, we use several Microsoft Excel spreadsheets to 
load and clean the data obtained from the experiment. After the data were loaded into MS 
Excel, using an answer key the data were then recoded to either correct-value of one, or 
incorrect-value of zero. Only a few missing values were found and were treated as wrong 
answers. After a thorough review of the data, inconsistent responses were dropped from 
the final data set. 
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4.3.3.2. Sample Demographics 
The sample of 84 responses was analyzed based on gender, age, education level, 
and primary occupation. Tables 12 to 14 provide demographic information about the 
sample. 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Female 35 41.67% 
Male 49 58.33% 
Table 12. Gender Distribution 
 
 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Less than 18 years 0 0% 
18-25 years 51 60.71% 
26-35 years 25 29.76% 
36-55 years 7 8.33% 
More than  55 1 1.19% 
Table 13. Age Distribution 
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 Frequency Percent 
High School 0 0% 
Some Years of 
college 
44 52.38% 
Bachelors Degree 29 34.52% 
Masters Degree 10 11.90% 
Doctorate Degree 1 1.19% 
Table 14. Educational Level Distribution 
 
 
 
Table 14 shows that there is an even representation of undergraduate and graduate 
students in the sample. 
 
 
 Frequency Percent 
Full time Employee 18 21.43% 
Part Time Employee 17 20.24% 
Self-Employed 4 4.76% 
Full Time Student   45 53.57% 
Table 15. Primary Occupation Distribution 
 
Table 15 shows that an even representation of full time students and professionals 
exists in the sample.  In addition, the sample was analyzed to determine the subjects’ 
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level of experience using System Development Methodologies (SDM), Use Case 
Diagram and Activity Diagrams.  
 
 Frequency Percent 
No experience in SDM          28 33.33% 
College experience in 
SDM          
49 58.33% 
Industrial experience in 
SDM   
7 8.33% 
Table 16. Level of Experience using System Development Methodologies (SDM) 
 
 
 
UML Technique In School At Work 
Activity Diagrams Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
None 25 29.76% 69 82.14% 
Less than 6 months 42 50% 11 13.10% 
More than 6 months and less 
than 1 years 
12 14.29% 1 1.19% 
More than 1 year and less than 2 
years 
4 4.76% 1 1.19% 
More than 2 years 1 1.19% 2 2.38% 
Table 17.  Level of Experience using UML- Activity Diagrams 
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UML Technique In School At Work 
Use Case  Frequency Percent Frequency Percent 
None 56 66.67% 83 98.81% 
Less than 6 months 19 22.62% 0 0% 
More than 6 months and less 
than 1 years 
7 8.33% 0 0% 
More than 1 year and less than 2 
years 
1 1.19% 0 0% 
More than 2 years 1 1.19% 1 1.19% 
Table 18.  Level of Experience using UML- Use Case  
 
 
 
Tables 17 and 18 show that about 30% of the subjects did not have experience 
using UML-activity diagrams and that 67 % of subjects  did not have experience using 
UML-Use Case. These sample’s characteristics were expected; therefore, we included an 
explanation of how to read UML diagrams in the experiment. 
 
4.3.3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
The descriptive statistics for each treatment are broken down into security 
perception, security comprehension, security prediction, and business process 
coordination items. Tables 19 and 20 present the minimum (Min), maximum (Max), 
Mean, Standard Deviation, Skewness, and Kurtosis for each treatment. 
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 Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Security Perception 0 5 1.607 0.905 0.769 1.605 
Security Comprehension 0 4 1.083 1.1323 0.802 -0.187 
Security Prediction 0 4 1.488 1.124 0.238 -0.970 
Business Process 
Coordination 
0 4 1.535 1.155 0.126 -1.115 
Table 19. Descriptive Statistics for the Enriched-Use Case combined with UML-Activity 
Diagram 
 
 
 
             
 Min Max Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Skewness Kurtosis 
Security Perception 0 5 4.095 1.001 -1.448 2.9712 
Security Comprehension 1 5 3.654 1.023 -0.568 0.016 
Security Prediction 0 5 2.547 1.206 -0.240 -0.200 
Business Process 
Coordination 
0 4 2.5 1.207 -0.126 -1.263 
Table 20. Descriptive Statistics for the SSeBP Design artifacts 
 
 
 
A common rule-of-thumb for normality test is to compute the Skewness and 
Kurtosis values for the sample. Based on the Skewness and Kurtosis values, several cut-
off points are suggested for normality test.  For instance, the most stringent criterion is to 
use a range of -1 to +1 for Skewness and Kurtosis. In addition, some authors suggest a 
range of -2 to +2. And some more moderate authors suggest a range of -3 to +3 (Boneau, 
1960; Cohen, 1969). Based on those cut-off points for normality test, it seems appropriate 
to conclude that the collected data for both treatments fall within the normally 
distribution range.  
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In addition, we use six questions with a five point Likert-scale to compare the 
subjects’ perceptions about the utility of the two treatments. We are interested in 
determining if SSeBP design artifacts are perceived to be superior to the Enriched-Use 
Case and UML-Activity diagrams. Interestingly, SSeBP design artifacts are perceived to 
be better than the Enriched-Use Case and UML-Activity diagrams in representing 
security aspects of a business process. Table 21 summarizes the results for the subjects’ 
perceptions about the two methods. 
 
 
Question  SSeBP’s  
Mean 
Enriched USeCase & 
UML-Activity 
Diagram’s mean 
Question 1: These diagrams help me to identify the 
security aspects of a business process 
3.59 
 
2.40 
Question 2: These diagrams help me to understand 
the security aspects of a business process 
3.52 2.36 
Question 3: These diagrams help me to determine 
what would happen with the business process 
when security aspects are violated 
3.38 
 
2.45 
Question 4: The security aspects depicted in the 
diagrams are easy to understand  
3.44 
 
2.38 
Question 5: Representations of processes using 
this approach are clear  
3.64 
 
2.67 
Question 6: Representations of processes using 
this approach provide useful security information  
3.46 
 
2.34 
Table 21.  Results for the subjects’ perceptions about the two methods 
Note: 1= Strongly Disagree; 5 =Strongly Agree 
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4.3.3.4. Carryover Effect  
Carryover, residual, or learning effect is defined as the effect of the treatment 
from the previous time period on the response at the current time period. It occurs when 
the effect of a treatment given in the first time period persists into the second period and 
distorts the effect of the second treatment. Only if the preliminary test for carryover is not 
significant, the data from both periods are analyzed in the usual manner (Grizzle, 1965). 
Following Grizzle’s procedure to test for carryover effect, we conducted an ordinary least 
squares (OSL) analysis of variance test with a standard α-level of 0.05 to determine 
whether there is a carryover effect for the different stages of the security awareness and 
business process coordination. 
For the security perception, we failed to detect a carryover effect (p-value= 
0.0614) for the different sequence of treatments. As a result, the order in which the 
treatments are applied (i.e.: Enriched-Use Case combined with UML-Activity 
Diagramsà SSeBP artifacts vs. SSeBP artifacts à Enriched-Use Case combined with 
UML-Activity Diagram) does not have an effect over the observed results for the security 
perception. 
For the security comprehension, we failed to detect a carryover effect (p-value= 
0.1100) for the different sequence of treatments. In other words, the order in which the 
treatments are applied does not have an effect over the observed results for the security 
comprehension. 
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For the security prediction, we failed to detect a carryover effect (p-value= 0. 
1068) for the different sequence of treatments. It means that the order in which the 
treatments are applied does not have an effect over the observed results for the security 
prediction. 
For the business process coordination, we failed to detect a carryover effect (p-
value= 0.4124) for the different sequence of treatments. In other words, the order in 
which the treatments are applied does not have an effect over the observed results for the 
business process coordination items. 
Given that a carryover effect was not detected for any of the stages of the security 
awareness and business process coordination, the data from both periods can be analyzed 
in the usual manner (Grizzle, 1965). 
 
4.3.3.5. Hypotheses Testing 
To test our hypotheses, we need to determine whether the mean of one group is 
statistically significant greater than the mean of another group.  A paired t-test is suitable 
to test mean differences between two groups for repeated measures (Westgard and Hunt, 
1973). In addition, t-test statistic is robust against violations of normality and 
homogeneity of data (Aron and Aron, 1994; Shapiro and Wilk, 1968). We test our 
hypotheses using a paired t-test.  Since there are not previous studies that compare SSeBP 
design artifacts and the Enriched-Use Case combined with UML-Activity diagrams, the 
effect size for this kind of experiment has not been established; therefore, the a priori 
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power analysis cannot be determined. In this case, literature recommends a power level 
of at least 0.8 as a threshold value (Cohen, 1988).  Studies with power levels higher than 
0.8 have a high probability of rejecting the null hypotheses if they were false (Cohen, 
1988).  In addition, it is an accepted practice to set an α level of 0.05 to test hypotheses 
(Fisher, 1948). We adopt a power level of 0.80 and an α level of 0.05. 
 
H1: Business Process Models (BPM) represented by SSeBP and Enriched-Use 
Case combined with UML activity diagrams are informationally equivalent. 
 
For H1, we empirically compared the mean of the business process coordination’s 
questions of each treatment.  Using a paired t-test.  The data support H1 with a p-
value<=0.001 and an observed power of 0.999. 
 
H2: BPM developed using the SSeBP Artifact creates a higher level of security 
awareness than a Business process model developed using an Enriched Use Case 
and Activity Diagram. 
 
For H2, we empirically compared the mean of the 15 security awareness questions for 
each treatment.  Using a paired t-test, the data support H2 with a p-value<=0.001 and an 
observed power of 0.999. 
 
H2a: BPM developed using the SSeBP Artifact creates a more accurate 
perception of security elements (i.e.: segregation of duties, non-repudiation, and 
authorization), in a business process than those using the Enriched Use Case and 
Activity Diagram. 
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For H2a, we empirically compared the mean of the 5 security perception questions for 
each treatment.  Using a paired t-test, the data support H2a with a p-value<=0.001 and an 
observed power of 0.999. 
 
H2b: BPM developed using the SSeBP Artifact creates a more accurate 
comprehension perception of security elements (i.e.: segregation of duties, non-
repudiation, and authorization) in a business process than those using the 
Enriched Use Case and Activity Diagram. 
 
For H2b, we empirically compared the mean of the 5 security comprehension questions 
for each treatment.  Using a paired t-test, the data support H2b with a p-value<=0.001 
and an observed power of 0.999. 
 
H2c: BPM developed using the SSeBP Artifact creates a more accurate 
prediction of the future security state of the business process, that those using the 
Enriched Use Case and Activity Diagram. 
 
For H2c, we empirically compared the mean of the 5 security prediction questions for 
each treatment.  Using a paired t-test, the data support H2c with a p-value<=0.001 and an 
observed power of 0.999. Table 22 summarizes the hypotheses testing results. 
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Hypothesis p-value; 
Observed power 
Supported//Not 
Supported 
H1: Business Process Models (BPM) represented by 
SSeBP and Enriched-Use Case combined with  UML 
activity diagrams are informationally equivalent 
p-value<=0.001; 
observed   power 
=0.999 
Supported 
H2: BPM developed using the SSeBP Artifact 
creates a higher level of security awareness than a 
Business process model developed using an Enriched 
Use Case and Activity Diagram 
p-value<=0.001; 
observed 
power=0.999 
Supported 
H2a: BPM developed using the SSeBP Artifact 
creates a more accurate perception of security 
elements (i.e.: segregation of duties, non-
repudiation, and authorization), in a business 
process than those using the Enriched Use Case and 
Activity Diagram. 
p-value<=0.001; 
observed 
value=0.999 
Supported 
H2b: BPM developed using the SSeBP Artifact 
creates a more accurate comprehension perception 
of security elements (i.e.: segregation of duties, non-
repudiation, and authorization) in a business process 
than those using the Enriched Use Case and Activity 
Diagram 
p-value<=0.001; 
observed 
power=0.999 
Supported 
H2c: BPM developed using the SSeBP Artifact 
creates a more accurate prediction of the future 
security state of the business process, that those 
using the Enriched Use Case and Activity Diagram 
p-value<=0.001; 
observed 
power=0.999 
Supported 
Table 22. Test of hypotheses summary 
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4.3.3.6. Discussion of Findings  
Business process modeling methods are intended to support the capture, 
representation, organization, and storage of knowledge on the state of an organization. 
The use of formal process modeling methods provides standardized semantics and 
representation and forms a bridge between process analysis and design and process 
implementation (Glassey, 2008). By showing that SSeBP design artifacts are 
informationally equivalent to Enriched-Use Case and UML-Activity Diagrams, we can 
affirm that not only business process represented using SSeBP design theory convey at 
least the same level of information than those business process represented using UML- 
models, but also that SSeBP design artifacts provide the semantics and grammar to 
analyze and represent the dynamics of business process.  
In addition, the results from hypothesis H1 allows us to infer that SSeBP design 
artifacts accurately depict the coordination of activities and data flows needed to 
complete a specific business process. This demonstrates how SSeBP design artifacts 
fulfill the second SSeBP meta-requirement, which states that SSeBP must support 
coordination of dependencies among business activities and information and knowledge 
resources involved in an eBusiness process. 
Hypotheses H2, H2a, H2b, and H2c all were supported by the data. In other 
words, business process models developed using SSeBP design theory generates a greater 
level of security awareness than those developed using Enriched-Use case and UML-
Activity diagrams. A direct implication of this is that when security requirements are 
incorporated as functional requirements in the analysis of business processes, individuals 
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become more aware of security constraints and possible violations. This implies that 
business processes conceptualizations represented using SSeBP design artifacts generate 
greater awareness of security policies and constraints than those represented using 
Enriched-Use Case and UML Activity diagrams. Using the SSeBP design artifacts 
conceptualization of a business process, analysts would be able to better explain the 
current state of security of a business process. If any security violations occur, analysts 
would be able to explain the nature of them, in terms of segregation of duties, non-
repudiation and authorization. In addition, analysts can use this understanding to predict 
the future security state of the business process in the event of a security threat. 
In particular, the data supported hypothesis H2a. This demonstrates that SSeBP 
design artifacts assist subjects to identify security constraints in a business process. 
SSeBP design artifacts clearly represent who (agents/roles) has access to what 
(information resources) and under what conditions. In fact, when subjects used the SSeBP 
design artifacts treatment, they were able to correctly answer 82% of the security 
perception questions in comparison to only 32% when they used the Enriched-Use Case 
and UML-Activity diagram treatment.  In other words, hypotheses H2a indicates that 
SSeBP design artifacts effectively represent access control policies that comply with inter 
and intra-organizational security requirements. This, in turn, shows that SSeBP design 
artifacts are more useful to subjects to decouple the association between agents and 
resources permissions and incorporates roles, permissions, access, and security of 
information and knowledge resources from the business process perspective.  According 
to the situational awareness theory (Endsley, 1995), perception of relevant elements of 
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environment is needed to comprehend and project their status within the near future. It is 
worthwhile to point out that although this finding relates to the security perception aspect 
of the security awareness, it is significant because it forms the basis for the security 
comprehension and prediction.  
Hypothesis H2b was also supported by the data. This indicates that SSeBP design 
artifacts can be used to provide a better understanding of the different security aspects of 
a business process. Interestingly, when subjects used the SSeBP design artifacts treatment 
they were able to correctly answer 73% of the security comprehension questions in 
comparison to only 22% when they use the Enriched-Use Case and UML-Activity 
diagram treatment.   SSeBP design artifacts can be used to explain why certain activities 
have particular permissions over an information resource and can be only executed by 
specific roles fulfilled by specific agents. In addition, SSeBP design artifacts assist 
subjects in understanding which resources are need to complete a specific business 
activity. 
Hypothesis H2c was supported by the data. This shows that SSeBP design 
artifacts allow subjects to make better inferences about future security states of a business 
process. Specifically, when subjects used the SSeBP design artifacts treatment they were 
able to accurately answer 51% of the security predictions questions in comparison to only 
30% when they use the Enriched-Use Case and UML-Activity diagram treatment.   Using 
SSeBP design artifacts, subjects were able to infer that when an activity did not have the 
right permission to read, write, or delete an information resource, the execution of the 
remaining activities may fail, as result the business process could not be completed. In 
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addition, the finding from H2c shows how SSeBP design artifact can be utilized to 
perform what-if type analyses of security violations. In summary, business process 
models developed using SSeBP design artifacts generate a greater level of security 
prediction that those models developed using Enriched-Use Case and UML-Diagram. 
Finally, the findings from the subjects’ perceptions about the utility of the two 
treatments indicate that SSeBP design artifacts are perceived to be superior to Enriched-
Use Case and UML-Activity diagrams in representing security aspects of a business 
process. This is consistent with the findings of hypotheses H2a, H2b, and H2c. Here, 
subjects not only perceived SSeBP design artifacts to be superior, but also they performed 
better when they used SSeBP design artifacts to identify, comprehend, and predict 
security requirements and constrains of a business process.  
SSeBP’s experimental evaluation demonstrates that SSeBP design artifacts can be 
used to effectively represent both coordination and security aspects of a business process.  
SSeBP design theory represents a method to effectively incorporate security requirements 
in the conceptualization of business processes, which in turn leads to a better understating 
and awareness of how to incorporate security as a functional requirement in the 
modeling, analysis, and design of information systems that enable secure business 
processes within and across organizations. 
The utility and efficacy of an IS design theory are established by evaluating its 
outputs, design artifacts.  By showing that the design artifact fulfills the requirements and 
constraints of the problem domain, the researcher demonstrates that the design theory is 
complete and effective (Walls et al., 1992; Simon 1969). We evaluate the efficacy and 
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utility of the SSeBP design theory using a rigorous multi-method approach. First, using a 
descriptive informed argument method, we illustrate SSeBP design artifact’s utility and 
application. Specifically, we apply SSeBP design artifacts to enhance and map critical 
business processes from the prevalent industry-developed Collaborative Planning, 
Forecasting, and Replenishment (CPFR) approach. Second, the SSeBP design theory is 
evaluated using an observational method. We demonstrate how SSeBP design theory is 
used to represent and enhance real core business processes of a business organization. 
Finally, using situational awareness theory (Endsley, 1995), we empirically demonstrate 
how SSeBP design artifacts generate greater security awareness than Enriched-Use Case 
(Siponen et al., 2006) and standard UML activity diagram. Table 23 summarizes the 
results of the SSeBP design theory evaluation. 
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Evaluation 
Method 
Results 
Descriptive 
Evaluation 
demonstrates 
SSeBP design 
theory 
applicability 
to represent 
and enhance 
core business 
process from 
an industry 
standard 
SSeBP meta-requirements, meta-design, and design method, including 
modeling concepts and grammar, can be used to model business 
processes that require a high degree of collaboration and secure 
environment  
 
SSeBP design theory can be used to enhance CPFR business process 
by incorporating security access control requirements and standard 
knowledge representation 
 
Using the atomic concepts of SSeBP design theory, DL formalisms 
were generated and validated for knowledge representation for CPFR 
business process, which forms the basis for the development of 
machine interpretable knowledge representation in the OWL-DL 
format 
Observational 
Evaluation  
demonstrates 
the utility and 
efficacy of 
SSeBP design 
theory in 
modeling and 
enhancing 
security 
aspects of 
core business 
processes of a 
large 
organization 
SSeBP design theory can be used to represent and enhance core 
business processes from a large apparel organization. Organization 
A’s Management and demand and planning analysts perceived the 
following as benefits of SSeBP  design artifact: 
• SSeBP approach provides the foundations to integrate 
heterogeneous  IT systems (Organization A’s CIO) 
• The SSeBP design artifacts allows us to have the big picture 
about the different actors and resources involved in the 
execution of the business processes (Organization A’s Director 
of Planning) 
• This approach facilitates the modeling and analysis of  
organizational functions and responsibilities involved in a 
eBusiness Process (Organization A Demand Analyst ) 
• These diagrams help us understand the delicate balance 
between accessibility, transparency and security (Organization 
A’s CIO ) 
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Evaluation 
Method 
Results 
Experimental 
Evaluation 
empirically 
demonstrates 
the security 
awareness 
generated by 
SSeBP design 
artifact 
against the 
best known 
existing 
approach 
 
We empirically demonstrate that business process models developed 
using SSeBP design theory are superior in representing business 
process’s dynamics to those model developed Enriched-Use Case and 
UML-Activity Diagram  
We empirically validate that business process models developed using 
SSeBP design artifacts generate a greater level of security awareness 
than those models developed using Enriched-Use Case and UML-
Activity Diagram  
SSeBP design artifacts generate greater level of security perception, 
comprehension and prediction than Enriched-Use Case and UML-
Activity Diagram 
Table 23. SSeBP Design Theory Evaluation Results 
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 
This chapter summarizes the main aspects of the SSeBP design theory and 
presents the theoretical and practical implications, limitations of the study, and potential 
future research.  
This research is motivated by the need of a theoretically grounded design method 
that guides the analysis and design of secure and coordinated e-Business processes. 
Following a design science approach, we attempt to answer the research question: How 
can we formulate a design theory to guide the analysis and design of Secure Semantic 
eBusiness processes? We answer that question by developing and evaluating a Secure 
Semantic eBusiness Processes (SSeBP) design theory that provides design principles, 
including modeling concepts and grammar, for the design and development of secure 
eBusiness processes.  
Based on the perspectives of Walls et al. (1992), Hevner et al. (2004), March and 
Smith (1995) and Vaishnavi et al. (2006), the theoretical foundations for the development 
of SSeBP design theory are established. Specifically, after a thorough review of the extant 
literature, kernel theories from the application domain and from the IS knowledge 
domain are analyzed and applied to formulate the SSeBP design theory.  
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In developing the theoretical foundations for our research, we bring together 
multiple theoretical foundations in a design artifact that integrates component knowledge 
of resources (Tallman et al, 2004) involved in a process, process knowledge (van der 
Aalst and Kumar, 2003) including process models, and security knowledge (Sandhu, 
1996) including access control. SSeBP design theory’s kernel theories are listed in Figure 
15.  
 
 
 
Figure 15. SSeBP Design Theory Kernel Theories  
 
 
 
These kernel theories and the characteristics of the problem domain are used to 
define the SSeBP design theory’s meta-requirements. 
i. The SSeBP design theory should allow multiple agents to cooperate in a 
coordinated manner to accomplish goals of an eBusiness process 
ii. The SSeBP design theory must support coordination of dependencies among 
business activities and resources  
Resource Based View of The Firm
Business Process and
Inter-Organizational Workflow
Coordination Theory
Access Control
Situational Awareness Theory
SSeBP
Semantic Web
Semantic eBusiness
Ontology
Description Logic
Functional View of Knowledge
Intelligent Agents
Secure Information Systems Design 
Kernel Theories for IS Knowledge DomainKernel Theories for the Application Domain
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iii. The SSeBP design theory should represent access control policies and 
security requirements for an eBusiness process 
iv. The SSeBP design theory should decouple and simplify association between 
agents and permissions to resources  
v. The SSeBP design theory must describe eBusiness processes in 
unambiguous, computer-interpretable knowledge representation 
vi. The SSeBP design theory should provide an integrative semantic foundation 
that facilitates agents reasoning with process and component knowledge in 
the context of an eBusiness process 
We develop a meta-design, which includes the constructs and relationships 
derived from the analysis of the kernel theories and posited to meet the meta-
requirements. SSeBP design theory meta-design’s atomic-concepts consist of business 
enterprise, agent, role, activity, and resource. Specifically, SSeBP meta-design is 
conceptualized as: in an eBusiness process, a Business Enterprise authorizes 
representation to an actor or Agent to fulfill a Role, which performs Activities that have 
access permissions to resources. Resources permit activities performed by Roles fulfilled 
by Agents that represent Business Enterprises, engaged in an eBusiness Process.  
 Description Logics (DL) provide formalism for theoretical soundness and it 
forms the basis for the development of machine interpretable knowledge representation. 
We develop and validate DL representation for the SSeBP atomic-concepts and their 
relationships.  
A design theory requires a design artifact and a design process. SSeBP design 
theory’s design process provides the guiding principles and procedures (steps) that must 
be followed in order to develop SSeBP design artifacts that satisfy the SSeBP design 
theory’s meta-requirements. 
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The utility and efficacy of an IS design theory are established by evaluating its 
design artifacts.  A design artifact must be evaluated to demonstrate its utility, quality, 
and efficacy.  We assess the efficacy and utility of SSeBP design theory using a rigorous 
multi-method approach which includes descriptive, observational, and experimental 
evaluations. The descriptive evaluation results show that SSeBP design theory can be 
used to represent and enhance core e-business processes of an industry standard. SSeBP 
allows for incorporating security policies and constraints in the analysis and design of e-
business processes. The observational evaluation demonstrates that SSeBP design theory 
can be applied to represent and enhance real core business processes. The experimental 
evaluation shows that SSeBP design artifacts do not incur in any loss of information. The 
findings from the SSeBP design theory’s empirical evaluation clearly demonstrate that 
business models developed using SSeBP design artifacts generate greater security 
awareness than those models developed using Enriched-Use Case and UML-diagrams.  
We follow Hevner et al. guidelines (2004) to summarize the main aspects of the 
SSeBP design theory in Table 24. 
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Guideline SSeBP Description 
Design as an 
Artifact 
We developed the constructs, the models, methods and instantiation for 
the SSeBP design theory. The SSeBP design theory defines the atomic 
concepts (i.e.: business enterprise, agent, role, activity, resource) and the 
relationship that exists among them.   
Problem 
Relevance 
This research attempts to answer the research question:  
How can we formulate a design theory to guide the analysis and design 
of Secure Semantic eBusiness processes? 
This is a relevant research question due to the following facts: 
i. Collaborating organizations must exchange information and 
knowledge resources in a coordinated and secure manner to 
efficiently conduct inter-organizational eBusiness processes.  
ii. Seamless knowledge exchange within and across organizations 
involved in secure business processes is critically needed. 
iii. Organizations engaged in collaborative inter-organizational 
processes continue to be plagued with semantic conflict issues and 
a lack of integration in heterogeneous systems. 
iv. The lack of process visibility across organizations mitigates the 
development of trust between the partner organizations. This is 
confounded by the lack of security knowledge regarding authorized 
access to resources.  
v. Extant literature does not explicitly consider or systematically 
represent component knowledge of resources such as description of 
skills and product knowledge; process knowledge including process 
workflow models; and security knowledge of authorized access for 
activities to resources within and across organizations.  
vi. Information systems methodology that includes security aspects 
in all stages is still needed (Baskerville, 1988). Siponen et al. (2006) 
argued that that existing SIS design methods fail to satisfy secure 
systems design requirements. 
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Guideline SSeBP Description 
Design 
Evaluation 
The utility and application of SSeBP was demonstrated using multiple 
evaluation methods from the IS knowledge base. 
i. It was demonstrated how the Collaborative Planning, Forecasting, 
and Replenishment (CPFR) approach can be mapped and enhanced 
by applying SSeBP design theory.  
ii. SSeBP design theory was validated by mapping real core business 
processes of a large apparel organization.  By using real core 
business processes, we capture both the information and 
knowledge, including component, process, and security knowledge 
related to the business processes and the richness of the 
organizational environment. 
iii. SSeBP design theory was empirically validated using situational 
awareness theory (Endsley, 1995). SSeBP design artifacts were 
empirically evaluated against the Enriched-Use Case (Siponen et 
al., 2006) and UML- activity diagram. 
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Guideline SSeBP Description 
Research 
Contribution 
i. SSeBP design theory provides practitioners with the meta-design 
and the design process, including the system features and systems 
principles, to guide the crafting of secure eBusiness processes that 
are semantically rich, highly coordinated and seamlessly integrated.  
ii. SSeBP design theory presents a novel and holistic approach that 
contributes to the IS knowledge base by filling an existing research 
gap in the area of design of information systems to support secure 
and coordinated eBusiness processes. 
iii. SSeBP is an IS design and action theory (Gregor, 2006) that allows 
IS researchers to understand the design principles needed to model 
secure semantic eBusiness process. 
iv. SSeBP provides design process and modeling concepts and 
grammar to guide the analysis and design of secure and 
semantically rich business processes. 
v. SSeBP offers eBusiness process conceptualizations that allow 
analysts to better explain the current and future security state of an 
eBusiness process. 
vi. SSeBP allows management to analyze and define the relationships 
between organizational roles and the activities that they perform. 
This leads to assurance of segregation of duty in the context of 
eBusiness processes. 
vii. SSeBP enables information and knowledge resources to be 
represented in a standard and unambiguous machine readable 
format. Common ontologies provide the foundation for semantic 
conflict resolution and seamless flow of information and 
knowledge among heterogeneous systems involved in an eBusiness 
process.   
Table 24. A Design Science approach for SSeBP   
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5.1. Implications 
Information Systems design science research must contribute to the IS knowledge 
base and provide an effective solution for relevant business problems.  
 
5.1.1. Theoretical Implications 
Theoretical implications of this research include the development and validation 
of a design theory (SSeBP). Current academic and practitioner literature in business 
process modeling does not address security requirements in the early stages. In addition, 
secure information systems design methods and business process modeling techniques 
are theoretically underdeveloped (Siponen et al. 2006; Soffer and Wand, 2007). There is 
still a need for information systems methodologies that include security requirements in 
all stages of development (Baskerville 1988, Apvrille and Pourzandi, 2005, Siponen et al. 
2006). SSeBP design theory presents a theoretical grounded and novel approach that 
contributes to the IS knowledge base by filling an existing research gap in the area of 
design of information systems that support secure and coordinated business processes. 
SSeBP design theory provides a security information systems methodology that 
incorporates security requirements and constraints into the analysis and design phases 
and considers security aspects as functional requirements. 
SSeBP design theory provides a sound framework that allows IS researchers to 
decompose the complexity of business processes into atomic-concepts and their 
relationships. SSeBP design theory provides an explicit and systematic way to represent 
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component knowledge of resources such as description of skills and product knowledge; 
process knowledge including process workflow models; and security knowledge of 
authorized access for activities to resources within and across organizations.  
We demonstrate, using a rigorous multi-evaluation approach, how SSeBP utilizes 
emerging technologies to solve semantic conflict issues, to prevent unauthorized access 
to resources, to foster knowledge exchange, and to integrate heterogeneous systems. This 
evaluation provides researchers with rich information and important guidelines that can 
be used to evaluate resulting IT artifacts. 
Theory for design and action prescribes “how to do something”. This type of 
theory provides a description of the method or structure or both for the construction of an 
artifact (Greegor, 2006). SSeBP design theory is an IS design and action theory (Gregor, 
2006) that allows IS researchers to understand the design principles needed to model 
secure semantic eBusiness processes. Specifically, SSeBP design theory prescribes the 
atomic concepts and the design-method needed to analyze and design secure semantic e-
Business processes. As Simon (1996, p.132) states, “solving a problem simply means 
representing it so as to make the solution transparent”. 
 
5.1.2. Practical Implications 
SSeBP design theory integrates streams of research in design science paradigm, 
eBusiness Process, authorization and Role-Based Access Control, ontology, coordination 
theory, and Description Logics (DL) and Semantic Web technologies. A business process 
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provides the context and global perspective to information and knowledge sharing within 
and across organizational boundaries. SSeBP design theory can be used to describe the 
roles, permissions, resources and security requirements by creating a standardized 
vocabulary that describes access control and security for distributed information and 
knowledge sharing. It provides practitioners with the meta-design and relevant examples 
that can be used to develop semantically rich models of business processes. These models 
can be verified through DL formalisms and can be converted to standardized machine-
interpretable knowledge representation. SSeBP provides an integrative mechanism for 
detailed analysis of business processes including the business enterprises and their agents 
involved, the roles they fulfill, the activities they perform and coordination mechanism 
and access control policies with respect to access and sharing of knowledge resources of 
organizations in a value chain.  
Organizations and practitioners would benefit from SSeBP in several ways. 
SSeBP design theory can help practitioners to analyze and enhance collaborative industry 
standards. We showed how the security of CPFR business processes can be enhanced by 
incorporating roles and permissions over resources and activities. SSeBP design artifact 
uses RBAC that allows for non-repudiation, auditing, and separation of duties mechanism 
much needed in collaborative business processes. Furthermore, SSeBP design theory 
provides the foundations for integrating heterogeneous data sources. SSeBP design 
artifacts can be used to develop semantic wrappers to dynamically feed CPFR data and 
information to ERP systems. Finally, a key success factor for CPFR is to integrate CPFR 
processes into existing business processes. In this context, SSeBP design theory provides 
 
150 
 
the atomic concepts, their relationships, and coordination mechanisms that can be used to 
analyze, map, and integrate existing business processes with CPFR’s processes. We 
strongly believe that the proposed IT artifact has the potential to benefit not only 
organizations that are planning to adopt CPFR, but also organizations that have adopted 
it.  
SSeBP design theory provides organizations with a design process, which 
establishes a set of principles and procedures to analyze and design secure eBusiness 
process. This facilitates the management of analysis and development activities and will 
result in more secure eBusiness processes. Moreover, management and analysts can 
utilize SSeBP design artifacts to have the whole picture about the different actors and 
resources involved in the execution of a specific business processes. In SSeBP design 
theory, roles specify organizational functions responsible for particular activities, which 
allow management to analyze and define the relationships between organizational roles 
and the activities that they perform. This leads to assurance of segregation of duty in the 
context of eBusiness processes. This, in turn, helps management with the modeling and 
analysis of organizational functions and responsibilities involved in an eBusiness 
Process. This allows for the inclusion of non-repudiation mechanisms into the analysis 
and design of eBusiness processes. Non-repudiation mechanisms lay the foundations for 
auditing, which is needed for compliance with regulations such as Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) 
and Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA). 
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SSeBP design artifacts allow analysts to identify and understand security 
requirements and constraints involved in a business process. SSeBP design theory enables 
the inclusion of security specifications as functional requirements early in the modeling 
and analysis of business processes; as a result analysts become more aware of security 
constraints and possible violations resulting in more secure eBusiness processes. This is 
very important in the design of inter-organizational business processes, where the lack of 
security knowledge regarding authorized access to resources hinders the development of 
trust between the partner organizations. 
SSeBP design theory can assist security analysts in developing technical and 
formal security controls needed for a secure eBusiness Process. Specifically, SSeBP 
design artifacts provide audit trial and segregation of duty mechanisms that can be used 
to develop technical and formal controls to ensure non-repudiation and authorized access 
to resources. In addition, SSeBP design artifacts enable information systems stakeholders 
to have a common understating of the security requirements and constraints involved in a 
specific eBusiness process. SSeBP design artifacts can be used to document existing and 
future eBusiness process. A common representation that is expressive and easy to 
understand by the stakeholders of the business process is a key factor for good 
requirements communication. Finally, SSeBP design artifacts can be used as a means of 
planning for eBusiness process security. Here, the security prediction generated by 
SSeBP design artifacts can be utilized by security analysts to predict the future security 
state of the business process in the event of a security threat. SSeBP design theory can be 
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proactively used to develop security mechanisms that would prevent security threats from 
happening or escalate. 
The SSeBP design theory enables information and knowledge resources to be 
represented in a standard and unambiguous machine readable format. Common 
ontologies provide the foundation for semantic conflict resolution and seamless flow of 
information and knowledge among heterogeneous systems involved in an eBusiness 
process.  A desirable outcome of enforcing the relationships between agents, business 
activities and resources is accountability of resource utilization and non-repudiation of 
business activities. When agents are allowed to fulfill organizational roles by performing 
business activities, their function is monitored for exceptions and logged for validation of 
authorization requirements. Roles specify organizational functions responsible for 
specific activities and provide mechanisms for non-repudiation and auditing. 
 
5.2. Limitations 
Although we diligently followed the design science guidelines proposed by 
Hevner et al. (2004), March and Smith (1995), Walls et al. (1992) and Vaishnavi et al. 
(2006) in this study, our research has some limitations.  
We base our observational and descriptive evaluations on the CPFR industry 
standard and apply the design artifact to a relevant case of a complex business problem of 
a large organization. While CPFR models are used by numerous organizations, one must 
be careful in drawing generalizations to other industry standards. Single cases and 
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analysis of industry standards have been used in research similar to ours. For example, 
Sikora and Shaw (1998) show the application of a multi-agent framework for 
coordination using a single case that illustrates a manufacturing problem in a printed 
circuit-boards facility.  Walls et al. (1995) provide a single example to explain the 
information system design theory for Vigilant Executive Information Systems (VIS). 
Nissen and Sengupta (2006) evaluate the application of agent technology to an e-
Procurement task.  Soffer and Wand (2007) present a generic process model and 
demonstrate its utility by application to the Supply Chain Operations Reference-model 
(SCOR).  
The CPFR model and the case study used in this research show a dyadic supply 
chain. Therefore, to increase the validity of SSeBP design artifacts, more complex 
relationships need to be analyzed. It is important to mention that this practice is a 
common one, given the difficulties that represent to model multi-echelon supply chains. 
For instance, Nissen and Sengupta (2006) show how intelligent agents can enhance 
supply chain performance. They conduct experiments to demonstrate that agents are 
capable of interacting in a marketplace with one buyer and one supplier. We evaluated 
our artifact using a multi-method approach, which includes observational, descriptive, 
and experimental. However, in order to increase the generalizability of the SSeBP design 
theory, we recommend further evaluations through simulations.  
Limitations of the experimental evaluation are related to the selected subjects and 
selected scenario. First, since subjects were information systems students, we must be 
careful in drawing generalizations from the findings to information systems professionals 
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in general.  However, extant literature recognizes that IS students resemble the 
characteristics of information systems and business analysts’ population (Bolloju and 
Leung, 2006; Porter et al., 1994; Jeyaraj and Sauter, 2007; Danesh and Kock, 2005; 
Agarwal and Sinha, 2003). Second, we used a simplified version of a “create order 
forecast” business process as the stimulus for the experimental evaluation. Even though 
this business process exhibits the characteristics of our problem domain, it represents a 
dyadic relationship between buyer and seller organizations. We recognize that real core 
business processes are usually more complex and larger in size. A danger of designing 
tasks for experiments is to select tasks that are either too complex or too easy for the 
subjects (Jarvenpaa et al., 1985).  We carefully selected and validated the scenario for the 
experiment and considered that given the amount of time needed to complete the 
experiment and expertise of the subjects, the selected scenario was appropriate.  
We developed and validated DLs for the atomic concepts represented in the 
secure activity-resource coordination diagrams. The DL formalisms serve as examples to 
illustrate the development of the formalisms for concepts and relationships needed to 
represent component, process, and security knowledge. While this serves the central 
theme of this research, the DL formalisms presented are not exhaustive. Future research 
would benefit the practitioner and researcher community by developing complete system 
knowledge representation DL formalisms that can form the basis for cross domain 
industry ontologies. Organizations and research groups, such as DERI (www.deri.org), 
are involved in such efforts. However, these efforts focus on EDI-type component 
descriptions and do not incorporate process and security knowledge to provide a 
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complete view of transparent information flows in secure and coordinated business 
processes. 
Despite these limitations, the approach presented in this dissertation is well 
grounded in kernel theories and it has been evaluated using a rigorous multi-methods 
approach.  
 
5.3. Future Research 
Quality research must also generate a new set of inquiries. Here, SSeBP design 
theory provides three lines of inquiries for IS research. First, the atomic concepts of 
SSeBP design theory include business enterprise, agents, roles, business activities, and 
resources. Research aimed at extending these atomic concepts to analyze and design 
information systems in general is needed. For instance, are those atomic concepts 
universal? Can accounting information systems be analyzed and designed using those 
atomic concepts? Are there any alternative sets of atomic concepts? Second, SSeBP 
design theory identifies a set of meta-requirements for designing secure and coordinated 
business processes. Here, new research aimed at establishing the completeness of those 
requirements is needed. Are those SSeBP meta-requirements a complete set? Are there 
any alternative sets of meta-requirements? Third, SSeBP design theory’s evaluation 
demonstrates that SSeBP design artifacts can be used to analyze and represent business 
processes in the context of apparel and retailing organizations; however, future research 
in different contexts is needed. Are SSeBP design artifacts effective in other business 
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context? For instance, the proposed design theory might be applied to enhance the 
security and interoperability of business processes in the areas of e-supply chain, e-
healthcare, and e-government.  
Another future research area includes qualitative studies aimed at factors that 
might affect the adoption of the type of IT artifact developed by applying SSeBP design 
theory. Here, research that answers the following questions is needed: What kind of 
enabler and inhibitor factors may affect the adoption of SSeBP design artifacts? What 
kind of organizations will benefit the most from the adoption of SSeBP design artifacts?  
Moreover, since the SSeBP design method natural path is to evolve into an IS 
methodology, an important area of research is about incorporating SSeBP design method 
into the IS curriculum. Is the SSeBP design method effective and easy to use? Can SSeBP 
design process be integrated into existing security information systems design methods?  
Experimental designs that include multiple tasks, different business processes, 
with different levels of complexity can be used to evaluate SSeBP design theory further. 
Here, the effect of tasks characteristics in the security awareness generated using the 
SSeBP design artifacts can be assessed. Does the complexity of the task play a role on the 
efficacy of the SSeBP artifact in creating security awareness? This type of experimental 
design increases the external validity of the experimental evaluation and helps to 
overcome the negative effects of learning effect. 
Cognitive fit theory (Vessey, 1991) states that problem solving is the outcome of 
the relationship between the external problem representation and the problem solving 
task. Agarwal et al. (1999) suggest that problem representation is a determinant of 
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performance, from the perspective of problem solving as well as comprehension.  In the 
context of SSeBP design theory, cognitive fit theory can be used to design an experiment 
that compares the performance obtained by subjects using SSeBP design artifacts against 
the performance obtained by subjects using existing security information systems 
methods in identifying business process security requirements and constraints. 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
 
Appendix A-CPFR Partnerships 
List of Buyers and Suppliers Participating in CPFR Partnerships 
 
Buyer Organizations 
10 Internal Affiliates 4 Retailers 850 n-Tier Partners 
Ace Hardware Albertson’s Best Buy 
Canadian Tire CVS Dansk 
Dealers Delhaize le Lion Distributors 
Do It Best Eckerd Federated Department Stores 
H.E. Butt Home Depot J.C. Penny 
Jusco Londis Marshall Field’s 
Match Supermarket McDonald’s US/ McDonald’s France Mijer 
Mervyn’s Radio Shack RiteAid 
Royal Ahold RONA Safeway/Safeway UK 
Safe Sainsbury SAKS 
Sears Roebuck Somerfield Sports Authority 
Staples Superdrug Target 
Tesco Tru Value Walgreens 
Wal-Mart Wickes Furniture Woolworth UK 
Supplier Organizations 
12 Suppliers 20+ Suppliers Ashley Furniture 
Ball Sports Black & Decker Broyhill 
Channel Chapin Colgate-Palmolive 
Compaq Eastman Chemicals ECPG3 
Eli Lily Feather Fruit Growers’ Cooperative FujiFilm 
GE Appliances General Mills Genovs 
Georgia Pacific Harley-Davidson Hasbro 
Heineken Henkel Herlitz 
Hewlett-Packard HYKo Inland Paperboard & Packaging 
International Paper John Deere Johnson & Johnson 
Kao Kimberly Clark Kraft 
Lever-Fabrege Levi Strauss Liquid Nails 
Liz Claiborne Manco Mars 
Master Lock Meriat Mitsubishi Motor 
Nestle UK New Balance Panasonic 
Philips Consumer Pillowtex Polo Ralph Lauren 
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List of Buyers and Suppliers Participating in CPFR Partnerships 
 Proctor & Gamble Reynolds Metal Sara Lee 
Schering-Plough Solo Cup Unilever Argentina 
Vandemoortele of Belgium Warner-Lambert Woodstream 
Source: Schwarz, L. (2004)  
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Appendix B-Description Logics 
Appendix B-1. Seller agent creates order forecast activity to coordinate order 
forecast 
CreateOrderForecast  ⊆ (BusinessActivity) ∧ 
           (= 1 IsPerformedby.SellerRole) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. POSData) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. ForecastImpactEvents) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. InventoryStrategy ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. CurrentInventory ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. SalesForecast ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes.  OrderForecast) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. ExceptionResolutionData ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. ItemManagementData ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. CapacityLimitations ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. HistoricalDemandShipment ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. OrderShipmentData ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowProduces. OrderForecast) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionRead. POSData) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionRead. ForecastImpactEvents) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionRead. InventoryStrategy ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionRead. CurrentInventory ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionRead. SalesForecast ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionRead.  OrderForecast) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionRead. ExceptionResolutionData ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionRead. ItemManagementData ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionRead. CapacityLimitations ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionRead. HistoricalDemandShipment ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionRead. OrderShipmentData ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionRead. OrderForecast) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionWrite. OrderForecast) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionCreate. OrderForecast)  
 
Appendix B-2. Sellers create their order forecast using standardized ontology for 
specifying the resource 
  OrderForecast ⊆ (Resource) ∧ 
      (= 1 IsOwnedBy⋅ Seller)∧ 
      (= 1 hasID .8)∧ 
   (=1 CoordinatesFlowProducedBy.CreateOrderForecast )∧ 
   (= 1 CoordinatesFlowConsumedBy . GenerateOrder) ∧ 
  (=1 Permits .CreateOrderForecast )∧ 
  (= 1 Permits . GenerateOrder) ∧ 
  (=1 hasCharacteristics. ForecastType) ∧ 
  (=1 hasCharacteristics. GenerationDate) ∧ 
  (=1 hasCharacteristics. StartDate) ∧ 
  (=1 hasCharacteristics. EndDate) ∧ 
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  (=1 hasCharacteristics. ProductID) ∧ 
  (=1 hasCharacteristics.Quantity) ∧ 
  (=1 hasCharacteristics.ChangeRestrictionIndicator)  
 
Appendix B-3. The seller agent generates order activity to coordinate order 
GenerateOrder ⊆ (BusinessActivity) ∧ 
           (= 1 IsPerformedby.SellerRole) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. Order) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. ItemManagementData) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. OrderForecast ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowProduces. Order) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionRead. Order) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionRead. ItemManagementData) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionRead. OrderForecast) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionRead. Order) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionWrite. Order) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionCreate. Order)  
 
Appendix B-4. Sellers communicate their order data using standardized ontology 
for specifying the resource 
  Order ⊆ (Resource) ∧ 
      (= 1 IsOwnedBy⋅ Buyer)∧ 
      (= 1 hasID .9)∧ 
   (=1 CoordinatesFlowProducedBy.CommunicateOrder )∧ 
   (= 1 CoordinatesFlowConsumedBy . GenerateOrder) ∧  
   (=1 Permits .CommunicateOrder )∧ 
   (= 1 Permits . GenerateOrder)  
 
Appendix B-5. Seller planning agent communicates adjustments to coordinate the 
Create Order Forecast activity 
 CommunicateAdjustments    ⊆ (BusinessActivity) ∧ 
           (= 1 IsPerformedby.SellerPlanningRole) ∧ 
            (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowProduces. Adjustments) ∧ 
            (= 1 Has PermissionRead. Adjustments) ∧ 
            (= 1 HasPermissionWrite. Adjustments) 
 
Appendix B-6. Buyers receive adjustments using standardized ontology for 
specifying the resource 
Adjustments  ⊆ (Resource) ∧ 
    (= 1 IsOwnedBy⋅ Buyer)∧ 
            (= 1 hasID .7)∧ 
            (= 1 CoordinatesFlowProducedBy . CommunicateAdjustments ) ∧ 
    (= 1 CoordinatesFlowConsumedBy . ReceiveAdjustments) ∧ 
            (= 1 Permits . CommunicateAdjustments) ∧ 
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    (= 1 Permits . ReceiveAdjustments) ∧  
(>= 1 hasCharacteristics. ProductID) ∧  
(>= 1 hasCharacteristics. RightQuantity) ∧  
(>= 1 hasCharacteristics. Date)  
  
Appendix B-7. The buyer planning agent receives adjustments to coordinate the 
Create Order Forecast activity 
ReceiveAdjustments    ⊆ (BusinessActivity) ∧ 
           (= 1 IsPerformedby.BuyerPlanningRole) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumedBy. Adjustments) ∧ 
           (= 1 Has PermissionRead. Adjustments)  
 
Appendix B-8. Activity Creates Order Forecast, which is performed by the seller 
forecast agent 
CreateOrderForecast  ⊆ (BusinessActivity) ∧ 
           (= 1 IsPerformedby.SellerForecastRole) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. POSData) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. EventsCalendar) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. InventoryStrategy ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. AvailableStock ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. SalesForecast ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes.  OrderForecast) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. ExceptionResolutionData ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. ItemManagementData ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. HistoricalDemandShipment ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. OrderShipmentData ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowConsumes. CPFRPolicies ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationFlowProduces. OrderForecast) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationRead. POSData) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationRead. EventsCalendar) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationRead. InventoryStrategy ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationRead. AvailableStock ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationRead. SalesForecast ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationRead.  OrderForecast) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationRead. ExceptionResolutionData ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationRead. ItemManagementData ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationRead. HistoricalDemandShipment ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationRead. OrderShipmentData ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasCoordinationRead. CPFRPolicies ) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionWrite. OrderForecast) ∧ 
           (= 1 HasPermissionCreate. OrderForecast)  
 
Appendix B-9. Sellers create their order forecast using standardized ontology for 
specifying the resource 
  OrderForecast ⊆ (Resource) ∧ 
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      (= 1 IsOwnedBy⋅ Seller)∧ 
      (= 1 hasID .12)∧ 
  (=1 CoordinatesFlowProducedBy.CreateOrderForecast )∧ 
  (= 1 CoordinatesFlowConsumedBy . GenerateOrder) ∧ 
  (=1 Permits .CreateOrderForecast )∧ 
  (= 1 Permits . GenerateOrder) ∧ 
  (=1 hasCharacteristics. ForecastType) ∧ 
  (=1 hasCharacteristics. GenerationDate) ∧ 
  (=1 hasCharacteristics. StartDate) ∧ 
  (=1 hasCharacteristics. EndDate) ∧ 
  (>=1 hasCharacteristics. ProductID) ∧ 
  (>=1 hasCharacteristics.Quantity) ∧ 
  (>=1 hasCharacteristics.MinQuantity) ∧ 
  (>=1 hasCharacteristics.MaxQuantity) ∧ 
     (>=1 hasCharacteristics.ChangeRestrictionIndicator) 
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Appendix C- Institutional Review Board Office (IRB) of Research 
Compliance (ORC) at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro 
acceptance Document and Project Description 
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Appendix D- Experiment Material 
Questions and Scenario for SSeBP Design Theory Experimental Evaluation 
Note: Two types of instruments were used for the study. The difference between the 
instruments is that the order in which Part III and IV are presented. 
Part I 
Subject’s Characteristics 
1. Gender:  Male     Female                    
2. Age in years (check one):  
 Less than 18 years   18-25        26-35        
 36-55      More than 55 years  
 
If you are UNDER 18 years of age, Please do NOT complete this survey. 
3. Currently, what is your highest level of education? (Check one):   
 High School   Some years of college  Bachelors Degree; 
Major:______________ 
Masters Degree; Degree______________   Doctorate Degree; 
Degree______________  
4. Please choose the option that best describes your current occupation status (check 
one): 
 Full time Employee; Number of years of experience______________; Job 
Title:___________________ 
 Part time Employee; Number of years of experience______________; Job 
Title:___________________           
  Self-employed;  Number of years of experience______________; Job 
Title:___________________ 
 Full time College Student          Other: __________ 
5. Please specify your Experience using System Development Methodologies (SDM) 
  No experience in SDM            College experience in SDM          Industrial 
experience in SDM   
 
6. Please specify your level of experience using the following Unified Modeling 
Language (UML) techniques 
UML Technique In School  At Work 
Sequence Diagrams Years_____ Months_____ Years_____ Months_____ 
Activity Diagrams Years_____ Months_____ Years_____ Months_____ 
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Use Case Diagrams Years_____ Months_____ Years_____ Months_____ 
Class Diagrams Years_____ Months_____ Years_____ Months_____ 
State Transition Diagrams Years_____ Months_____ Years_____ Months_____ 
Other:_____________ Years_____ Months_____ Years_____ Months_____ 
 
 
 
7. Please specify your level of experience using the following business process 
modeling techniques: 
Business Process Modeling 
Technique 
In School At Work 
Business Process Modeling 
Notation (BPMN)      
Years_____ Months_____ Years_____ Months_____ 
Event-Driven Process 
Chains (EPC) 
Years_____ Months_____ Years_____ Months_____ 
Role Activities Diagrams  Years_____ Months_____ Years_____ Months_____ 
Process Description Capture 
Method (IDEF3) 
Years_____ Months_____ Years_____ Months_____ 
Other:_____________ Years_____ Months_____ Years_____ Months_____ 
 
8. Please specify your level of experience using any of the following: 
 In School At Work 
Gathering Information 
Security Requirements 
Years_____ Months_____ Years_____ Months_____ 
Analyzing Information 
Security Requirements 
Years_____ Months_____ Years_____ Months_____ 
Modeling Information 
Security Requirements 
Years_____ Months_____ Years_____ Months_____ 
Other:_____________ Years_____ Months_____ Years_____ Months_____ 
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Part II: Please read the description about the “Create Order Forecast 
Business Process” 
Scenario I: “Create Order Forecast Business Process” 
The ”create order forecast” business process takes place between a retailer (i.e.: buyer) 
and a manufacturer (i.e.: seller) organization. Here, retailers and manufacturers must 
work together to estimate future orders needs. In other words, they must determine the 
right products and their quantities that must be ordered for the next planning period.  
Accurate order forecasts drive sales increases, improve customer service, and support 
better inventory decisions. 
The process is triggered at the beginning of each planning period.  Here, the retailer 
(buyer) organization consolidates its point of sales (POS) data and generates an initial 
prediction of its sales for the next planning period (sales forecast).  Such information, 
along with the available stock, the promotions and event calendars (i.e.: weather, school 
season, holidays,  etc.), and the historical order shipment data is then retrieved by the 
manufacturer (seller) organization to generate an initial sales forecast.  
At this point, the buyer and the seller organization with the assistance of a collaborative 
information system must compare their initial estimates to reach an agreement. Basically, 
the collaborative system retrieves information about the buyer inventory strategies, seller 
order shipment data, and collaborative policies (i.e.: CPFR policies), to determine any 
differences and/or errors that might exist in the initial sales forecast.  Finally, the 
collaborative system produces the exceptions resolution data that is used to make the 
corrections or adjustments to the seller and buyer sales forecast.   
1. Please specify your level of experience in School about the business process 
described before: 
a) None 
b) Less than 6 months 
c) More than 6 months and less than 1 years 
d) More than 1 year and less than 2 years 
e) More than 2 years 
2. Please specify your level of experience at Work about the business process described 
before: 
a) None 
b) Less than 6 months 
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c) More than 6 months and less than 1 years 
d) More than 1 year and less than 2 years 
e) More than 2 years 
 
 
Part III 
The following Enriched Use Case and Activity Diagrams correspond to the business 
process of “create order forecast” describe in scenario I, part II.  
Figure 1. Enriched Use Case 
Use Case: Create Order Forecast 
Scenario: Create a new Order Forecast 
Brief Description: Determining the right products and quantities that must be 
ordered for the next planning period 
Actors/Security 
Subjects: 
Buyer and Seller 
Security 
Classification of 
the subject: 
All Data Sources are confidential 
 
Security Objects 
and Access Types 
to Security 
Objects: 
Object:  Buyer Forecast and Inventory Database (the buyer 
must be able to read and write  sales forecast, point of sales 
(POS) Data, and to read  Inventory Strategy) 
 
Object:  Seller Forecast and Inventory Database (the seller must 
be able to read  sales forecast, POS Data, Available Stock, 
Events Calendar, Historical Order Shipment Data) 
 
Object:  Collaborative Planning and Replenishment 
Database(the collaborative systems must be able to read order 
shipment, CPFR policies, Inventory Strategy and Item 
Management Data.  The collaborative system must be able to 
read and write the seller and buyer adjustment forecast and the 
order forecast) 
 
Security 
Policy/Specific 
Security 
Restrictions 
Buyer and Seller are only allowed to access security objects 
classified as confidential with the planning and replenishment 
department 
Preconditions: All the Data Sources exists  
Flow of Events: Actor: 
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 9. The buyer generates and consolidates its point of sales (POS 
Data)  
10. The buyer generates the initial Sales forecast 
11. The seller retrieves the buyer’s POS data, available stock, 
events calendars, and historical order shipment data. 
12. The seller generates an initial Sales forecast 
13. The buyer sends its inventory strategy 
14. The seller sends the order shipment data and retrieve CFPR 
policies and Item Management Data 
15. The collaborative system generates the exceptions 
resolution data 
16. The collaborative system generates the adjustments to the 
seller and buyer Sales forecast  
Exception 
Conditions: 
If information about any object is not available, an appropriate 
error message is produced. 
 
 
 
How to Read an Activity Diagram 
Figure 2 shows an example of an Activity Diagram. Here, the process begins when Actor 1 
executes Activity 1, which is needed to complete Activity 2, which is executed by Actor 2. Then 
in order for Actor 2 to execute Activity 4, both Activity 3 and Activity 2 must be completed first. 
Notice that, the process ends after Activity 4 is completed. 
Figure 2.  Activity Diagram 
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Figure 3. Activity Diagram 
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Please answer the following questions based on the description and 
diagrams provided above (Figure 1-Page 4 and Figure 3-Page 5). 
1. Can the Forecasting analyst from the seller organization perform the Retrieve Events 
Calendar activity? Yes___  No___ 
2. Why? Because 
a) Only the Buyer Planning analyst has permission to Read the Events Calendar 
information 
b) Only the Seller Forecasting analyst has permission to Read the Events Calendar 
information 
c) Only the Seller Planning analyst has permission to Read the Events Calendar 
information 
d) All analysts have permission to Create/Write/ Read the Events Calendar 
information 
e) It cannot be determined from the information given 
f) I do not know 
3. What would happen if the Forecasting analyst from the seller organization cannot 
perform the Retrieve Events Calendar activity?   
a) The Generate Exceptions activity would not be performed 
b) The execution of the remaining activities would not be affected 
c) The Generate Seller Initial Sales forecast activity would not be performed 
d) The Communicate Inventory Strategy activity would not be performed 
e) It cannot be determined from the information given 
f) I do not know 
4. Who has permission to perform the Communicate Inventory Strategy activity? 
i) Buyer Planning Analyst 
j) Buyer Replenishment Analyst 
k) Seller Planning Analyst 
l) Seller Forecasting Analyst 
m) All 
n) None 
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o) It cannot be determined from the 
information given 
p) I do not know 
5. Why? Because 
g) The Buyer Replenishment Analyst has permission to Read the Inventory 
Strategy information 
h) The Seller Planning Analyst has permission to Read the Inventory Strategy 
information 
i) All analysts have permission to Read the Inventory Strategy information 
j) Nobody has permission over the Inventory Strategy Information 
k) It cannot be determined from the information given 
l) I do not know 
6. What would happen if the Replenishment analyst from the buyer organization does 
not have permission to read the Inventory Strategy information? 
g) The Communicate Order Shipment activity would not be performed 
h) The Generate Exceptions Order Forecast activity would not be performed 
i) The execution of the remaining activities would not be affected 
j) The Generate Buyer Initial Sales forecast activity would not be performed 
k) It cannot be determined from the information given 
l) I do not know 
 
7. Who has permission to perform the Generate Exceptions Order Forecast activity? 
a) Buyer Planning Analyst 
b) Buyer Replenishment 
Analyst 
c) Seller Planning Analyst 
d) Seller Forecasting Analyst 
e) All 
f) None 
g) It cannot be determined from 
the information given 
h) I do not know 
8. Why? Because 
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a) The Buyer Planning Analyst has permission to Read the Inventory Strategy 
information 
b) The Seller Planning Analyst has permission to Create/Write/ Read the 
Exceptions Resolution information 
c) All analysts have permission to Create/Write/ Read the Exceptions Resolution 
information 
d) Nobody has permission over the Exceptions Resolution information 
e) It cannot be determined from the information given 
f) I do not know 
9. What would happen if the Replenishment analyst from the buyer organization does 
not have permission to perform the Generate Exceptions Order Forecast? 
a) The Generate Exceptions activity would not be performed 
b) The execution of the remaining activities would not be affected 
c) The Generate Buyer Initial Sales forecast activity would not be performed 
d) It cannot be determined from the information given 
e) I do not know 
10. What kind of permission has the Generate POS data activity on the POS Data?  
a) Delete 
b) Write 
c) Create 
d) Write/Delete 
e) Create/Write/Read 
f) It cannot be determined from the information given 
g) I do not know 
11. Why? Because 
a) Generate POS data activity has permissions to Read POS data  
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b) Generate POS data activity has permissions to Create/Write/Read  POS data  
c) Generate POS data activity does not has permissions over POS data  
d) It cannot be determined from the information given 
e) I do not know 
12. What would happen if Generate POS Data activity does not have the right permission 
over POS Data? 
a) The execution of the remaining activities would not be affected 
b) The communicate sales forecast activity would not be performed 
c) The Communicate Order Shipment activity would not be performed 
d) The Generate POS  Data activity would not be performed 
e) It cannot be determined from the information given 
f) I do not know 
13. Can the CPFR Policies information be Deleted by the Generate POS Data activity? 
Yes___  No___   
14. Why? Because 
a) The Generate POS Data Activity has permission to Delete the CPFR Policies 
information 
b) The Generate POS Data Activity has only permission to Create/Write/Read 
the POS Data  
c) The Buyer Planning analyst has permission to Create/Write/Read the CPFR 
Policies information 
d) Nobody has permission over the CPFR Policies information 
e) It cannot be determined from the information given 
f) I do not know 
15. What would happen if the Communicate CPFR Policies activity cannot be performed 
by the Planning Analyst from the seller organization? 
a) The execution of the remaining activities would not be affected 
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b) The Generate Buyer Initial Sales forecast activity would not be performed 
c) The Generate POS  Data activity would not be performed 
d) The Generate Exceptions Order Forecast activity would not be performed 
e) It cannot be determined from the information given 
f) I do not know 
16. Can the activity Generate Exceptions Order Forecast be executed before retrieving 
POS Data? Yes___  No___   
17. Can the activity Generate Exceptions Order Forecast be executed before retrieving 
CPFR Policies? Yes___  No___ 
18. Can the activity Generate Initial Sales forecast for the Buyer organization be 
executed before communicating the sales forecast activity? Yes___  No___  
19. Can the activity Generate Exceptions Order Forecast be executed before generating 
the Order Shipment information? Yes___  No___  
20. Can the activity Retrieve POS Data be executed after the retrieve initial sales 
forecast activity for the Seller organization? Yes___  No__ 
Based on your experience, circle your level of agreement with each statement using 
the following scale:   
1=  2              3                        4               5  
Strongly           Somewhat       Neutral            Somewhat              Strongly  
Disagree          Disagree                                    Agree                         Agree  
 
  1                             5 
Strongly             Strongly
Disagree             Agree 
21. These diagrams help me to identify the security 
aspects of a business process 
1       2       3       4      5       
22. These diagrams help me to understand the security 
aspects of a business process 
1       2       3       4      5       
23. These diagrams help me to determine what would 
happen with the business process when  security 
aspects are violated 
1       2       3       4      5       
24. The security aspects depicted in the diagrams are  
easy to understand 
1       2       3       4      5       
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25. Representations of processes using this approach are 
clear 
1       2       3       4      5       
26. Representations of processes using this approach 
provide useful security information 
1       2       3       4      5       
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part IV 
Figure 4 shows an example of the modeling concepts and grammar used to design a Secure 
Activity Resource Coordination Diagram. Here, in order to produce the information/data 
resource 2,  Organizational Role2, which is only  fulfilled by Agent 2, must perform Business 
Activity 2, which uses or consumes the Information/Data Resource 1 that is produced or 
generated by the Business Activity1. In addition, Business Activity1 is performed only by the 
Organizational Role1, which is only fulfilled by Agent 1. Each activity has permission over 
specific resources and resources permits activities to be performed on them. Permissions type 
includes create, read, write and delete. For instance, Business Activity 1 has read permission 
over the information/data resource 1. Business Activity 2 has create/read/write permissions over 
the information/data resource 2. Notice, that one activity cannot interact with another activity, 
and that activities are performed by specific organizational roles. 
Figure 4. Secure Activity Resource Coordination Modeling Concepts and Grammar  
 
How to Read a Role-Activity-Resource Permissions Table 
Figure5 shows an example of the Agent- Role-Activity-Resource Permissions Table used to 
represent the security policies and constraints related to specific activities and information 
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resources involved in a business process. Here Agent1 fulfills Role1 which in turn performs 
Business Activity 1.  Business Activity 1 has permission to create, write, and read the 
Data/Information Resource 1.  
Figure 5. shows an example of the Role-Activity-Resource Permissions Table  
Agent Role Business 
Activity 
Permission Type Resource 
Agent 1 Role1 Business 
Activity 1 
Create/Write/Read Data/Information 
Resource 1 
 
The following Secure Activity Resource Coordination Diagram (figure 6) and Role-
Activity-Resource Permissions Table (figure 7) correspond to the business process of 
“create order forecast”.   
Note: Agents are similar to Actors. For instance, analysts, students are actors; 
therefore, they are also agents. 
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Figure 7. Role-Activity-Resource Permissions Table 
Agent Role Business 
Activity 
Permission Type Resource 
Buyer 
Planning 
Agent 
Buyer 
Planning Role 
Generate 
POS Data 
Create/Write/Read POS Data 
  Generate 
Buyer Initial 
Sales 
Forecast 
Create/Write/Read Buyer Initial 
Forecast 
Sales 
   Read POS Data, 
Sales 
Forecast 
Buyer 
Replenishment 
Agent 
Buyer 
Replenishment 
Role 
Communicate 
Sales 
Forecast 
Read Sales 
Forecast 
  Communicate 
Inventory 
Strategy 
Read Inventory 
Strategy 
  Communicate 
Exceptions 
Resolution 
Data 
Read Exceptions 
Resolution 
Data 
Seller 
Forecasting 
Agent 
Seller 
Forecasting 
Role 
Retrieve POS 
Data 
Read POS Data 
  Retrieve 
Sales 
Forecast 
Read Sales 
Forecast 
  Generate 
Seller Initial 
Sales 
Forecast 
Create/Write/Read Seller Initial 
Sales 
Forecast 
   Read POS Data, 
Sales 
Forecast, 
Available 
Stock, 
Events 
Calendar, 
Historical 
Demand 
Shipment 
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Agent Role Business 
Activity 
Permission Type Resource 
Data 
Seller 
Planning 
Agent 
Seller 
Planning Role 
Retrieve 
Available 
Stock 
Read Available 
Stock 
  Retrieve 
Events 
Calendar 
Read Events 
Calendar 
  Communicate 
Historical 
Demand & 
Shipment 
Data 
Read Historical 
Demand  & 
Shipment 
Data 
  Communicate 
Order 
Shipment 
Read Order 
Shipment 
  Communicate 
CPFR 
Policies 
Read CPFR 
Policies 
  Communicate 
Item 
Management 
Data 
Read Item 
Management 
Data 
  Generate 
Exceptions 
Order 
Forecast 
Read Inventory 
Strategy, 
Buyer Initial 
Sales 
Forecast, 
Seller Initial 
Sales 
Forecast, 
Order 
Shipment, 
CPFR 
Policies, 
Item 
Management 
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Agent Role Business 
Activity 
Permission Type Resource 
Data 
   Create/Write/Read Exceptions 
Resolution 
Data  
  Communicate 
Exceptions 
Resolution 
Data 
Read Exceptions 
Resolution 
Data  
 
Please answer the following questions based on the description and 
diagrams provided above (Figure 6-Page 10 and Figure 7-Page 11). 
1. Can the Forecasting analyst from the seller organization perform the Retrieve Events 
Calendar activity? Yes___  No___ 
2. Why? Because 
a) Only the Buyer Planning analyst has permission to Read the Events Calendar 
information 
b) Only the Seller Forecasting analyst has permission to Read the Events 
Calendar information 
c) Only the Seller Planning analyst has permission to Read the Events Calendar 
information 
d) All analysts have permission to Create/Write/ Read the Events Calendar 
information 
e) It cannot be determined from the information given 
f) I do not know 
3. What would happen if the Forecasting analyst from the seller organization cannot 
perform the Retrieve Events Calendar activity?   
a) The Generate Exceptions activity would not be performed 
b) The execution of the remaining activities would not be affected 
c) The Generate Seller Initial Sales forecast activity would not be performed 
d) The Communicate Inventory Strategy activity would not be performed 
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e) It cannot be determined from the information given 
f) I do not know 
4. Who has permission to perform the Communicate Inventory Strategy activity? 
a) Buyer Planning Analyst 
b) Buyer Replenishment 
Analyst 
c) Seller Planning Analyst 
d) Seller Forecasting Analyst 
e) All 
f) None 
g) It cannot be determined from 
the information given 
h) I do not know 
5. Why? Because 
a) The Buyer Replenishment Analyst has permission to Read the Inventory 
Strategy information 
b) The Seller Planning Analyst has permission to Read the Inventory Strategy 
information 
c) All analysts have permission to Read the Inventory Strategy information 
d) Nobody has permission over the Inventory Strategy Information 
e) It cannot be determined from the information given 
f) I do not know 
6. What would happen if the Replenishment analyst from the buyer organization does 
not have permission to read the Inventory Strategy information? 
a) The Communicate Order Shipment activity would not be performed 
b) The Generate Exceptions Order Forecast activity would not be performed 
c) The execution of the remaining activities would not be affected 
d) The Generate Buyer Initial Sales forecast activity would not be performed 
e) It cannot be determined from the information given 
f) I do not know 
7. Who has permission to perform the Generate Exceptions Order Forecast activity? 
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a) Buyer Planning Analyst 
b) Buyer Replenishment 
Analyst 
c) Seller Planning Analyst 
d) Seller Forecasting Analyst 
e) All 
f) None 
g) It cannot be determined from 
the information given 
h) I do not know 
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8. Why? Because 
a) The Buyer Planning Analyst has permission to Read the Inventory Strategy 
information 
b) The Seller Planning Analyst has permission to Create/Write/ Read the Exceptions 
Resolution information 
c) All analysts has permission to Create/Write/ Read the Exceptions Resolution 
information 
d) Nobody have  permission over the Exceptions Resolution information 
e) It cannot be determined from the information given 
f) I do not know 
9. What would happen if the Replenishment analyst from the buyer organization does 
not have permission to perform the Generate Exceptions Order Forecast? 
a) The Generate Exceptions activity would not be performed 
b) The execution of the remaining activities would not be affected 
c) The Generate Buyer Initial Sales forecast activity would not be performed 
d) It cannot be determined from the information given 
e) I do not know 
10. What kind of permission has the Generate POS data activity on the POS Data?  
a) Delete 
b) Write 
c) Create 
d) Write/Delete 
e) Create/Write/Read 
f) It cannot be determined from the information given 
g) I do not know 
11. Why? Because 
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a) Generate POS data activity has permissions to Read POS data  
b) Generate POS data activity has permissions to Create/Write/Read  POS data  
c) Generate POS data activity does not has permissions over POS data  
d) It cannot be determined from the information given 
e) I do not know 
12. What would happen if Generate POS Data activity does not have the right permission 
over POS Data? 
a) The execution of the remaining activities would not be affected 
b) The communicate sales forecast activity would not be performed 
c) The Communicate Order Shipment activity would not be performed 
d) The Generate POS  Data activity would not be performed 
e) It cannot be determined from the information given 
f) I do not know 
13. Can the CPFR Policies information be Deleted by the Generate POS Data activity? 
Yes___  No___   
14. Why? Because 
a) The Generate POS Data Activity has permission to Delete the CPFR Policies 
information 
b) The Generate POS Data Activity has only permission to Create/Write/Read the 
POS Data  
c) The Buyer Planning analyst has permission to Create/Write/Read the CPFR 
Policies information 
d) Nobody has permission over the CPFR Policies information 
e) It cannot be determined from the information given 
f) I do not know 
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15. What would happen if the Communicate CPFR Policies activity cannot be performed 
by the Planning Analyst from the seller organization? 
a) The execution of the remaining activities would not be affected 
b) The Generate Buyer Initial Sales forecast activity would not be performed 
c) The Generate POS  Data activity would not be performed 
d) The Generate Exceptions Order Forecast activity would not be performed 
e) It cannot be determined from the information given 
f) I do not know 
16. Can the activity Generate Exceptions Order Forecast be executed before retrieving 
POS Data? Yes___  No___   
17. Can the activity Generate Exceptions Order Forecast be executed before retrieving 
CPFR Policies? Yes___  No___ 
18. Can the activity Generate Initial Sales forecast for the Buyer organization be 
executed before communicating the sales forecast activity? Yes___  No___  
19. Can the activity Generate Exceptions Order Forecast be executed before generating 
the Order Shipment information? Yes___  No___  
20. Can the activity Retrieve POS Data be executed after the retrieve initial sales 
forecast activity for the Seller organization? Yes___  No__ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Based on your experience, circle your level of agreement with each statement using the 
following scale:   
1=  2              3                        4               5  
Strongly           Somewhat       Neutral            Somewhat              Strongly  
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Disagree          Disagree                                    Agree                         Agree  
 
  1                             5 
Strongly         Strongly 
Disagree             Agree 
21. These diagrams help me to identify the security 
aspects of a business process 
1       2       3       4      5       
22. These diagrams help me to understand the security 
aspects of a business process 
1       2       3       4      5       
23. These diagrams help me to determine what would 
happen with the business process when  security 
aspects are violated 
1       2       3       4      5       
24. The security aspects depicted in the diagrams are  
easy to understand 
1       2       3       4      5       
25. Representations of processes using this approach 
are clear 
1       2       3       4      5       
26. Representations of processes using this approach 
provide useful security information 
1       2       3       4      5       
 
 
 
 
 
